In sixth place: There is a siege/blockade on the Strip

all it takes is a few photos of a bustling market to refute a very simplistic understanding of the closure. Feras Market in Gaza City

Though the words “siege” and “blockade” are frequently used, we believe those terms actually misrepresent the situation in important ways. “Closure” has been our term of choice, and in our 2008 paper Gaza Closure Defined we explained why in detail. Leaving aside the legal terms and definitions, it’s clear that siege and blockade are used to describe the difficult situation faced by residents of Gaza, mainly by well-intentioned individuals who want to help. The problem is that these terms tend to evoke a situation where nothing and no one comes in or out (again, this despite the fact that their legal meanings are quite specific). It’s certainly not the case that nothing or no one is moving and because of this, it’s quite easy to refute the terms, thus dismissing the very real and difficult closure that is in place. In other words, all it takes is a few photos of a bustling market or statistics on truckloads to refute a very simplistic understanding of the closure. The point is not that movement isn’t occurring at all, the point is that it’s not in the right quantities or kinds.

In fifth place: People in Gaza can’t go anywhere

This was not far from the truth until June 2010, when Egypt began to allow for greater movement of people via Rafah Crossing. Today around 28,000 people pass through the crossing in both directions each month, and there are no longer waiting lists for exit from Gaza into Egypt. So access to the outside world from Gaza is easier today, and less controlled by Israel.

What hasn’t really changed are the restrictions on travel from Gaza to Israel and the West Bank, which is by far the most important. Considering that Gaza and the West Bank share one education and one health system, are bound by countless familial and social ties, and that Gaza’s primary markets are in Israel and the West Bank, this is where the crux of the problem lies. Exit from Gaza via Israel, for those needing to travel into Israel or to the West Bank, officially remains limited to “exceptional humanitarian circumstances”. In practice, Israel allows approximately 3000 exits of Palestinians from Gaza every month: nearly half are businessmen, and the rest are mainly medical patients and their companions. Compared with more than half a million exits before the start of the second Intifada in September 2000, this is hardly sufficient.

There are several thousand statusless persons in Gaza and it is unclear how many of these have no other form of valid travel document. For these individuals travel really is impossible because they are not recognized by Israel, Egypt, or any other place for that matter. Israel, via its control of the Palestinian population registry, continues to determine who is counted as a resident of the occupied territory and can therefore receive an ID and passport.

In fourth place: It’s illegal for Israel to stop ships on their way to Gaza

Gisha’s position is that Israel has the right under the law of occupation to determine by which routes goods and people enter and leave the Gaza Strip, and condition their passage on security checks. However, at the same time it bears an obligation to allow movement and access in such a way that facilitates normal life. In other words, the same authority that allows them to stop ships translates into a responsibility to allow freedom of movement, subject only to specific and necessary security screening procedures.

In third place: Israel bears full responsibility for what happens in Gaza because of the occupation

In our opinion, the formula that makes the most sense is that control equals responsibility – where you exercise it, you are also responsible for it. That means that Israel bears primary responsibility in the spheres where it maintains control of Gaza – such as on the ability to export and on movement between Gaza and the West Bank. This does not mean, however, that other actors exercising control, namely Hamas and the PA, don’t also bear a responsibility for what happens in those domains where they are the primary actor – for example, in the creation of school textbooks or the running of prisons.

In second place: What Gaza needs is more aid

A common refrain we hear is that people want to work, not receive charity. Abu Shawareb family

While it’s true that at least 70% of the population receives humanitarian aid, the key problem isn’t that there is a lack of aid but rather a lack of economic activity to pull people up and away from dependence on aid. A common refrain we hear is that people want to work, not receive charity. Restrictions on movement, of both goods and people, have prevented residents of Gaza from engaging in the productive, dignified work that could be available to them otherwise. Take the case of Naima Abu Shawareb and her family as an example.

The good news is that Gaza has the potential to form a productive and prosperous part of the Palestinian territory: it has infrastructure, universities, a robust civil society, industries and a highly educated population. This should give reason not to be satisfied that things are “good enough” but rather to demand that access be permitted to allow that potential to be reached.

