In sixth place: There is a siege/blockade on the Strip

all it takes is a few photos of a bustling market to refute a very simplistic understanding of the closure. Feras Market in Gaza City

Though the words “siege” and “blockade” are frequently used, we believe those terms actually misrepresent the situation in important ways. “Closure” has been our term of choice, and in our 2008 paper Gaza Closure Defined we explained why in detail. Leaving aside the legal terms and definitions, it’s clear that siege and blockade are used to describe the difficult situation faced by residents of Gaza, mainly by well-intentioned individuals who want to help. The problem is that these terms tend to evoke a situation where nothing and no one comes in or out (again, this despite the fact that their legal meanings are quite specific). It’s certainly not the case that nothing or no one is moving and because of this, it’s quite easy to refute the terms, thus dismissing the very real and difficult closure that is in place. In other words, all it takes is a few photos of a bustling market or statistics on truckloads to refute a very simplistic understanding of the closure. The point is not that movement isn’t occurring at all, the point is that it’s not in the right quantities or kinds.

In fifth place: People in Gaza can’t go anywhere

This was not far from the truth until June 2010, when Egypt began to allow for greater movement of people via Rafah Crossing. Today around 28,000 people pass through the crossing in both directions each month, and there are no longer waiting lists for exit from Gaza into Egypt. So access to the outside world from Gaza is easier today, and less controlled by Israel.

What hasn’t really changed are the restrictions on travel from Gaza to Israel and the West Bank, which is by far the most important. Considering that Gaza and the West Bank share one education and one health system, are bound by countless familial and social ties, and that Gaza’s primary markets are in Israel and the West Bank, this is where the crux of the problem lies. Exit from Gaza via Israel, for those needing to travel into Israel or to the West Bank, officially remains limited to “exceptional humanitarian circumstances”. In practice, Israel allows approximately 3000 exits of Palestinians from Gaza every month: nearly half are businessmen, and the rest are mainly medical patients and their companions. Compared with more than half a million exits before the start of the second Intifada in September 2000, this is hardly sufficient.

There are several thousand statusless persons in Gaza and it is unclear how many of these have no other form of valid travel document. For these individuals travel really is impossible because they are not recognized by Israel, Egypt, or any other place for that matter. Israel, via its control of the Palestinian population registry, continues to determine who is counted as a resident of the occupied territory and can therefore receive an ID and passport.

In fourth place: It’s illegal for Israel to stop ships on their way to Gaza

Gisha’s position is that Israel has the right under the law of occupation to determine by which routes goods and people enter and leave the Gaza Strip, and condition their passage on security checks. However, at the same time it bears an obligation to allow movement and access in such a way that facilitates normal life. In other words, the same authority that allows them to stop ships translates into a responsibility to allow freedom of movement, subject only to specific and necessary security screening procedures.

In third place: Israel bears full responsibility for what happens in Gaza because of the occupation

In our opinion, the formula that makes the most sense is that control equals responsibility – where you exercise it, you are also responsible for it. That means that Israel bears primary responsibility in the spheres where it maintains control of Gaza – such as on the ability to export and on movement between Gaza and the West Bank. This does not mean, however, that other actors exercising control, namely Hamas and the PA, don’t also bear a responsibility for what happens in those domains where they are the primary actor – for example, in the creation of school textbooks or the running of prisons.

In second place: What Gaza needs is more aid

A common refrain we hear is that people want to work, not receive charity. Abu Shawareb family

While it’s true that at least 70% of the population receives humanitarian aid, the key problem isn’t that there is a lack of aid but rather a lack of economic activity to pull people up and away from dependence on aid. A common refrain we hear is that people want to work, not receive charity. Restrictions on movement, of both goods and people, have prevented residents of Gaza from engaging in the productive, dignified work that could be available to them otherwise. Take the case of Naima Abu Shawareb and her family as an example.

The good news is that Gaza has the potential to form a productive and prosperous part of the Palestinian territory: it has infrastructure, universities, a robust civil society, industries and a highly educated population. This should give reason not to be satisfied that things are “good enough” but rather to demand that access be permitted to allow that potential to be reached.

In first place: There’s a humanitarian crisis in Gaza

Like we note above, when one paints the Strip with wide swaths of murky terminology, the task of refuting and obscuring the real picture becomes much easier. Is the entirety of Gaza’s population facing a humanitarian crisis, in the terms that one might imagine places ravaged by famine or destitution? The answer is no. It’s hard to argue though that without the efforts and resources of international organizations, including the United Nations, the situation wouldn’t be much worse. It’s also hard to argue that restrictions on movement which have resulted in a stifled economy and high dependence on charity are in any way acceptable, especially given that the official policy of the Israeli government is to enable economic development in Gaza. We think that the question of whether or not there is a humanitarian crisis is the wrong one to ask. We’re often under the impression that for some, the ambiguous red line that defines a humanitarian crisis also demarcates the extent of their concern. We believe that it’s Israel’s and the international community’s duty and in their interest to strive higher than that.

