Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech last week at the United Nations highlighted once again the centrality of the Gaza Strip to any understanding of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. It is impossible to discuss the impasse currently facing the peace process without addressing the Gaza Strip and, in particular, Israel’s “disengagement” from the Strip. Netanyahu expressed a position shared by many Israelis, who see in the Gaza Strip a nightmare scenario of what is liable to happen if Israel leaves the West Bank, and particularly if it does so without an agreement. We left Gaza, Netanyahu declared, and the radicals gained strength.

However, developments in Gaza in recent years would seem to impart a different lesson – one that Netanyahu failed to mention in his speech. Netanyahu linked between Israel’s “disengagement” and the strengthening of Hamas, but that is not where Israel’s policy towards Gaza ended. The closure policy that soon followed, and which is still in effect, has been the subject of growing criticism by Israeli journalists, commentators and researchers who have argued that rather than fulfilling its explicit objective of weakening Hamas, the policy has actually achieved the opposite outcome.

In a previous post, we presented a collection of comments from the past year supporting this conclusion. Additional commentators and public figures have since added their voices to this growing chorus. In the past, Ofer Shelah (Hebrew), Amos Harel and Dan Margalit (Hebrew) have called for the removal of the closure. Dr. Zvi Bar’el, a senior commentator for Ha’aretz, has been arguing this position for several years. Barel urged an end to the closure, arguing that it is not only ineffective, but also damaging to Israel’s foreign relations. The Institute for National Security Studies also published a position paper suggesting that Israel should negotiate with Turkey to permit the entry of ships to the Gaza Strip after security inspection.

While the closure is ineffective, the easings announced by Israel in 2010 have proven beneficial. As Danny Rubinstein demonstrated in an article in Calcalist, the easings have had a significant impact on Hamas rule in the Strip. Rubinstein argues that the closure actually improves Hamas’ standing, since the organization relies heavily on taxes and levies raised on the smuggling of imports through the tunnels along the border at Rafah. Accordingly, the easing struck a blow at one of the organization’s main sources of income. Rubinstein bases his assessment, in part, on a report by the Peres Center for Peace. The report finds that Hamas has leveraged trade restrictions imposed by Israel in order to secure economic benefits. As a result, the movement’s annual budget rose from $40 million in 2006 to approximately $500 million in 2010. A report published by UNRWA on the same day shows that the closure has helped strengthen the public sector in the Gaza Strip, which is controlled by Hamas, while at the same time leading to the collapse of the private sector.

Ironically, Prime Minister Netanyahu himself made this point cogently in an interview with Ayala Hasson on July 2, 2010 (Hebrew). “I think that the civilian closure will damage the security closure”, Netanyahu commented. “Instead of strengthening our position and our demands of Hamas, it has actually begun to erode our moral superiority”.

Netanyahu also claimed in the interview that Israel had removed the civilian closure imposed on the Gaza Strip. However, the easings do not entail the complete removal of the closure. Israel continues to prevent movement of people and goods from the Gaza Strip. This policy has exacteda heavy toll: over seventy percent of the residents of the Gaza Strip received humanitarian assistance and the unemployment rate is 25.6 percent.

Maybe the time has come to stop seeing the Gaza Strip as Israel’s doomsday scenario. The time has certainly come to stop regarding the situation in Gaza as an immutable fact. The closure imposed on the Gaza Strip has remained in place since 2007. During this period, the civilian economy in Gaza has collapsed, and Palestinians living in the Strip have been denied the right to visit their families, study or engage in commerce in the West Bank. To date, the closure has not helped stop the firing of rockets, bring back Gilad Shalit, or cause the downfall of the Hamas regime– objectives cited by the Israeli government to justify the closure. Instead, Israeli soldiers have found themselves discussing how many rolls of toilet paper should be allowed into the Gaza Strip, or confiscating smuggled tobacco. Clearly, Israel does not bear sole responsibility for the fate of the Gaza Strip, however, it can play its part by removing the civilian closure. It’s time to allow Gaza to be a different kind of example, for Israelis and Palestinians alike.

As usual, we hardly have any reservations about the numbers published by COGAT. However, we continue to recommend that the data be examined in a wider context. In a broader context, the report’s self-congratulatory nature is a little less persuasive. The security context provided by the report – it opens with statistics on rocket fire on Israel during the past year – is important, but needs to be examined alongside Israel’s obligations under international law, the government’s promises and the real needs of the residents of Gaza. What would the numbers look like then?