In first place: There’s a humanitarian crisis in Gaza

Like we note above, when one paints the Strip with wide swaths of murky terminology, the task of refuting and obscuring the real picture becomes much easier. Is the entirety of Gaza’s population facing a humanitarian crisis, in the terms that one might imagine places ravaged by famine or destitution? The answer is no. It’s hard to argue though that without the efforts and resources of international organizations, including the United Nations, the situation wouldn’t be much worse. It’s also hard to argue that restrictions on movement which have resulted in a stifled economy and high dependence on charity are in any way acceptable, especially given that the official policy of the Israeli government is to enable economic development in Gaza. We think that the question of whether or not there is a humanitarian crisis is the wrong one to ask. We’re often under the impression that for some, the ambiguous red line that defines a humanitarian crisis also demarcates the extent of their concern. We believe that it’s Israel’s and the international community’s duty and in their interest to strive higher than that.

1. Passage through the crossing remains limited: Egypt has indicated that it will operate the crossing six days per week during regular working hours, but it seems this won’t be enough: between 400 – 450 individuals have been able to travel through the crossing per day from Gaza to Egypt. From November 2005 to June 2006, approximately 660 passengers per day exited the Gaza Strip through Rafah and according to the Palestinian Crossings Authority, 10,000 people are currently waiting to travel.
2. The situation is unstable: As last week’s closure of the crossing indicates, the situation on both sides of Rafah remains unstable, such that it’s not clear whether the crossing will remain open, nor exactly to what degree.
3. Rafah doesn’t lead to the West Bank: Travel and movement of goods between Gaza and the West Bank remains severely limited, a problem which Rafah cannot address, as goods and Gaza ID holders are not allowed into the West Bank even via the Egypt-Jordan route. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip are part of the same customs envelope, and are recognized, including by Israel, as a single territorial unit, which, despite four years of tight closure, still shares one economy, one education system, one healthcare system and countless familial and social ties.
   

   Rafah Crossing, June 2011. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

4. Export is not moving and not through Rafah either: Export remains severely limited (about 2 truckloads per day, the last of which left Gaza on May 12, 2011, compared with a target of 400 per day in the Agreement on Movement and Access) and is currently not taking place through Rafah at all. This is impacting industries across Gaza which used to sell or export their wares in Israel, the West Bank and abroad. Before the closure, the vast majority of Gaza’s “exports” were sold in Israel and the West Bank.
5. Construction materials do not enter through Rafah: Construction materials are being let into Gaza via Kerem Shalom only (between Israel and Gaza) for approved projects undertaken by international organizations and following exceedingly lengthy bureaucratic procedures. Each month since January 2011, about 10% of what entered monthly in the years prior to June 2007 has entered for these specific projects. At present, Egyptian authorities have not indicated if or when they will allow construction materials to pass at Rafah.
6. Import of goods does not take place at Rafah: Imports to the Strip purchased by the private sector enter Gaza from Israel via Kerem Shalom Crossing. Even if Egypt were to allow goods to enter at Rafah (and there is no indication that they intend to do so nor when) the crossing and surrounding roadways are not currently equipped to handle the transfer of large quantities of goods, on the scale of the access needs of the Strip.
   

   Rafah Crossing, June 2011. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

7. Humanitarian aid does not regularly enter through Rafah: Aid enters Gaza via Kerem Shalom Crossing, between Gaza and Israel. At present, Egyptian authorities have not indicated if or when they will allow convoys of humanitarian aid to pass at Rafah.
8. Medical patients in need of treatment not available in Gaza cannot always make the long journey to Egyptian hospitals. In any case, Palestinian hospitals in east Jerusalem and the West Bank, part of a common Palestinian health care system, are there to serve all residents of the Palestinian territory, including Gaza residents.
9. Reports prove it: Restrictions on access at the crossings between Israel and Gaza (at Kerem Shalom for goods and Erez for people) continue to impact the well-being of residents of the Strip. Yesterday UNRWA published a study showing high rates of unemployment and the Association for International Development Agencies also reportedrecently on how limits on the entrance of construction materials primarily impacts the work of aid agencies and residents of Gaza.
   