1. Passage through the crossing remains limited: Egypt has indicated that it will operate the crossing six days per week during regular working hours, but it seems this won’t be enough: between 400 – 450 individuals have been able to travel through the crossing per day from Gaza to Egypt. From November 2005 to June 2006, approximately 660 passengers per day exited the Gaza Strip through Rafah and according to the Palestinian Crossings Authority, 10,000 people are currently waiting to travel.
2. The situation is unstable: As last week’s closure of the crossing indicates, the situation on both sides of Rafah remains unstable, such that it’s not clear whether the crossing will remain open, nor exactly to what degree.
3. Rafah doesn’t lead to the West Bank: Travel and movement of goods between Gaza and the West Bank remains severely limited, a problem which Rafah cannot address, as goods and Gaza ID holders are not allowed into the West Bank even via the Egypt-Jordan route. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip are part of the same customs envelope, and are recognized, including by Israel, as a single territorial unit, which, despite four years of tight closure, still shares one economy, one education system, one healthcare system and countless familial and social ties.
   

   Rafah Crossing, June 2011. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

4. Export is not moving and not through Rafah either: Export remains severely limited (about 2 truckloads per day, the last of which left Gaza on May 12, 2011, compared with a target of 400 per day in the Agreement on Movement and Access) and is currently not taking place through Rafah at all. This is impacting industries across Gaza which used to sell or export their wares in Israel, the West Bank and abroad. Before the closure, the vast majority of Gaza’s “exports” were sold in Israel and the West Bank.
5. Construction materials do not enter through Rafah: Construction materials are being let into Gaza via Kerem Shalom only (between Israel and Gaza) for approved projects undertaken by international organizations and following exceedingly lengthy bureaucratic procedures. Each month since January 2011, about 10% of what entered monthly in the years prior to June 2007 has entered for these specific projects. At present, Egyptian authorities have not indicated if or when they will allow construction materials to pass at Rafah.
6. Import of goods does not take place at Rafah: Imports to the Strip purchased by the private sector enter Gaza from Israel via Kerem Shalom Crossing. Even if Egypt were to allow goods to enter at Rafah (and there is no indication that they intend to do so nor when) the crossing and surrounding roadways are not currently equipped to handle the transfer of large quantities of goods, on the scale of the access needs of the Strip.
   

   Rafah Crossing, June 2011. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

7. Humanitarian aid does not regularly enter through Rafah: Aid enters Gaza via Kerem Shalom Crossing, between Gaza and Israel. At present, Egyptian authorities have not indicated if or when they will allow convoys of humanitarian aid to pass at Rafah.
8. Medical patients in need of treatment not available in Gaza cannot always make the long journey to Egyptian hospitals. In any case, Palestinian hospitals in east Jerusalem and the West Bank, part of a common Palestinian health care system, are there to serve all residents of the Palestinian territory, including Gaza residents.
9. Reports prove it: Restrictions on access at the crossings between Israel and Gaza (at Kerem Shalom for goods and Erez for people) continue to impact the well-being of residents of the Strip. Yesterday UNRWA published a study showing high rates of unemployment and the Association for International Development Agencies also reportedrecently on how limits on the entrance of construction materials primarily impacts the work of aid agencies and residents of Gaza.
   

   Rafah Crossing, June 2011. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

10. Rafah doesn’t lead to the West Bank: Oh wait, did we say that already? Well, we’re saying it again, because it’s very, very important.

Some might think that what happens at Rafah Crossing is irrelevant to Israel; as if, since the disengagement, Israel no longer owes obligations to the people of Gaza. If that’s what you think, we made this video for you:

It could also be good news for Israel, whose obligations, deriving from its control over movement of people and goods, would be reduced, commensurate with the reduction in the extent of its control. However, as long as Israel continues controlling the territorial waters of the Gaza Strip, its airspace and most of its land borders, its population registry and its tax system, Israel will continue to bear substantial, although not exclusive, responsibility under international humanitarian law for the maintenance of regular and free movement (subject to individual security inspections) into and out of the Gaza Strip. In addition to an obligation to allow people and goods to cross between Gaza and foreign countries, Israel continues to bear almost full responsibility for passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which has been restricted since 1991 and which the opening of Rafah Crossing would not resolve.