For instance, the report states: “Israel is working with the international community and the Palestinian Authority to advance and streamline procedures for the approval of internationally-funded projects. To this end a coordination and monitoring mechanism has been set up for the implementation of internationally funded projects in accordance with security considerations. So far 163 internationally funded projects were approved for implementation”.

And in the broader context? The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), whose projects account for half of those approved by Israel last year, reports that this still only represents 27% of the projects they wish to implement in their recovery and reconstruction plan. For example, of 100 schools the agency seeks to build, only 42 were approved, and as getting clearance for materials still involves cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, actual construction has begun on only half of the schools.  ”Advancing and streamlining”, indeed.

The report continues: “In the past year, 29,715 Palestinians entered Israel from the Gaza Strip. Additionally, Israel decided to increase the quota of traders entering Israel to 70 per day. In the past year 7,282 traders entered from the Gaza Strip for business reasons in Israel, Judea and Samaria [the West Bank], and abroad as part of the ongoing economic activities in the Gaza Strip”.

And back to the broader context. It is interesting to compare those numbers to the average of half a million workers who left Gaza every month on the eve of the Second Intifada. Furthermore, permits issued today are only for “senior businesspeople”, defined as those whose exit would contribute to improving the Gaza economy. The few women traders in Gaza, as well as young merchants, who want to build commercial ties with Israel and the West Bank, generally do not receive permits. Israel is thereby ignoring the common wisdom that small businesses are a driver of economic development.

From the report: “In the framework of the Cabinet’s decision on agricultural exports, the export project, in cooperation with the Netherlands to export strawberries and carnations continued. In addition it had been decided to export bell-peppers, but the exports stopped due to low quality of the produce that did not meet European standards. As an alternative the export of cherry tomatoes to European markets was approved”.

Here too, the context puts a damper on the good news. In the first five months of 2011, Israel may have allowed export of agricultural produce to Europe at the economically negligible volume of around two truckloads per day, but it has now been more than two months since a single truckload of goods left Gaza. Besides, as opposed to the government’s December decision and repeated promises made to international actors, the export of textile and furniture from the Gaza Strip has still not been approved.

Certain measures have indeed been taken over the past year to “ease” the closure, and we welcome those. But when seen in the broader context of the needs of Gaza residents and promises made to them, it’s clear that overall, progress has come too little and too late.

This is a positive step, but unfortunately there’s nothing new about the news. The projects had already been approved over the course of the last year and in fact, the last time a new project was approved was in early February. Besides, the total value of the approved projects represents only 20% of the budget for projects planned by UNDP and UNRWA alone.

UNRWA's construction project in Khan Yunis, October 2010. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

Leaving aside the recurring declarations of approval of the same projects, construction is proceeding at a snail’s pace because Israel operates only a single crossing into the Gaza Strip – Kerem Shalom – through which all goods are transferred, leaving little room for building materials. The average amount of “banned” construction materials (steel, cement and gravel) that Israel allowed into the Gaza Strip each month between October 2010 and February 2011 was 20,000 tons, which is just 7.6% of the average monthly amount (264,000 tons) brought into Gaza before the closure, from January to May 2007.

The Israeli security establishment has admitted (Hebrew) that the shortage of building materials impedes reconstruction in Gaza but claims that it restricts the transfer of these materials because Hamas can use them for military purposes, such as the building of bunkers and tunnels. For this reason, Israel operates a cumbersome bureaucratic system which, among other things, creates painstaking documentation and monitoring requirements for international organizations bringing in goods for their projects, as if we were talking about enriched uranium and not cement to lay the foundation of a school.

But even this cumbersome system doesn’t ensure Israel control over the transfer and use of building materials in the Gaza Strip. According to a UN report, from October 2010 to February 2011, 98,000 tons of steel, cement and gravel were transferred through the tunnels per month without Israeli supervision – five times the amount transferred through the crossings during that same period.

Aside from the ineffectiveness of Israel’s restrictions in preventing Hamas’s access to building materials, this number illustrates just how great the demand for building materials is in the Gaza Strip compared to the limited supply Israel allows in through the crossings. The near-monopoly of the tunnel industry over the import of building materials, created as a result of Israel’s construction materials policy, allows the local government to appear more effective than international organizations in the construction of vital buildings. The local government uses materials from the tunnels, while the regulations of most international organizations prevent them from doing so.