   Rafah Crossing, June 2011. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

10. Rafah doesn’t lead to the West Bank: Oh wait, did we say that already? Well, we’re saying it again, because it’s very, very important.

Some might think that what happens at Rafah Crossing is irrelevant to Israel; as if, since the disengagement, Israel no longer owes obligations to the people of Gaza. If that’s what you think, we made this video for you:

Since the closure was imposed, aid dependence in Gaza has increased from 63% to 80% because of the paralysis of the private sector, reports OCHA. The International Monetary Fund reported three months ago that the Gross National Product in Gaza is still 40% less than it was in 1994 and has yet to recover to 2007 levels.

Why is there so little economic activity and so much dependence on international aid? There is a very simple explanation: the closure of the Gaza Strip. The closure of Gaza is not just about shortages of products – coriander became the star-of-the-moment when it was discovered that its transfer into Gaza was banned by Israel – it is also about restrictions on selling of Gaza’s goods outside of the Strip, about bringing in construction materials, and about movement of people.

Before 2007, some 70 truckloads of consumer and agricultural products left Gaza for marketing outside Gaza each day. Since the Cabinet decision declaring an easing of the closure and until December 23rd, 70 trucks left the Gaza Strip, in other words, 2/3 of a truck per day.

A truck near Kerem Shalom. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

Another reason for the low economic activity is the ban on construction materials. Before the ban, residents of Gaza brought in 5,000 truckloads of gravel, cement and steel per month, compared to an average of 149 trucks per month since Israel declared the easing of the closure. As a result, there was a drastic decrease in the number of people employed in construction.

It is therefore no wonder that those who do have jobs in Gaza are more often than not working in the public sector. According to a recent report by the British think-tank The Portland Trust, jobs in the private sector shrunk from 100,000 to 30,000 over the years 2006-2010 – while in 2006 only 28% of those employed worked in the public sector, today 70% of those employed work in the public sector. Those who lost their jobs found work mainly in the public sector: in local government offices, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. Whereas the population of Gaza grew from 1.41 to 1.54 million between the end of 2007 and mid-2010, the number of jobs remained static. There has also been a shift from employment in factories, agriculture and construction towards employment in the Palestinian Authority, the Hamas government and international organizations. Work in the public sector is vital for sustaining a society – the public sector includes teachers, doctors, aid workers – but the private sector is the engine for development.

The question that should be asked, therefore, is not whether there is a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, but whether deliberate harm is being done to the economy and by extension to the well-being of residents of the Strip, and whom this serves. What is the likelihood that the percentage of residents living beneath the poverty line will decrease and that Gaza’s economy will enter a period of significant growth, without marketing Gaza’s goods outside of the Strip, without movement of people, and without construction?

Although Israel states that the number of trucks carrying goods into the Gaza Strip has risen by 70% since the cabinet decision, when seen in context, that number still only accounts for 34% of the needs of the residents of Gaza and its economy (in 2005 the number of trucks entering Gaza was 10,400 per month).

Furthermore, when you zoom out from the numbers and percentages, it turns out that even though Israel allowed the Palestinian Coordination Committee (the body in charge of coordinating and transferring requests from private sector merchants to the Israeli side, not including the agricultural sector) to include raw materials in its daily lists, there is still a long way to go until those materials actually reach Gaza. Since an Israeli permit is subject to the capacity constraints of the crossings, and since Israel has permitted only one of the crossings (Kerem Shalom) to be fully operational, most requests by merchants for raw materials are not even submitted. Last week, for example, the average number of trucks crossing per day, including via the conveyer belt at the Karni crossing, was 180, including 50 trucks of humanitarian supplies and inputs for the agricultural sector. Under these circumstances, the Palestinian Coordination Committee has its hands full prioritizing the items and trying to find a place in the daily quotas for the various industries in Gaza requesting goods. The Committee estimates that to meet the current applications for raw materials it will be necessary to allow 500 trucks through per day.

Kerem Shalom crossing (source: USAID)

Under these circumstances it will take months until the first orders of basic raw materials for industry will be able to enter Gaza and since Israel continues to insist on banning export, it is not clear how it intends to implement its promise “to expand economic activity” in the Gaza Strip, which depends on the passage of people and goods in both directions.

