Naturally, Israel exercises complete control over the crossings between it and the Gaza Strip. Since June 2007, it has closed three of the four commercial crossings: Karni, which was Gaza’s commercial life line, through which all trucks exited and most trucks entered; Sufa, through which construction materials were brought into the Gaza Strip; and Nahal Oz, through which fuel and cooking gas were transported. The crossings that remain open are Kerem Shalom, which is designated for the passage of goods and located inside Israel (near the three-way meeting point of Israel, Gaza and Egypt); and Erez, which is designated for passage by people and may be used by Palestinian residents only in “humanitarian cases, with an emphasis on urgent medical cases”¹.  In practice, as of July 2010, Israel permits approximately 3,000 exits by Palestinians through Erez each month, mostly by patients and accompanying family members, and, since 2011, merchants as well.

Through its control over the passage of commercial goods, Israel has a tremendous impact on life in the Gaza Strip, a small and densely populated area which relies on trade with the outside world for obtaining basic products and maintaining a productive economy. When Israel decides to allow the export of flowers, strawberries and peppers but not ice cream, cookies or soft drinks²,  it essentially determines which of Gaza’s industries will function. When Israel requires an international organization to change the location of a new school as a condition for allowing into Gaza the materials required for building it³,  it influences planning and zoning policy inside the Gaza Strip.

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1. Section 15 of the State’s response in H.C. 4906/10 Sharif v. Defense Ministry (hereinafter: State’s response in Sharif).
2. Security Cabinet Resolution, 32nd Government, Dec. 8, 2010; see also IDF Spokesperson, Pepper Export from Gaza Strip Begins [in Hebrew] (Jan. 23, 2011).
3. Thus, for example, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories required UNRWA to shift the location of a school it was planning to build by a few hundred meters, as the original location was allegedly near a building used by Hamas (Yaakov Katz, Israel Reviewing UNRWA List of Sites for Gaza Schools, The Jerusalem Post [Dec. 15, 2010]).

Wheat is delivered to Gaza through the conveyer belt at the Karni crossing (currently the only operational part of the crossing, which was closed to trucks in June 2007). So far, the conveyer belt has been operational on only two days per week for the transfer of wheat and animal feed into Gaza.  However, since mid-October, Israel has reduced the transfer of wheat and animal feed to just one day per week. On the other day, Israel allows gravel to be transferred to the Strip, pursuant to its June announcement regarding changes to the policy for the entry of goods into Gaza, including a promise to allow the entry of construction materials for projects run by international organizations. Incidentally, Israel also promised to open other land crossings “if the need arises to further increase the capacity of the crossings”.

In practice, approvals for construction projects are extremely limited – since the change in policy, an average of 107 trucks carrying construction materials were allowed into Gaza per month compared to an average of about 5,000 trucks which entered Gaza every month prior to the closure. In addition, instead of opening additional crossing points, Israel has announced its intention to close the Karni conveyor belt and transfer all operations to Kerem Shalom.

Thus Israel’s promise to allow the entry of construction materials, which was supposed to be good news for the residents of Gaza, has created additional difficulties in transferring basic and essential nutritional ingredients. Israel refuses to increase the number of days the conveyor belt operates and with regard to opening additional crossing points – there is no room for discussion.

Moreover, the gravel which Israel allows into the Gaza Strip is not sufficient for the construction planned by international organizations. According to UNRWA, at this rate, it will take 75 years to implement the organization’s plan to rehabilitate Gaza. UNRWA, incidentally, is also facing a shortage in its flour reserves, because it buys flour from the local market in Gaza after the wheat is transferred to the Strip through the Karni crossing.

That’s better than the current average of 138.5 trucks per day (based on 21 working days per month and including trucks of fuel and gas crossing at Kerem Shalom) but it’s far from what Gaza needs. Even if Dangot’s plan becomes reality, the increase would bring us to just 51% of what Gaza residents need for ordinary trade and activity, not including the additional and immediate demand for tens of thousands of truckloads of construction materials needed to repair damage from the war.

And even if import increases, it’s not clear that raw materials for manufacturing and industry will be included in the increase in items or that export will be allowed. In other words, restrictions continue to apply on goods with no apparent security correlation, pursuant to the policy of crippling Gaza’s economy and keeping residents there dependent on charity. And let’s not forget that people, 1.5 million of them, are still being blocked from traveling into and out of Gaza to reach jobs, training opportunities, schools, medical treatment and family.

Maybe someone should ask them if they feel that the closure has been eased.

What has changed on the ground since the announcement and more generally, since international pressure mounted on Israel in the wake of the May 31 flotilla incident? The list of consumer goods permitted into Gaza has been expanded to include previously banned items such as ketchup, mayonnaise, and children’s toys. Ah, yes, and chips (french fries) as well, for dipping into the ketchup. But that’s about it.