The West Bank and the Gaza Strip are recognized, including by Israel, as a single territorial unit, which, despite four years of tight closure, still shares one economy, one education system, one healthcare system and countless familial and social ties. Furthermore, if the reconciliation agreement signed yesterday between Fatah and Hamas is implemented, there will soon be a single internal government for both areas.

We at Gisha believe that this moment is an opportunity for the Government of Israel to initiate cooperation with the PA, Egypt and international parties over operation of the border crossings. Such arrangements should guarantee freedom of movement between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank under reasonable conditions, while addressing Israel’s security interests recognized by international law. This will enable Israel to realize the declarations that it, and its prime minister, have made repeatedly since June 2010, namely that the “civilian” closure of Gaza must be lifted and restrictions should apply only to the transfer of weapons and war materiel.

The Rafah border crossing opened last June, following the flotilla incident, after being closed for nearly four years. However, it was closed again in late January, until further notice, due to security concerns in the Sinai Peninsula. While Egypt and the Hamas government administer the border crossing by way of ad-hoc agreements, Israel also exerts partial control of the crossing through its control of the Palestinian population registry (in other words, Palestinians who wish to cross must be listed in the registry administered by Israel). Israel also exercises control through joint security arrangements with Egypt. According to reports in the Palestinian media, approximately 4,000 people are waiting in the Sinai Peninsula for the crossing to re-open so that they can return to Gaza. A number of Palestinian residents of Gaza were also being held at the airport in Cairo, since, according to Egyptian protocol, they can not leave the airport except to go directly to the Rafah border crossing, and this requires a police escort. Other residents of Gaza worldwide are also waiting to return home.

On the Gaza side of the crossing, 300-500 people in need of medical attention are waiting to exit the Strip in order to receive treatment.

Students who returned to Gaza for the vacation cannot return to their schools. Among them is Ahmad, a medical student studying in Egypt. He hesitantly agreed to return home after five years during which he had avoided making the trip, fearing that once in Gaza, he would not be permitted to return to his studies. His worst fears have now come true and he is missing out on his studies while waiting to leave: “We never could have imagined that the source of our problems in returning this time would be instability in Egypt”, he said. The exit of students through the Erez crossing, which is controlled by Israel, is limited to those with a scholarship for study in a “Western” country. So exit through Rafah is Ahmad’s and many other students’ only option. If the opening of Rafah last June indicated a partial solution to the movement restrictions faced by students seeking to study abroad, recent events show how easily this freedom can be undermined.

Petrol station in Gaza. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

Events in Egypt have also led to a rise in the cost of fuel and construction materials in the Strip as a result of a drop in activity in the tunnels and shortages in supply on the Egyptian side. Last week, the price of cement rose by more than 30%, while the price of gravel increased by about 20%. The rising fuel costs were checked following the government’s decision to set a fixed maximum rate, but shortages continue. Since Israel imposed restrictions on the transfer of these goods in 2007 (claiming that this would “weaken” the Hamas rule), the trade in fuel and construction materials has operated through the tunnels, where the Hamas government levies taxes on it. As events calm down in Egypt, tunnel activity is resuming.

Recent events in Egypt illustrate how the closure of Gaza and the dependence it creates on the border with Egypt make freedom of movement in Gaza as vulnerable as a leaf blowing in the wind.

]]> http://www.gazagateway.org/2011/02/meanwhile-in-gaza/feed/ 2 http://www.gazagateway.org/2010/05/more-than-70-days-of-waiting/ http://www.gazagateway.org/2010/05/more-than-70-days-of-waiting/#comments Tue, 18 May 2010 08:55:15 +0000 admin http://www.gazagateway.org/?p=1240 Continue reading →]]> Amid rumors of tension between the Hamas government and Egypt, on Saturday, May 15, 2010, the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt was opened to the passage of people wishing to enter and exit the Gaza Strip. The border had been closed for 72 days prior to this latest opening.

The Rafah crossing (source-B'Tselem)

1. Between March 1 — March 5, 2010, the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt was open, and 4427 people passed through the crossing, including 461 students. Of these students, 100 were returned to Gaza by the Egyptians either because Egypt believed that they would seek to remain in Egypt, or because they were missing the requisite exit documents.
2. According to the latest information, 502 students are presently seeking to leave the Gaza Strip in order to realize their dreams and study in universities abroad. Yet why do students in Gaza aspire to study outside the Strip? Among the reasons is the fact that in Gaza it is not possible to study certain fields, such as dentistry, occupational therapy, veterinary studies, environment preservation and democracy and human rights. In contrast, degrees in all these areas are available in the West Bank.
3. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, the number of students that have received permission from Israel to study in the West Bank since 2000 stands at zero. This is due to the imposition by Israel of a sweeping prohibition on students from Gaza traveling to the West Bank in order to study there. Therefore, students from Gaza (who are able) focus on studying at universities abroad.
4. Since June 2007, Israel has imposed tight restrictions on the exit of students through the Erez border crossing, establishing strict criteria for the passage of students through Israel on their way to the Allenby border crossing (in Jordan) and from there to their studies overseas. As a result, students are forced to try and exit Gaza through the Rafah crossing.
   