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While we wait for Gaza’s economy to bounce back and in better news … tomorrow, over 6,000 kids in Gaza will attempt to break the world record for the number of basketballs bounced simultaneously as part of UNRWA’s “Great Gaza Global Bounce”. To see a short clip about the attempt, click below.

We wrote last week about the seeming paradox between a policy whose stated goals are to reduce civilians to the minimum “essential for survival” (but not to fall below it) in order to achieve political gains, while at the same time boasting of one’s humanitarianism.

This week, together with Physicians for Human Rights-Israel (PHR-Israel), an Israeli human rights group that protects the right to health, we provide further details.

Humanitarian aid only, and even that just barely trickles through

• Food and hygiene products continue to account for 76% of the goods allowed in to Gaza, although entrance is routinely denied for many food items including chocolate and vinegar. Food items that could be used as inputs for local food production – such as margarine in large buckets or glucose – are banned. Civil society institutions, critical infrastructure, factories, schools, and even homes can’t function on flour, sugar, and sponges alone.

• Numbers show that indeed many tons of aid is going into the Strip, destined especially for the 80% of Gaza residents now completely dependent on charity because of the collapse of the economy. Export for commercial purposes, which was allowed on exceptional basis for the strawberry and flower markets, was minimal: 259 trucks in three years were allowed to leave Gaza, which is less than what Gaza residents were exporting in four days prior to June 2001.

• The Foreign Ministry claims that Israel facilitates “all cases of medical treatments from Gaza unless the patient is a known perpetrator of terror”. Last year, over 2,300 entry permits for medical treatment were either rejected or delayed by Israeli officials. These rejections included many individuals who, according to Israel, “only” wish to improve their “quality of life” – by trying to avoid loss of vision or limbs. In these cases, Israel says it need not allow entrance. It also includes patients denied entry where no security allegation was made, but rather the military claimed there was concern that they would remain in the West Bank after treatment, contrary to Israel’s political goal of separating Gaza from the West Bank.

• During the first two months of 2010, PHR-Israel re-submitted the requests of 23 individuals who were initially rejected for security reasons. Thanks to expert opinions from senior Israeli physicians attached to each request, 10 out of the 23 cases were overturned. This raises serious questions about the balancing act that Israel claims it performs between each patient’s medical needs and his or her perceived threat to State security. It also raises questions about the State’s definition of “security risk”.

• Israel claims that Hamas is often an obstacle to granting permits for medical care. However, Hamas has little to do with the permit process. The process was actually created during the Oslo Peace Process, and both the Palestinian Authority and Israel have a role to play. Patients are required to receive an authorized referral from practicing physicians in Gaza, apply for financial coverage from the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, submit papers to a Palestinian Civil Affairs Committee in Gaza subject to the authority of the PA in Ramallah, which then forwards the request to the Israeli Army at Erez Crossing. This process takes an average of 6 weeks and is extremely taxing on Gaza’s sick and injured as well as their families.

• While Israel has the right to conduct security checks, Israel often exploits a patient’s vulnerable state by preconditioning entry for medical treatment on participation in a Shin Bet interrogation – in violation of international law. In several cases, the Shin Bet has summoned patients to the Erez Crossing for security investigations, and then tried to coerce them into collaborating with the Shin Bet by conditioning an exit permit on their collection and provision of information to the Shin Bet. In a number of instances, the Shin Bet went as far as using the permit application process as a way to “lure” Palestinians to the Erez checkpoint in order to arrest them: upon arrival at the checkpoint, they have been immediately arrested and imprisoned in Israeli jails.

Illustration: Moran Barak, source: PHR-Israel

• The MFA reports that coordination with international parties on entrance for building supplies takes place regularly. OCHA, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that it took nine months of negotiations to get approval for entrance of items to finish construction on some 151 housing facilities that were already 85% complete on the eve of the closure in June 2007. This is a hard-fought-for drop in the bucket compared with the 86,000 housing units that are needed in Gaza.

• Likewise, UNRWA reports that donor funds to the tune of $109 million USD are frozen because restrictions on movement of building materials prevent breaking ground on 24 constructions and infrastructure projects. If it took nine months to negotiate the start of each of the 24 projects, we’d be looking at 18 years of negotiations.

