Gaza is not as isolated from the rest of the world as it was a few years ago, but it is still cut off from the West Bank and it’s hard to find convincing security reasons why. For example, Israel prohibits students from traveling from Gaza to the West Bank – individual security checks are not even an option because the ban is sweeping. Israel does not allow goods from Gaza to be sold in the West Bank or Israel, while at the same time allowing exports from Gaza to Europe to be transferred through its own airports and seaports. It also imposes restrictions on the import of building materials into the Gaza Strip. The impact is felt mainly by international organizations rather than the local government, which gets all the cement, gravel, and steel it needs from the tunnels. Ongoing restrictions make it difficult for Gaza’s economy to recover, but they also split families apart and impede Gaza residents’ access to higher education and the opportunity to acquire training in a number of highly needed fields.

In fifth place: “Israel gives Gaza money, electricity and water”.

True, Israel does give Gaza residents electricity and water. That is, if by “give” you mean “sells”. Israel also does not “give” money to Gaza’s residents – it does transfer tax monies it collects on their behalf, although sometimes with great delay.

In fourth place: “The Palmer Report concluded that the closure was legal”.

The Palmer Commission decided not to examine the legality of the overall closure of the Gaza Strip and determined only that the naval blockade imposed on Gaza was legal. In its report, the commission included a recommendation for Israel to continue easing restrictions on movement “with a view to lifting its closure and to alleviate the unsustainable humanitarian and economic situation of the civilian population”.

And one wishes to move to the West Bank? Rafah crossing, 3.30.2005. Photo: PHR

In third place: “Gaza has a border with Egypt, so Egypt should take care of the Strip”.

Six months ago, we posted the top ten reasons why the opening of Rafah Crossing just doesn’t cut it. The list is still valid, but here’s the gist of it: Even if Egypt fully opens Rafah to movement of people and goods, this would still not provide a solution for the problem of movement restrictions between Gaza and the West Bank. The desire to push Gaza onto Egypt and therefore make it possible to cut the Strip off from the West Bank is a common one, but its implementation would entangle Israel legally and politically.

In second place: “Israel disengaged from Gaza and all it got was Qassam rockets”.

Firing Qassam rockets on civilians is an unjustifiable war crime. This much is clear. We should keep in mind that the rockets didn’t start after the disengagement from Gaza and that four and a half years of closure have done nothing to reduce the threat of rockets being fired from Gaza into Israel – but don’t take our word for it.

As for disengagement, Israel did remove its permanent military installations and civilian settlements from the Gaza Strip, but did this really end Israeli control over Gaza? Try asking a Palestinian from Gaza if she feels that Israel has really “disengaged” from her life. She wouldn’t think twice before responding in the negative. Israel controls her ability to study in the West Bank, export goods, fish, farm her lands and visit relatives. True, it’s hard to imagine control of a territory without permanent military presence on the ground, but this is exactly Gaza’s unique situation today.

And in first place: “Gaza’s residents voted for Hamas so they had it coming to them”.

Hamas’ victory in parliamentary elections in 2006, shortly after the “disengagement” was met with surprise. Withdrawal from Gaza didn’t bolster those in support of the peace process as many in Israel had expected. Today, more than five years after the elections were held, they are still used as an excuse for the closure.

First of all, it is important to stress that international law prohibits collective punishment of a civilian population and for good reason. Past experience has taught that civilians, irrespective of their political convictions, must remain “off limits”. This principle must be upheld in Gaza, in Israel and in all other places in the world facing conflict.

While we’re on the topic of the elections, and to be accurate, the elections Hamas won were not held just in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank and east Jerusalem. It was more than a year after the elections, in June 2007, that Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip.

No elections have been held in Gaza since 2006 and the debate between the various political movements in the Strip has been ongoing. One way of following this debate is through polls, such as those published by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. For example, a poll from December 2011 shows that if elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council were to be held now, Hamas would get 35% of the vote and Fatah 43%. It’s worth recalling also that over half of Gaza’s population is below voting age. How can children be blamed for the outcome of elections in which they didn’t take part?