Gaza residents whose homes were destroyed during Operation "Cast Lead" build new homes with aid provided by Islamic charities. The construction materials entered via the tunnels, December 2010. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

Gaza’s economy has grown 15% in the last year from the place to which it had sunk post-war and during three years of nearly hermetic closure, but the gross domestic product is still 20% less than it was in 2005. According to a report by the International Monetary Fund released ahead of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee meeting this coming Wednesday, one of the measures needed for a meaningful recovery of the economy is the lifting of restrictions on the private sector, including the ban on the transfer of building materials.

It can be assumed that some of the building materials brought in through the tunnels are being put to military use, just as it can be assumed that such use is being made of some civilian infrastructure and other basic products. Yet, Israel does not define electricity, computers or telephones as dual use products and allows them into the Gaza Strip. Is banning building materials for the private sector and preventing construction of vital buildings really necessary, especially considering that construction materials are flowing through the tunnels to whoever is willing to pay the price?

True: “Traffic has increased significantly. The number of trucks coordinated with the PA normally reaches the current maximum capacity of 250 trucks a day”.

More True: While the volume of trucks has increased, it was still at just 38% of demand in the last month, due to Israel’s refusal to re-open crossings it has closed since 2007.

True: “Real GDP growth in the first half of 2010 (compared to the first half of 2009) is estimated by the IMF at 9 percent for the West Bank and 16 percent for Gaza”.

More true: The IMF report points out that growth is reflected in part because the first half of 2009, which included the military operation “Cast Lead” and its aftermath, represents a very low base or point of comparison. GDP per capita for Gaza is still 40% less than it was in 1994 and has yet to recover to 2007 levels, due to an apparently ongoing Israeli policy of “economic warfare”, including a ban on exports. The IMF has noted that true and sustainable economic recovery requires lifting the ban on exports and removing remaining restrictions on entrance of raw materials.

True: “Growth in the field of construction reached more than 20% in the first quarter of 2010 (in comparison to the parallel quarter in 2009)”.

More true: The parallel quarter in 2009 included the military operation “Cast Lead”, in which buildings were still being actively destroyed by the Israeli military. Due to onerous approval requirements and limited capacity of the crossings, just 132 truckloads of cement and gravel have entered Gaza since the “easing”, even though tens of thousands are needed. The UN notes, at this rate, it would take approximately 75 years to bring in the materials needed for UNRWA’s reconstruction plan.

True: “A number of projects have already been fully implemented or are currently underway. These projects include… Delivery of containers to serve as classrooms, a UN project”.

More True: Children in UNRWA schools attend classes in the aforementioned shipping containers, because despite the “easing”, Israel has yet to approve entry of a single truckload of construction materials for the 100 new schools UNRWA has requested to build.

True: “In July … a total of 2,457 exit permits were granted [to leave the Gaza Strip]“.

More true: This is less than 1% of the number of exits in Sept. 2000, before Israel imposed tight restrictions. Israel has announced that “[the easing] does nothing to expand the criteria [for travel]“.

Although Israel states that the number of trucks carrying goods into the Gaza Strip has risen by 70% since the cabinet decision, when seen in context, that number still only accounts for 34% of the needs of the residents of Gaza and its economy (in 2005 the number of trucks entering Gaza was 10,400 per month).

Furthermore, when you zoom out from the numbers and percentages, it turns out that even though Israel allowed the Palestinian Coordination Committee (the body in charge of coordinating and transferring requests from private sector merchants to the Israeli side, not including the agricultural sector) to include raw materials in its daily lists, there is still a long way to go until those materials actually reach Gaza. Since an Israeli permit is subject to the capacity constraints of the crossings, and since Israel has permitted only one of the crossings (Kerem Shalom) to be fully operational, most requests by merchants for raw materials are not even submitted. Last week, for example, the average number of trucks crossing per day, including via the conveyer belt at the Karni crossing, was 180, including 50 trucks of humanitarian supplies and inputs for the agricultural sector. Under these circumstances, the Palestinian Coordination Committee has its hands full prioritizing the items and trying to find a place in the daily quotas for the various industries in Gaza requesting goods. The Committee estimates that to meet the current applications for raw materials it will be necessary to allow 500 trucks through per day.

Kerem Shalom crossing (source: USAID)

Under these circumstances it will take months until the first orders of basic raw materials for industry will be able to enter Gaza and since Israel continues to insist on banning export, it is not clear how it intends to implement its promise “to expand economic activity” in the Gaza Strip, which depends on the passage of people and goods in both directions.