• We’ve written before about Israel’s refusal to allow books, stationery, toys, and other educational materials for 248,000 students in Gaza, although it makes an exception for other students studying in UNRWA schools. But UNRWA alone, whose schools generally operate three shifts to deal with overcrowding, needs to build 100 schools to meet demand, and Israel refuses to allow the building materials to enter. Even if Israel were to agree to allow in the building materials and if it takes nine months to negotiate the construction of each school, UNRWA would have its schools after about 75 years, about the time that today’s children would be in their 80s.

We are encouraged that the MFA report seems to embrace the need to facilitate humanitarian aid, while encouraging the development of a healthy economy in Gaza. If Israel is truly interested in implementing such a policy, it would be advised to open Gaza’s crossings for movement of goods and people, subject only to concrete security considerations and not political maneuvering.

1. Take things out of context. When you say that, “41 truckloads of equipment for the maintenance of the electricity networks were transferred”, you do not need to mention that those spare parts were waiting for many months for clearance, and that, at the end of 2009, the Gaza Electricity Distribution Company reported that 240 kinds of spare parts were completely out of stock or had dipped below the required minimum stock. Likewise, “There was a significant increase in the number of international organization staff entering the Gaza Strip” does not require explanation that, were the productive sector in Gaza not almost completely paralyzed, so many aid workers would not be needed and the number of aid recipients would not be so high. You also don’t need to explain that the high number of staff you quote might be misleading, since it’s likely you are counting individual entrances and not unique visitors (the same international aid workers enter and exit multiple times per month).
2. Demonstrate impartiality. Present the transfer of 44,500 doses of swine flu vaccine as having nothing to do with you. There is always a chance people will forget it is a border-transcending epidemic and that the head of the Gaza District Coordination Office himself said an outbreak in Gaza would endanger Israel.
3. Make it look like you are paying the bill. Use vague language such as “In 2009, Israel continued to supply electricity to the Gaza Strip”. Count on the fact that most people don’t know that Israel charges full payment for the electricity by deducting the amount from the VAT and taxes it collects for the Palestinian Authority via import into its territory.
4. Take credit for the work of others. Note that “Between April and October 2009, maintenance work was conducted on the power station by Siemens” and “In 2009, the international community transferred 141,390 tons of humanitarian aid” are your successes too. These actions were undertaken after you decided in a unique instance to lift the restrictions you imposed yourself. You deserve credit even for the summer camps UNRWA runs for children in Gaza: in an exceptional measure you did not prevent the transfer of musical instruments and other items you define as “non-humanitarian” (such as ice cream machines and swimming pools).
5. Make sure to even present your failures as successes. “As part of the preparations for winter” you approved the transfer of glass. Even if you did so only after external parties exerted heavy pressure on you, even if you had to make an exception to a prohibition you imposed for two winters, even if you started transferring the glass only on December 29 (long after winter weather had already begun battering destroyed homes in Gaza), and even if you continue preventing the transfer of heaters – present the transfer of glass as your success.
6. Make sure to use headlines that will stun your readers. “The activities of the private and banking sectors in the Gaza Strip are maintained”. With a headline like that, few are likely to realize you are talking about maintaining an economy that has been at an almost complete standstill for nearly three years, with more than 90% of the factories closed or working at minimal capacity, because Israel has been preventing the transfer of raw materials. The headline “Over the years, Israel has kept the issue of public humanitarian infrastructure out of the conflict” will also obscure the Cabinet Decision to restrict the transfer of industrial diesel fuel to the power plant, which is crucial to the functioning of the water and sewage systems and other vital infrastructure, in an attempt to pressure the Hamas government.
7. Use vague terminology. Choose words such as “transferred” and “were transferred”. This way, some people will understand that “Over 1.1 billion NIS were transferred to the Gaza Strip to cover the salaries and activities of international organizations” came out of Israel’s pocket and not, as actually happened, that Israel simply did not prevent the PA and international organizations from transferring the money through the border crossings under Israel’s control, in a rare exception to its restrictions on cash transfers and on the banking system in Gaza.
8. Use visual tricks. State the number of individual flowers you allowed to Gaza farmers to export (9,782,076). This method can become problematic only if you mention that the potential for export is 55 million individual flowers per year, or that in 2006, 2,089 tons of strawberries were exported (compared to only 54 tons in 2009). 105,701,740 liters of industrial diesel fuel (according to COGAT’s 2009 report) sounds like a respectable amount when you state it in individual liters, but is a little less respectable when you discover that it amounts to only 57% of the amount required for maximum electricity production at the Gaza power plant.
9. You do not have to reveal everything. Play down the extent and nature of your control of the Gaza Strip‘s border crossings, including indirect but substantial control of the Rafah Crossing.