Can you think of more misconceptions? Comment below.

Israel continues to control taxation in the Gaza Strip, which forms part of a single customs envelope along with Israel and the West Bank. This means that Israel sets the customs and Value Added Tax rates collected for goods and in so doing influences product prices as well as Palestinian fiscal policy. To illustrate: a merchant in Gaza who purchases clothes from an Israeli manufacturer pays VAT at a rate determined by Israel, and Israel is responsible for transferring this amount to the Palestinian Authority. If the merchandise is imported, Israel sets and collects the customs for it and is responsible for transferring the amount to the Palestinian Authority. The VAT and customs rates set by Israel then affect the price the consumer pays for clothes in Gaza.

Israel continues to collect VAT and customs on behalf of the Palestinian Authority and has the power to decide whether or not to transfer this revenue. As such, Israel controls the Palestinian Authority’s ability to use this revenue to fund public services in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, such as electricity, health care, public service salaries, etc¹.

The exception to the rule whereby Israel controls the collection of taxes and hence the services provided to the Palestinian public is the taxes collected by Hamas on goods entering Gaza from Egypt through the underground tunnels. The volume of goods transferred via the tunnels significantly increased since Israel began restricting the entry of civilian goods to the Gaza Strip in 2007. The government in Gaza collects taxes for some of these goods, such as cigarettes, fuel, and occasionally building materials. For example, the Hamas regime in Gaza sets the tax rate for fuel transported through the tunnels and collects it from the merchants who import the fuel to Gaza from Egypt. In this way, the regime in Gaza influences local fuel prices, which are significantly cheaper than those in Israel or the West Bank. Having some goods transported into Gaza via tunnels rather than the Israeli-controlled crossings and the collection of taxes on these goods allow the government in Gaza to reduce its dependence on Israel for setting tax rates for these goods and for funding public services.

« Previous Page || Next Page »

Scale of Control: The project »
Scale of Control: The full position paper »
Scale of Control: The executive summary »
Gaza Reels: Watch the animation »

1. See e.g., GISHA, DISENGAGED OCCUPIERS, supra note 1, p. 56, which provides details of the impact of Israel’s nonpayment of tax revenues to the Palestinian Authority from March 2006 until June 2007, a period in which Hamas presided in the Palestinian Authority along with Fatah and other parties. A similar measure was taken in May 2011, when Hamas and Fatah announced a reconciliation agreement. See: Israel Suspends Cash to Palestinians after Hamas Deal, BBC News (May 1, 2011).

Following Hamas’ takeover of internal control in Gaza in June 2007, the Palestinian Authority’s influence over Gaza has significantly diminished, and most of the routine administration of the government and public services, such as the education system, policing, sanitation and hospitals, is carried out by the Hamas regime. However, the Palestinian Authority still maintains significant responsibilities, particularly the financing of major public services such as the healthcare system and the supply of electricity. The Palestinian Authority continues to coordinate the passage of people and goods with Israel, and taxes levied on goods transported from Israel through the crossings are collected by Israel on behalf of the PA. Additionally, Palestinian Authority officials remain responsible for transferring applications for changes in the population registry to Israeli authorities, including for the purpose of issuing passports.
For this reason, Israel’s control over the Palestinian Authority, which operates both in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, influences the latter’s ability to make independent decisions related to Palestinian residents, govern them and fund public services¹.