   The Rafah crossing (source-B'Tselem)

5. Since June 2006 and the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit, the Rafah crossing has been officially closed and has been opened on an ad hoc and irregular basis. This is contrary to the Agreement on Movement and Access concluded in November 2005, according to which the Rafah crossing must be open to the movement of people between Gaza and Egypt.
6. In total approximately 1600 people, including 502 students who are eager to start their studies abroad, were not able to exit Gaza via the Rafah crossing when it opened at the start of March. They are forced instead to wait until the next time the crossing is opened.
7. Yet they have no way of knowing when the next time will arrive.  

The Rafah crossing- a view from the Egyptian side (source- Oxfam)

On average, 2,500 trucks of goods enter the Gaza Strip each month. This is roughly 25% of the amount that entered prior to the June 2007 closure of the Strip (10,400/month). The items permitted entrance are limited to basic goods “necessary for the survival of the population” (to quote a recent letter Gisha received from the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)). Items like flour, grain, and sugar are allowed. Every month new items appear among those allowed in and others items are mysteriously rejected: coffee this month yes, but cardamom to flavor it, no. Anise yes, and black pepper too, but vinegar no. Significantly, there is a total ban on raw materials that would permit Gaza residents to engage in production and commerce, allowing for economic independence. Clarity regarding the policy requires no less than a court order.

Israel does not provide the aid transferred to Gaza. In fact it earns on each truck that passes and each ton of aid bought or shipped, stored, and transferred through its territory. After closing all of Gaza’s other crossings, including the airspace, territorial waters, and indirectly – Rafah Crossing – Israel partially opens its side of the gates to Gaza to allow others to bring in aid and other items. More often than not, Israel blocks the movement of goods in to and out of Gaza and of course the movement of people who in most parts of the world travel into and out of their countries for simple, every day things like work and school and weddings.

These restrictions – and the policy underlying them, limiting Gaza residents to a “minimal” existence – are what have helped make Gaza residents dependent on international aid, whose provision Israel burdens.

The Israeli Defense Ministry’s hasty response, however, declaring that Kerem Shalom would be closed until further notice, raised concern among those trying to transfer humanitarian supplies to Gaza. It was not clear whether the closure of the crossing was a legitimate measure in response to a real and concrete security risk to the crossing and those who work there, or if the Defense Ministry decided to react as it had in the second half of 2008: In the months leading up to the Gaza war, Israel closed the civilian crossings as punitive retribution for rocket fire, not as a response to a concrete security threat.

Residents of Gaza breathed a sigh of relief on Sunday, when Israel permitted the reopening of the Kerem Shalom Crossing and the resumption of a minimum level of supply to the Strip. The dependence on Kerem Shalom is so great because it is virtually the only goods’ crossing that remains open; every closure thus blocks the transfer of goods that are in short supply in Gaza because of the Israeli-imposed “minimum humanitarian standard”.

Since the closure of Gaza began in June 2007, Israel has systematically worked to restrict the operation of the Gaza Strip’s crossings – policies that reached a peak with the closure of the Nahal Oz crossing at the start of 2010. And so, at this time, with the exception of the grain conveyor at the Karni Crossing, the Gaza Strip is dependent on one crossing – Kerem Shalom – which was originally designed for the occasional transfer of humanitarian aid and which has limited capacity. Israel has even insisted that Egypt transfer all aid to the Gaza Strip coming from its territory via the Kerem Shalom crossing and not via its own crossing at Rafah. Last week, Egypt announced that it would permit supply from its territory only via Kerem Shalom. This dependence on Kerem Shalom is well-known to those who shoot at it and to those who allow the shooting to take place.

Israeli policies to restrict the operation of the Kerem Shalom crossing stand in violation of international agreements it has signed, which take into account situations where a security risk may occur at a particular crossing. In these agreements Israel committed to three basic principles that were intended to ensure that the Gaza Strip crossings would function on a continuous basis, even in the presence of real security threats: the operation of alternative lanes (lane redundancy) and alternative crossings (passage redundancy), as well as a commitment to the primary aim: the principle of continuous operation. Yet as of 2010, virtually all alternative crossings have been closed.