 Don’t be so modest! You play a central role in the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

Prior to the June 2007 closure, 30-35 trucks of agricultural produce were exported every working day of the agricultural export season (November – March), carrying mainly cherry tomatoes, flowers and strawberries. This amount is from a total daily average of 70 trucks of exports, mostly furniture, garment, cash crops, vegetables, processed food, metal products, handicrafts, and other kinds of goods. Gaza export –halted except for the trickle of strawberries and flowers – used to account for 10.8% of the Palestinian gross domestic product (GDP), valued at $330 million. That is now lost. Estimated annual losses from the inability to export agricultural products alone stand at approximately $32 million, and tens of thousands of people in the agricultur! al sector have lost their livelihood.

The flower and strawberry export is part of a one million Euro program, sponsored by the Dutch government, to support Gaza’s farmers. The Dutch government insists that Israel permit the flowers and strawberries to reach European markets as an exception to the ban on all other kinds of export from Gaza, a ban which has forced other donors to convert development programs into humanitarian hand-outs. If Gaza’s crossings were fully open for export and Gaza residents were afforded the right to engage in a dignified living, European taxpayers could spend less money on aid and more money buying strawberries grown in Gaza, rumored to be among the sweetest and reddest in the world.

Not only has the closure of Gaza failed to protect it from the virus, but the restrictions on the passage of equipment and fuel are making it difficult to contain the virus’s spread.

During the military operation last winter, 15 hospitals and 34 medical institutions were damaged, and their repair has not been possible due to Israel’s refusal to allow building materials into the Gaza Strip. While Israel boasts of permitting increased quantities of humanitarian aid to Gaza, it continues to restrict the entrance of medical supplies, claiming security risks. Thus, Israel is making it difficult to send batteries needed for the UPS systems that protect sensitive hospital equipment during the frequent power outages and is limiting the supply of additional medical supplies, such as X-ray equipment.

The Swine Flu, however, known for its tendency to breach borders, is not treated like other illnesses, and Israel has allowed 6,000 vaccinations purchased by the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Ramallah into Gaza. The vaccinations are destined for Gaza residents who participated in the pilgrimage to Mecca (the Hajj) and for the medical professionals treating patients diagnosed with the virus. It is estimated that more than 400,000 vaccinations are needed for people in high risk groups.

Allowing vaccinations through to Gaza residents is surely a nice public relations photo opportunity, but preventing the outbreak of an epidemic requires appropriate sanitary conditions and infrastructure, too. Frequent and extended blackouts (8 hours a day, 4 days a week), due to Israel’s refusal to allow the transfer of the required amount of industrial diesel to the Gaza power station, interfere with the proper functioning of local hospitals. Hospitals rely on back-up generators during the power outages, but limitations on their power production interferes with the heating and ventilation systems that are vital for maintaining proper air-pressure.  Likewise, the ongoing shortage of gas limits the ability to run hospital washing machines needed for basic hygiene. This past week, only 34% of the gas needed by Gaza residents was supplied (518 tons out of the 1,500 tons needed per week).

Other types of infrastructure systems which are needed to deal with infectious diseases are the sewerage and water purification systems, which also rely on fuel and supplies limited by Israel. A roof over the heads of the thousands of residents uprooted from their homes and the hundreds still living in tents since their homes were destroyed in the war is another basic requirement.

Some people resort to prayer to protect them from the Swine Flu. We would make do, for starters, with policies that allow the ongoing transfer of equipment required for sanitation and the proper functioning of the health system – out of respect for the rights of the 1.5 million people who live in the Gaza Strip.