In addition, Israel’s control over travel between the West Bank and Gaza Strip affects the operation of civil institutions and systems throughout the Palestinian territory. These systems and institutions have developed as part of a single apparatus serving residents in both parts of the Palestinian territory².  For example, a Palestinian democracy and human rights academic program is offered by Birzeit University in the West Bank. Israeli control over movement between Gaza and the West Bank and its prohibition on travel from Gaza to the West Bank for the purpose of studying impact Gaza residents’ access to this program and to higher education in general³.  In addition, control over the ability of Palestinian professionals from the West Bank to work in Gaza impacts the quality of services available in Gaza⁴.  It should be noted that control over movement between Gaza and the West Bank is not merely a result of the fact that Israel is situated between the two parts of the Palestinian territory, but also of its exclusive control over all crossings to and from the West Bank, including the Allenby Bridge, on the West Bank’s Jordanian border. Israel prohibits residents of Gaza from entering the West Bank irrespective of passage through Israel: a Gaza resident who exits to Egypt and seeks to enter the West Bank from Jordan will be thwarted by Israel’s policy of disallowing use of the Allenby Bridge by Palestinian residents whose registered address is in the Gaza Strip⁵.  Though a distinction should be made between Israel’s control over one part of the Palestinian territory and the other (and the legal ramifications of this distinction should be taken into account), Israel’s control over travel between the two areas impacts civilian institutions and the lives of residents throughout the Palestinian territory.

« Previous Page

Scale of Control: The project »
Scale of Control: The full position paper »
Scale of Control: The executive summary »
Gaza Reels: Watch the animation »

1. For details see, GISHA, DISENGAGED OCCUPIERS, supra note 1, pp. 56-58.
2. See, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Washington DC, September 28, 1995, Article XI (hereinafter: Oslo B), and GISHA, DISENGAGED OCCUPIERS, supra note 1, p. 58.
3. See, Press Release, Gisha, Israel Announces: No Easing for Travel of People Into and Out of Gaza (July 8, 2010).
4. For example, the refusal to allow an educator from the West Bank to provide professional training for teachers designed to encourage parents to read to their children affects the quality of educational services in the Gaza Strip. See Press Release, Gisha, Following Gisha’s petition to the High Court: Parents in Gaza to benefit from workshop encouraging reading to children (Nov. 28, 2010).
5. Gisha, Legal Framework: Merchants and the Economy – Rights and Obligations under International and Israeli Law (May 2010) (hereinafter: Gisha, Merchants and the Economy).

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech last week at the United Nations highlighted once again the centrality of the Gaza Strip to any understanding of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. It is impossible to discuss the impasse currently facing the peace process without addressing the Gaza Strip and, in particular, Israel’s “disengagement” from the Strip. Netanyahu expressed a position shared by many Israelis, who see in the Gaza Strip a nightmare scenario of what is liable to happen if Israel leaves the West Bank, and particularly if it does so without an agreement. We left Gaza, Netanyahu declared, and the radicals gained strength.

However, developments in Gaza in recent years would seem to impart a different lesson – one that Netanyahu failed to mention in his speech. Netanyahu linked between Israel’s “disengagement” and the strengthening of Hamas, but that is not where Israel’s policy towards Gaza ended. The closure policy that soon followed, and which is still in effect, has been the subject of growing criticism by Israeli journalists, commentators and researchers who have argued that rather than fulfilling its explicit objective of weakening Hamas, the policy has actually achieved the opposite outcome.

In a previous post, we presented a collection of comments from the past year supporting this conclusion. Additional commentators and public figures have since added their voices to this growing chorus. In the past, Ofer Shelah (Hebrew), Amos Harel and Dan Margalit (Hebrew) have called for the removal of the closure. Dr. Zvi Bar’el, a senior commentator for Ha’aretz, has been arguing this position for several years. Barel urged an end to the closure, arguing that it is not only ineffective, but also damaging to Israel’s foreign relations. The Institute for National Security Studies also published a position paper suggesting that Israel should negotiate with Turkey to permit the entry of ships to the Gaza Strip after security inspection.