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While we wait for Gaza’s economy to bounce back and in better news … tomorrow, over 6,000 kids in Gaza will attempt to break the world record for the number of basketballs bounced simultaneously as part of UNRWA’s “Great Gaza Global Bounce”. To see a short clip about the attempt, click below.

We wrote last week about the seeming paradox between a policy whose stated goals are to reduce civilians to the minimum “essential for survival” (but not to fall below it) in order to achieve political gains, while at the same time boasting of one’s humanitarianism.

This week, together with Physicians for Human Rights-Israel (PHR-Israel), an Israeli human rights group that protects the right to health, we provide further details.

Humanitarian aid only, and even that just barely trickles through

• Food and hygiene products continue to account for 76% of the goods allowed in to Gaza, although entrance is routinely denied for many food items including chocolate and vinegar. Food items that could be used as inputs for local food production – such as margarine in large buckets or glucose – are banned. Civil society institutions, critical infrastructure, factories, schools, and even homes can’t function on flour, sugar, and sponges alone.

• Numbers show that indeed many tons of aid is going into the Strip, destined especially for the 80% of Gaza residents now completely dependent on charity because of the collapse of the economy. Export for commercial purposes, which was allowed on exceptional basis for the strawberry and flower markets, was minimal: 259 trucks in three years were allowed to leave Gaza, which is less than what Gaza residents were exporting in four days prior to June 2001.

• The Foreign Ministry claims that Israel facilitates “all cases of medical treatments from Gaza unless the patient is a known perpetrator of terror”. Last year, over 2,300 entry permits for medical treatment were either rejected or delayed by Israeli officials. These rejections included many individuals who, according to Israel, “only” wish to improve their “quality of life” – by trying to avoid loss of vision or limbs. In these cases, Israel says it need not allow entrance. It also includes patients denied entry where no security allegation was made, but rather the military claimed there was concern that they would remain in the West Bank after treatment, contrary to Israel’s political goal of separating Gaza from the West Bank.

• During the first two months of 2010, PHR-Israel re-submitted the requests of 23 individuals who were initially rejected for security reasons. Thanks to expert opinions from senior Israeli physicians attached to each request, 10 out of the 23 cases were overturned. This raises serious questions about the balancing act that Israel claims it performs between each patient’s medical needs and his or her perceived threat to State security. It also raises questions about the State’s definition of “security risk”.

• Israel claims that Hamas is often an obstacle to granting permits for medical care. However, Hamas has little to do with the permit process. The process was actually created during the Oslo Peace Process, and both the Palestinian Authority and Israel have a role to play. Patients are required to receive an authorized referral from practicing physicians in Gaza, apply for financial coverage from the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, submit papers to a Palestinian Civil Affairs Committee in Gaza subject to the authority of the PA in Ramallah, which then forwards the request to the Israeli Army at Erez Crossing. This process takes an average of 6 weeks and is extremely taxing on Gaza’s sick and injured as well as their families.

• While Israel has the right to conduct security checks, Israel often exploits a patient’s vulnerable state by preconditioning entry for medical treatment on participation in a Shin Bet interrogation – in violation of international law. In several cases, the Shin Bet has summoned patients to the Erez Crossing for security investigations, and then tried to coerce them into collaborating with the Shin Bet by conditioning an exit permit on their collection and provision of information to the Shin Bet. In a number of instances, the Shin Bet went as far as using the permit application process as a way to “lure” Palestinians to the Erez checkpoint in order to arrest them: upon arrival at the checkpoint, they have been immediately arrested and imprisoned in Israeli jails.

Illustration: Moran Barak, source: PHR-Israel

• The MFA reports that coordination with international parties on entrance for building supplies takes place regularly. OCHA, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that it took nine months of negotiations to get approval for entrance of items to finish construction on some 151 housing facilities that were already 85% complete on the eve of the closure in June 2007. This is a hard-fought-for drop in the bucket compared with the 86,000 housing units that are needed in Gaza.

• Likewise, UNRWA reports that donor funds to the tune of $109 million USD are frozen because restrictions on movement of building materials prevent breaking ground on 24 constructions and infrastructure projects. If it took nine months to negotiate the start of each of the 24 projects, we’d be looking at 18 years of negotiations.

• We’ve written before about Israel’s refusal to allow books, stationery, toys, and other educational materials for 248,000 students in Gaza, although it makes an exception for other students studying in UNRWA schools. But UNRWA alone, whose schools generally operate three shifts to deal with overcrowding, needs to build 100 schools to meet demand, and Israel refuses to allow the building materials to enter. Even if Israel were to agree to allow in the building materials and if it takes nine months to negotiate the construction of each school, UNRWA would have its schools after about 75 years, about the time that today’s children would be in their 80s.