Since Israel insists on enforcing an almost total closure policy that leaves the Gaza Strip “on the edge” in every aspect of life (food, goods, electricity, cooking gas and more), every closure of the single crossing still permitted to operate, when already only minimum amounts are allowed through it, threatens to push Gaza over the edge.

“It has been decided that the Shalit deal will not bring about a change in Israel’s policy regarding the blockade of Gaza and preventing the passage of people and goods between Gaza and the West Bank, except for humanitarian cases and essential goods”.

Really? It won’t?

Israel has justified its 3.5 year closure of Rafah Crossing and 2.5 year closure of Gaza’s other crossings as “sanctions” designed to pressure the Hamas regime, especially to release Shalit. While Gisha and other human rights groups have criticized the closure as unlawful collective punishment – irrespective of its “goals” – Israeli officials  have insisted that closing Gaza’s crossings nearly hermetically is not only permissible but is also effective in achieving political objectives. The position that prevailed in an August 24, 2006 internal discussion among security officials regarding Rafah Crossing, reproduced in Gisha’s position paper, Disengaged Occupiers was to:

“Oppose opening the crossing even for a few hours, so long as the issue of the captured soldier remains unchanged”.

The “logic” of the policy was to make life so difficult in the Gaza Strip, that the 1.5 million civilians trapped in Gaza would somehow “overthrow” Hamas or at least – exert pressure for the Hamas regime to acquiesce to Israeli demands.

True, the Israeli public never quite believed the effectiveness of that goal: a 2008 survey commissioned by Gisha and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel found that 78% of Jewish Israelis believed it was unlikely that the closure would lead to regime change in Gaza, and 83% believed that Hamas had been strengthened since the closure was tightened in June 2007. A newly released film by the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem uses animation to show just how fanciful the idea that the suffering of 1.5 million people could somehow be “effective” in putting the squeeze on Hamas. But Israeli policy-makers insist that Gaza residents could be “taught a lesson” through the closure. Can they really?

]]> http://www.gazagateway.org/2009/12/has-israel-forgotten-the-reason-for-gazas-closure/feed/ 1 http://www.gazagateway.org/2009/10/all-gates-to-gaza-nailed-shut/ http://www.gazagateway.org/2009/10/all-gates-to-gaza-nailed-shut/#comments Tue, 13 Oct 2009 06:26:15 +0000 admin http://www.gazagateway.com/?p=309 Continue reading →]]> According to Palestinian officials, last week Israel mounted two attempts to transport industrial diesel into the Gaza Strip via the Kerem Shalom border crossing, and not via the Nahal Oz crossing, which has until now been the only crossing designed and equipped for the transfer of fuels and gas to Gaza. Attempts to transfer industrial diesel via Kerem Shalom were also made in the previous month. In the last week, Israel transferred not one drop of industrial diesel via Nahal Oz and in the previous two weeks transferred 3.68 million liters in total- 53% of the amount required. The reports that Israel intends to close down the Nahal Oz crossing completely follow a gradual slowdown of operations at the terminal, which now operates only three days a week.

The other crossings have also been closed: Karni Crossing, which was the main trade route, has been closed since June 2007, and only one conveyer belt, used to transport produce and animal feed, has continued to operate on a partial basis since then. The Sufa crossing has not operated since September 2008 and Israel announced its permanent closure in March 2009. The transfer of goods via the Rafah crossing is prohibited. And so all of Gaza is now almost totally dependent on the Kerem Shalom crossing, which has limited capacity and was originally designed for the occasional transfer of humanitarian aid only. Now Israel apparently plans to burden Kerem Shalom with fuel and gas transports as well.

Of course, in response to rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, Israel occasionally closes Kerem Shalom too, due to what it identifies as dangers to the crossing.

The possibility that security risks would threaten the opening of Gaza’s crossings was the subject of considerable forethought. As a result, three fundamental conditions designed to ensure that the Gaza Strip crossings would operate continuously were established and agreed to by Israel:  (1) Recognition of the need to operate alternative lanes (lane redundancy); (2) recognition of the need to operate alternative crossings (passage redundancy); and (3) the primary objective which Israel committed to in the Crossings Agreement: the principle of continuous operation.

It is hard to imagine how one crossing, consisting of only one primary lane, can fulfill these fundamental conditions.

Meanwhile, Israel continues to strike against the tunnels underneath the Egypt-Gaza border, via which the majority of goods required by Gaza residents are transported, including by blowing them up.

Under these circumstances, with the sea and air routes completely blocked, the tunnels rejected as a legitimate option, and the overland crossings increasingly shut down, how exactly are the residents of Gaza supposed to get the goods they need?