While the closure is ineffective, the easings announced by Israel in 2010 have proven beneficial. As Danny Rubinstein demonstrated in an article in Calcalist, the easings have had a significant impact on Hamas rule in the Strip. Rubinstein argues that the closure actually improves Hamas’ standing, since the organization relies heavily on taxes and levies raised on the smuggling of imports through the tunnels along the border at Rafah. Accordingly, the easing struck a blow at one of the organization’s main sources of income. Rubinstein bases his assessment, in part, on a report by the Peres Center for Peace. The report finds that Hamas has leveraged trade restrictions imposed by Israel in order to secure economic benefits. As a result, the movement’s annual budget rose from $40 million in 2006 to approximately $500 million in 2010. A report published by UNRWA on the same day shows that the closure has helped strengthen the public sector in the Gaza Strip, which is controlled by Hamas, while at the same time leading to the collapse of the private sector.

Ironically, Prime Minister Netanyahu himself made this point cogently in an interview with Ayala Hasson on July 2, 2010 (Hebrew). “I think that the civilian closure will damage the security closure”, Netanyahu commented. “Instead of strengthening our position and our demands of Hamas, it has actually begun to erode our moral superiority”.

Netanyahu also claimed in the interview that Israel had removed the civilian closure imposed on the Gaza Strip. However, the easings do not entail the complete removal of the closure. Israel continues to prevent movement of people and goods from the Gaza Strip. This policy has exacteda heavy toll: over seventy percent of the residents of the Gaza Strip received humanitarian assistance and the unemployment rate is 25.6 percent.

Maybe the time has come to stop seeing the Gaza Strip as Israel’s doomsday scenario. The time has certainly come to stop regarding the situation in Gaza as an immutable fact. The closure imposed on the Gaza Strip has remained in place since 2007. During this period, the civilian economy in Gaza has collapsed, and Palestinians living in the Strip have been denied the right to visit their families, study or engage in commerce in the West Bank. To date, the closure has not helped stop the firing of rockets, bring back Gilad Shalit, or cause the downfall of the Hamas regime– objectives cited by the Israeli government to justify the closure. Instead, Israeli soldiers have found themselves discussing how many rolls of toilet paper should be allowed into the Gaza Strip, or confiscating smuggled tobacco. Clearly, Israel does not bear sole responsibility for the fate of the Gaza Strip, however, it can play its part by removing the civilian closure. It’s time to allow Gaza to be a different kind of example, for Israelis and Palestinians alike.

On December 8th, the Israeli Security Cabinet decided to ease some of the restrictions on export of goods from Gaza. It announced that Israel would increasingly allow export of textile, furniture and agricultural produce from the Strip. These promises were reiterated as part of a package of gestures that the prime minister announced in February. The same promises reappeared in an April report to donor countries which also included the news that Israel was installing special inspection equipment at Kerem Shalom that would allow for increased exports. However, six months after the cabinet decision, the volume of exports from Gaza has only decreased.

From January to May 2011, Israel allowed only 187 truckloads of goods to leave Gaza – an average of two truckloads per day. Since May 12th, not a single truck has left Gaza. Since goods cannot be transported through the Rafah Crossing, there is presently no way to export goods from the Strip. More than one and a half million people – zero export.

A policy that categorically bans the export of civilian goods from the Gaza Strip is, at the very least, puzzling. Why, during the last harvest season, were Palestinians in Gaza allowed to export strawberries, peppers, cherry tomatoes and flowers via Israel to Europe but are now forbidden to export furniture, textiles and other food products in the same way? And why was the export Israel did allow to be transferred through its territory restricted to Europe and not allowed to be sold to closer markets in Israel, the West Bank or Jordan? Is that what the government meant when it claimed it was making efforts to “improve the economic situation of the population in the Gaza Strip”?

The damage caused by restrictions on export is significant. The restrictions are the main reason why 83% of Gaza’s factories are closed or are operating at less than half their capacity, according to the Palestinian Federation of Industries. The restrictions also result in high unemployment rates, which stand at some 30.8%.

The export ban has paralyzed whole sectors of the Gaza Strip. The fashion and textile industries in Gaza used to sell 70% of their products outside of the Strip. Today, due to the ban, the industry has suffered a near fatal blow. The same is true for other sectors, such as furniture and food, which depend on markets outside of the Gaza Strip for their survival.