We are encouraged that the MFA report seems to embrace the need to facilitate humanitarian aid, while encouraging the development of a healthy economy in Gaza. If Israel is truly interested in implementing such a policy, it would be advised to open Gaza’s crossings for movement of goods and people, subject only to concrete security considerations and not political maneuvering.

In March 2009, UNICEF (United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund) submitted an application to transfer percussion instruments, drums, guitars and ouds (a stringed instrument popular in the Arab world), designated for a number of musical projects for children and youth in the Gaza Strip. In order for the army to consider the application, the musical instruments were classified as humanitarian goods, the import of which would not violate the ban on the entry of goods beyond the “humanitarian minimum” determined by the army.

After going through the standard, long and tiresome bureaucratic process of obtaining a permit to bring in humanitarian goods to Gaza, the musical instruments were transferred on July 4 – five months after the application was submitted to Israel. While international organizations can bring in certain goods for humanitarian projects (e.g. the transfer of learning materials is permitted only for schools operated by UNRWA), for Palestinians living in Gaza and for local organizations the ban on importing goods beyond the “minimum” remains unchanged.

The few music stores that exist in Gaza have started to run out of stock due to the restrictions on the import of their wares. Yehya Al-Jerou, the owner of a well-known Gaza store specializing in sound systems and musical instruments, used to import large quantities of goods from Israel and the West Bank every month up until June 2006. Due to the increased restrictions on the transfer of goods since then, he has been forced to start buying sound systems and musical instruments through an Egyptian dealer and import them via the tunnels – paying top dollar for low-quality merchandise.  

The high prices have deterred most private customers, and his main business is now in selling to institutions and local organizations trying to run musical programs. Apparently, according to Israel, these activities are not considered humanitarian, since they are not operated under the auspices of an international organization. Al-Jerou says that he does not even bother trying to arrange the import of musical instruments from Israel, due to the ban on goods that are not considered “humanitarian”.

If tambourines and other musical instruments pose a security risk in that they could “aid terrorist activity”, according to Vilnai, or, alternatively, are not sufficiently “humanitarian,” why does Israel allow international organizations to import them, but not local organizations?

The lack of transparency, inconsistency and vagueness that characterize Israel’s policies on the transfer of goods to the Gaza Strip continues to confuse not just Gaza residents and aid organizations, but apparently even the Deputy Defense Minister himself.

In this week’s post we provide context for the MFA’s (mostly) correct numbers.

Israel’s policy in the Gaza Strip: Permit the entrance of humanitarian aid ONLY – no development, no prosperity, no economic activity.

Food: No luxury, no production

True: “All food products are brought into the Gaza Strip, except for those that definitely constitute luxury items”.

More true: Did you know that honey and canned fruit, which have been banned since the beginning of the closure, definitely constitute luxury items? Or that, for 8 months, tea definitely constituted a luxury item, until it was suddenly permitted into Gaza about two months ago, indicating that maybe it is not a luxury item after all? On the other hand, pasta is definitely not a luxury item anymore, since Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed concern about obstacles to the entrance of aid in February. Margarine in small packets is not a luxury item, but margarine in large buckets is definitely a luxury item, because it could then be used as a raw material for local food production, giving Palestinian residents of Gaza the luxury of engaging in productive work.

There are no published lists of what kinds of goods can and cannot enter, and Israel has refused to explain which products constitute a luxury, and which don’t. Without some kind of list – how are we to know?

Unemployment: Revealing all the numbers

True: Unemployment in Gaza dropped from 45.5% in the second quarter of 2008 to 36% in the second quarter of 2009.

More true: According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the reason for the second quarter drop in unemployment may have been that temporary relief projects, especially for clearing rubble after the military operation, were initiated by international organizations and the local government. The MFA neglects to mention that in the third quarter of 2009 unemployment again rose to 42.3%, as these temporary relief projects ended. Compare this with 32.3% unemployment in June 2007, just before the closure began.

Fuel and electricity: Not meeting needs

True: Israel meets the minimum threshold set by the Israeli High Court for the passage of industrial diesel for electricity production at the Gaza power plant.

More true: The minimum threshold for industrial diesel set by the court is far below what Gaza needs. In fact, the industrial diesel that was transferred in the month of November met just 39.1% percent of needs, creating power outages.