We are therefore puzzled by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statement that “we are already seeing a significant growth in the scope of the civilian goods entering Gaza.” There has been no significant change in the volume of trucks entering Gaza, as is evident from Gaza Gateway’s graphs. Last week, for example, 654 trucks entered Gaza, including via the grain elevator, similar to the number that entered in the week before the flotilla incident (662). This week, as of yesterday, the fourth of five working days for the crossings, approximately 567 trucks had entered Gaza, which is consistent with the policy, since June 2007, to allow entry of approximately 25% of what Gaza residents need.

Indeed, it is hard to see how more goods could enter Gaza, given that the one crossing still operating – Kerem Shalom (Kerem Abu Salam) – is working at near capacity with an average of 110 trucks per day of goods, five days per week. The “significant growth” mentioned by Mr. Netanyahu would be difficult unless Israel opens some of the crossings it has sealed over the last three years, including Karni Crossing, Gaza’s commercial lifeline, with a capacity of 1,000 trucks per day.

In any event, as Dan Ephron notes in Newsweek today, without the ability to export finished products and receive raw materials (they are still not being allowed in), economic recovery in Gaza will remain elusive.

The Israeli Defense Ministry’s hasty response, however, declaring that Kerem Shalom would be closed until further notice, raised concern among those trying to transfer humanitarian supplies to Gaza. It was not clear whether the closure of the crossing was a legitimate measure in response to a real and concrete security risk to the crossing and those who work there, or if the Defense Ministry decided to react as it had in the second half of 2008: In the months leading up to the Gaza war, Israel closed the civilian crossings as punitive retribution for rocket fire, not as a response to a concrete security threat.

Residents of Gaza breathed a sigh of relief on Sunday, when Israel permitted the reopening of the Kerem Shalom Crossing and the resumption of a minimum level of supply to the Strip. The dependence on Kerem Shalom is so great because it is virtually the only goods’ crossing that remains open; every closure thus blocks the transfer of goods that are in short supply in Gaza because of the Israeli-imposed “minimum humanitarian standard”.

Since the closure of Gaza began in June 2007, Israel has systematically worked to restrict the operation of the Gaza Strip’s crossings – policies that reached a peak with the closure of the Nahal Oz crossing at the start of 2010. And so, at this time, with the exception of the grain conveyor at the Karni Crossing, the Gaza Strip is dependent on one crossing – Kerem Shalom – which was originally designed for the occasional transfer of humanitarian aid and which has limited capacity. Israel has even insisted that Egypt transfer all aid to the Gaza Strip coming from its territory via the Kerem Shalom crossing and not via its own crossing at Rafah. Last week, Egypt announced that it would permit supply from its territory only via Kerem Shalom. This dependence on Kerem Shalom is well-known to those who shoot at it and to those who allow the shooting to take place.

Israeli policies to restrict the operation of the Kerem Shalom crossing stand in violation of international agreements it has signed, which take into account situations where a security risk may occur at a particular crossing. In these agreements Israel committed to three basic principles that were intended to ensure that the Gaza Strip crossings would function on a continuous basis, even in the presence of real security threats: the operation of alternative lanes (lane redundancy) and alternative crossings (passage redundancy), as well as a commitment to the primary aim: the principle of continuous operation. Yet as of 2010, virtually all alternative crossings have been closed.

Since Israel insists on enforcing an almost total closure policy that leaves the Gaza Strip “on the edge” in every aspect of life (food, goods, electricity, cooking gas and more), every closure of the single crossing still permitted to operate, when already only minimum amounts are allowed through it, threatens to push Gaza over the edge.

The other crossings have also been closed: Karni Crossing, which was the main trade route, has been closed since June 2007, and only one conveyer belt, used to transport produce and animal feed, has continued to operate on a partial basis since then. The Sufa crossing has not operated since September 2008 and Israel announced its permanent closure in March 2009. The transfer of goods via the Rafah crossing is prohibited. And so all of Gaza is now almost totally dependent on the Kerem Shalom crossing, which has limited capacity and was originally designed for the occasional transfer of humanitarian aid only. Now Israel apparently plans to burden Kerem Shalom with fuel and gas transports as well.

Of course, in response to rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, Israel occasionally closes Kerem Shalom too, due to what it identifies as dangers to the crossing.

The possibility that security risks would threaten the opening of Gaza’s crossings was the subject of considerable forethought. As a result, three fundamental conditions designed to ensure that the Gaza Strip crossings would operate continuously were established and agreed to by Israel:  (1) Recognition of the need to operate alternative lanes (lane redundancy); (2) recognition of the need to operate alternative crossings (passage redundancy); and (3) the primary objective which Israel committed to in the Crossings Agreement: the principle of continuous operation.

It is hard to imagine how one crossing, consisting of only one primary lane, can fulfill these fundamental conditions.

Meanwhile, Israel continues to strike against the tunnels underneath the Egypt-Gaza border, via which the majority of goods required by Gaza residents are transported, including by blowing them up.

Under these circumstances, with the sea and air routes completely blocked, the tunnels rejected as a legitimate option, and the overland crossings increasingly shut down, how exactly are the residents of Gaza supposed to get the goods they need?