What can explain the harm that’s been done to the ability of residents of Gaza to earn a dignified living? In an interview (Hebrew) a year ago, the prime minister said that the civilian closure must be lifted, leaving in place only a “security closure”, but it is hard to find a security argument that would justify a complete ban on export. Just like all goods entering Israel, goods transferred from the Strip undergo security inspections. The sale of Gaza-made armchairs in the West Bank will not supply weapons to Hamas and selling socks made in Khan Younis in Israel will not help build bunkers in the Gaza Strip. If there is a reason, security or otherwise, preventing the government from keeping its promises and from implementing a policy it defined as an Israeli interest, then it owes the public an explanation.

No economy can survive over time without trade and export, and the present condition of Gaza’s economy is a painful reminder of that fact. A stable economy is one of the conditions for a functioning society – a vital interest both for Palestinians and Israelis. Without export there can be no independent private sector and the only alternative that leaves is an economy in which money flows only from top to bottom – from the government and foreign donors to citizens. This is exactly what is happening today in Gaza where the public sector has become the biggest employer. Whereas in the past 60% of the workforce was employed in the private sector and 40% in the public sector, today the ratio has been reversed.

Israel began the closure of Gaza with the declared goal of ending Hamas rule. Four years later, it is clear that this policy has failed. Restrictions on export have brought increasing harm on residents of the Gaza Strip and made them more dependent on Hamas than ever.

Recently there has been an improvement in the situation in the Gaza Strip: while unemployment remains high, it dropped some in relation to 2010, and new building projects have begun. This is a welcome development, but there is nothing that will help more than allowing Gaza’s businesses to access markets beyond the Strip. Four years on, maybe it is time to finally consider a change in policy.

Prominent Israeli opinion-makers Dan Margalit, Ofer Shelah and Amos Harel write that the closure harms Israel’s international standing (Hebrew), is “evil” (Hebrew), and even “foolish and ineffectual“. Prof. Shlomo Avineri believes broad agreement can be reached in Israel for a plan that includes lifting the closure. Minister Dan Meridor said (Hebrew) last weekend that the closure of Gaza won’t help weaken Hamas or return Gilad Shalit. Ami Ayalon, former head of the Shin Bet and 2007 member of the security cabinet, was also quoted in an article as saying that such pressure on the Gaza Strip was never thought to succeed and was implemented carelessly. The same article includes a call to lift the closure immediately by Prof. Avraham Sela, an expert on Hamas.

From another perspective, Ehud Yaari and Eyal Ofer do not call for an end to the closure policy but describe the dimensions of its failure. They show how throughout the years of closure, Hamas has cultivated an economic empire while the population has suffered increasing unemployment and poverty.

Uri Avnery calls for an opening of the border crossings and construction of sea and airports in Gaza, while Zvi Bar’el predicts that if Israel does not lift the restrictions itself, it will be forced to do so by international powers as part of their anticipated recognition of a Palestinian state. Who said there is no consensus about the need to lift the closure?

And what about the prime minister? According to Netanyahu, the closure had already been eased prior to June 2010, and he even boasted that this harmed Hamas propaganda. In an interview he gave at the time, Netanyahu said (Hebrew) that “ahead of the flotilla and even after the flotilla, [the closure] should have simply been lifted”. Ahead of the next expected flotilla, Netanyahu ought to simply lift the three sweeping restrictions that remain intact on the import of building materials, export and travel of people between Gaza and the West Bank.

]]> http://www.gazagateway.org/2011/05/more-mainstream-than-mainstream/feed/ 0 http://www.gazagateway.org/2011/04/de-constructing-the-construction-boom/ http://www.gazagateway.org/2011/04/de-constructing-the-construction-boom/#comments Mon, 11 Apr 2011 11:26:03 +0000 admin http://www.gazagateway.org/?p=1976 Continue reading →]]> Early last week, the Israeli Army Spokesperson’s Unit announced “widespread construction” in the Gaza Strip after the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories approved 121 projects funded by international organizations. According to the report, following the approval, the Gaza economy was expected “to be bolstered”.