Re-building projects: A drop in the bucket

True: “Israel is conducting discussions with the Palestinian Authority, the US, EU representatives in the area and others, with the aim of establishing an agreed-upon supervisory mechanism, subject to international standards, which will ensure, if and when a decision is made to that effect, that monies, materials and equipment that are brought into the Gaza Strip for vita humanitarian projects actually reach their destinations”.

More true: Israel has refused to allow reconstruction materials to enter Gaza, despite “discussions” that have taken place over the past 11 months. Gaza needs at least 25,000 tons of iron and 40,000 tons of cement for reconstruction. Since the war, Israel has blocked all but 19 trucks of construction materials permitted to enter on an exceptional basis for the humanitarian infrastructure (i.e. water and sewage systems), though restrictions on other materials mean that infrastructure continues to function below capacity (see below). Without reconstruction materials it is impossible to rebuild the more than 3,500 homes destroyed and the approximately 56,000 homes damaged, in addition to over a thousand businesses, factories, and other commercial establishments destroyed and partially damaged during the war. Even if construction materials were permitted in to fix the estimated $45 million in damage to private sector establishments, the ban on import and export ensures that these businesses would likely lay idle, as 97% of factories generally have done so for over two and half years. Some cement enters via the tunnels beneath the Gaza-Egypt border, but prices are beyond the reach of most residents, and many international organizations are restricted from using these materials.

Water, Sewage and Electricity Infrastructure

True: “Israel is conducting a dialogue with Robert Serry, special emissary of the UN Secretary-General, regarding vital humanitarian projects, primarily relating to sewer systems”.

More True: Dialogue notwithstanding, Israeli restrictions on supply of spare parts and materials for the devastated water and electricity systems mean that 10,000 people are without running water, 40,000 people are cut off from electricity, and power outages lasting 8 hours, four times per week are a common occurrence in most homes.

Education: Children paying the price

True: UNRWA schools recently received shipments of education materials, including notebooks and pencils.

More true: UNRWA is the only agency permitted to receive school supplies in Gaza, and only after Israel delayed the entrance of these items for several months. Israel continues to ban the entrance of supplies for two-thirds of the schools in Gaza, the private and government-run schools which educate 240,199 children.

The final section of the MFA newsletter includes a quote by EU Special Representative to the Middle East, Marc Otte. Find here another important statement made by Marc Otte recently in an interview for Al Quds newspaper, describing the EU position on the closure:

“[The] Gaza closure and denying entry to construction materials is morally unacceptable and is a failure. I was in Gaza last week, there were large quantities of cement in Gaza, but the only people who do not get it are the ones who most need it. For this, ban on constructions materials is not acceptable and I have explained this to the Israelis and told them that this is also not in their interest. Our position is clear, especially that winter is coming, and people can not live in tents in the cold and under the rain”.

Post-script: a perceptive reader pointed out to us that in a November 24^thbriefing to the Security Council, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Mr. Haile Menkerios, made comments in reference to the stalled Serry Plan mentioned in the MFA newsletter:

“Beyond immediate humanitarian needs and the water and sanitation sector, I regret to inform the Security Council that the United Nations has not yet received a satisfactory response from the Israeli government to the proposal, put forward in May, to complete $77 million of stalled UNRWA and UNDP projects in the area of housing units and school and health facilities. The UN has left no stone unturned in seeking approval of this package in extensive consultations with the Israeli authorities, and is confident of its capacity to ensure the integrity of programming. It is completely unacceptable that no meaningful progress has been made in kick-starting UN civilian construction activities essential for the well-being and recovery of a war- and blockade-affected population, half of whom are children”.

“Great efforts” indicate the existence of great obstacles, and the obstacles are indeed great. But ironically, these are obstacles that Israel itself created when it decided that only goods required for maintaining the “humanitarian minimum” would be allowed into the Gaza Strip. And so the recent transfer of educational materials was “facilitated” by Israel’s deviation from its own sweeping policy – of obstruction.

Furthermore, in addition to the fact that the school year began in the Gaza Strip more than 2.5 months ago, the basic goods that Israel has now allowed in are destined only for schools operated by UNRWA, which comprise just one-third of all schools in the Strip – 221 out of 640 schools.

For 240,199 other school students – more than half the student population – who study at government and private schools, the Israeli ban on the import of paper and other basic educational materials remains firmly in place, just as it has been for the past 29 months.