This is a positive step, but unfortunately there’s nothing new about the news. The projects had already been approved over the course of the last year and in fact, the last time a new project was approved was in early February. Besides, the total value of the approved projects represents only 20% of the budget for projects planned by UNDP and UNRWA alone.

UNRWA's construction project in Khan Yunis, October 2010. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

Leaving aside the recurring declarations of approval of the same projects, construction is proceeding at a snail’s pace because Israel operates only a single crossing into the Gaza Strip – Kerem Shalom – through which all goods are transferred, leaving little room for building materials. The average amount of “banned” construction materials (steel, cement and gravel) that Israel allowed into the Gaza Strip each month between October 2010 and February 2011 was 20,000 tons, which is just 7.6% of the average monthly amount (264,000 tons) brought into Gaza before the closure, from January to May 2007.

The Israeli security establishment has admitted (Hebrew) that the shortage of building materials impedes reconstruction in Gaza but claims that it restricts the transfer of these materials because Hamas can use them for military purposes, such as the building of bunkers and tunnels. For this reason, Israel operates a cumbersome bureaucratic system which, among other things, creates painstaking documentation and monitoring requirements for international organizations bringing in goods for their projects, as if we were talking about enriched uranium and not cement to lay the foundation of a school.

But even this cumbersome system doesn’t ensure Israel control over the transfer and use of building materials in the Gaza Strip. According to a UN report, from October 2010 to February 2011, 98,000 tons of steel, cement and gravel were transferred through the tunnels per month without Israeli supervision – five times the amount transferred through the crossings during that same period.

Aside from the ineffectiveness of Israel’s restrictions in preventing Hamas’s access to building materials, this number illustrates just how great the demand for building materials is in the Gaza Strip compared to the limited supply Israel allows in through the crossings. The near-monopoly of the tunnel industry over the import of building materials, created as a result of Israel’s construction materials policy, allows the local government to appear more effective than international organizations in the construction of vital buildings. The local government uses materials from the tunnels, while the regulations of most international organizations prevent them from doing so.

Gaza residents whose homes were destroyed during Operation "Cast Lead" build new homes with aid provided by Islamic charities. The construction materials entered via the tunnels, December 2010. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

Gaza’s economy has grown 15% in the last year from the place to which it had sunk post-war and during three years of nearly hermetic closure, but the gross domestic product is still 20% less than it was in 2005. According to a report by the International Monetary Fund released ahead of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee meeting this coming Wednesday, one of the measures needed for a meaningful recovery of the economy is the lifting of restrictions on the private sector, including the ban on the transfer of building materials.

It can be assumed that some of the building materials brought in through the tunnels are being put to military use, just as it can be assumed that such use is being made of some civilian infrastructure and other basic products. Yet, Israel does not define electricity, computers or telephones as dual use products and allows them into the Gaza Strip. Is banning building materials for the private sector and preventing construction of vital buildings really necessary, especially considering that construction materials are flowing through the tunnels to whoever is willing to pay the price?

We wrote last week about the seeming paradox between a policy whose stated goals are to reduce civilians to the minimum “essential for survival” (but not to fall below it) in order to achieve political gains, while at the same time boasting of one’s humanitarianism.

This week, together with Physicians for Human Rights-Israel (PHR-Israel), an Israeli human rights group that protects the right to health, we provide further details.

Humanitarian aid only, and even that just barely trickles through

• Food and hygiene products continue to account for 76% of the goods allowed in to Gaza, although entrance is routinely denied for many food items including chocolate and vinegar. Food items that could be used as inputs for local food production – such as margarine in large buckets or glucose – are banned. Civil society institutions, critical infrastructure, factories, schools, and even homes can’t function on flour, sugar, and sponges alone.

• Numbers show that indeed many tons of aid is going into the Strip, destined especially for the 80% of Gaza residents now completely dependent on charity because of the collapse of the economy. Export for commercial purposes, which was allowed on exceptional basis for the strawberry and flower markets, was minimal: 259 trucks in three years were allowed to leave Gaza, which is less than what Gaza residents were exporting in four days prior to June 2001.

• The Foreign Ministry claims that Israel facilitates “all cases of medical treatments from Gaza unless the patient is a known perpetrator of terror”. Last year, over 2,300 entry permits for medical treatment were either rejected or delayed by Israeli officials. These rejections included many individuals who, according to Israel, “only” wish to improve their “quality of life” – by trying to avoid loss of vision or limbs. In these cases, Israel says it need not allow entrance. It also includes patients denied entry where no security allegation was made, but rather the military claimed there was concern that they would remain in the West Bank after treatment, contrary to Israel’s political goal of separating Gaza from the West Bank.

• During the first two months of 2010, PHR-Israel re-submitted the requests of 23 individuals who were initially rejected for security reasons. Thanks to expert opinions from senior Israeli physicians attached to each request, 10 out of the 23 cases were overturned. This raises serious questions about the balancing act that Israel claims it performs between each patient’s medical needs and his or her perceived threat to State security. It also raises questions about the State’s definition of “security risk”.

• Israel claims that Hamas is often an obstacle to granting permits for medical care. However, Hamas has little to do with the permit process. The process was actually created during the Oslo Peace Process, and both the Palestinian Authority and Israel have a role to play. Patients are required to receive an authorized referral from practicing physicians in Gaza, apply for financial coverage from the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, submit papers to a Palestinian Civil Affairs Committee in Gaza subject to the authority of the PA in Ramallah, which then forwards the request to the Israeli Army at Erez Crossing. This process takes an average of 6 weeks and is extremely taxing on Gaza’s sick and injured as well as their families.

• While Israel has the right to conduct security checks, Israel often exploits a patient’s vulnerable state by preconditioning entry for medical treatment on participation in a Shin Bet interrogation – in violation of international law. In several cases, the Shin Bet has summoned patients to the Erez Crossing for security investigations, and then tried to coerce them into collaborating with the Shin Bet by conditioning an exit permit on their collection and provision of information to the Shin Bet. In a number of instances, the Shin Bet went as far as using the permit application process as a way to “lure” Palestinians to the Erez checkpoint in order to arrest them: upon arrival at the checkpoint, they have been immediately arrested and imprisoned in Israeli jails.

Illustration: Moran Barak, source: PHR-Israel

• The MFA reports that coordination with international parties on entrance for building supplies takes place regularly. OCHA, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that it took nine months of negotiations to get approval for entrance of items to finish construction on some 151 housing facilities that were already 85% complete on the eve of the closure in June 2007. This is a hard-fought-for drop in the bucket compared with the 86,000 housing units that are needed in Gaza.

• Likewise, UNRWA reports that donor funds to the tune of $109 million USD are frozen because restrictions on movement of building materials prevent breaking ground on 24 constructions and infrastructure projects. If it took nine months to negotiate the start of each of the 24 projects, we’d be looking at 18 years of negotiations.

• We’ve written before about Israel’s refusal to allow books, stationery, toys, and other educational materials for 248,000 students in Gaza, although it makes an exception for other students studying in UNRWA schools. But UNRWA alone, whose schools generally operate three shifts to deal with overcrowding, needs to build 100 schools to meet demand, and Israel refuses to allow the building materials to enter. Even if Israel were to agree to allow in the building materials and if it takes nine months to negotiate the construction of each school, UNRWA would have its schools after about 75 years, about the time that today’s children would be in their 80s.

We are encouraged that the MFA report seems to embrace the need to facilitate humanitarian aid, while encouraging the development of a healthy economy in Gaza. If Israel is truly interested in implementing such a policy, it would be advised to open Gaza’s crossings for movement of goods and people, subject only to concrete security considerations and not political maneuvering.