On Tuesday, May 25, 2010, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) released its latest update, claiming to be actively contributing to the humanitarian needs and even economic development of the Gaza Strip. Contrast the MFA report with UN agency OCHA’s critical report on limitations to access in the Palestinian territory released on May 27, 2010.

We wrote last week about the seeming paradox between a policy whose stated goals are to reduce civilians to the minimum “essential for survival” (but not to fall below it) in order to achieve political gains, while at the same time boasting of one’s humanitarianism.

This week, together with Physicians for Human Rights-Israel (PHR-Israel), an Israeli human rights group that protects the right to health, we provide further details.

Humanitarian aid only, and even that just barely trickles through

• Food and hygiene products continue to account for 76% of the goods allowed in to Gaza, although entrance is routinely denied for many food items including chocolate and vinegar. Food items that could be used as inputs for local food production – such as margarine in large buckets or glucose – are banned. Civil society institutions, critical infrastructure, factories, schools, and even homes can’t function on flour, sugar, and sponges alone.

• Numbers show that indeed many tons of aid is going into the Strip, destined especially for the 80% of Gaza residents now completely dependent on charity because of the collapse of the economy. Export for commercial purposes, which was allowed on exceptional basis for the strawberry and flower markets, was minimal: 259 trucks in three years were allowed to leave Gaza, which is less than what Gaza residents were exporting in four days prior to June 2001.

• The Foreign Ministry claims that Israel facilitates “all cases of medical treatments from Gaza unless the patient is a known perpetrator of terror”. Last year, over 2,300 entry permits for medical treatment were either rejected or delayed by Israeli officials. These rejections included many individuals who, according to Israel, “only” wish to improve their “quality of life” – by trying to avoid loss of vision or limbs. In these cases, Israel says it need not allow entrance. It also includes patients denied entry where no security allegation was made, but rather the military claimed there was concern that they would remain in the West Bank after treatment, contrary to Israel’s political goal of separating Gaza from the West Bank.

• During the first two months of 2010, PHR-Israel re-submitted the requests of 23 individuals who were initially rejected for security reasons. Thanks to expert opinions from senior Israeli physicians attached to each request, 10 out of the 23 cases were overturned. This raises serious questions about the balancing act that Israel claims it performs between each patient’s medical needs and his or her perceived threat to State security. It also raises questions about the State’s definition of “security risk”.

• Israel claims that Hamas is often an obstacle to granting permits for medical care. However, Hamas has little to do with the permit process. The process was actually created during the Oslo Peace Process, and both the Palestinian Authority and Israel have a role to play. Patients are required to receive an authorized referral from practicing physicians in Gaza, apply for financial coverage from the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, submit papers to a Palestinian Civil Affairs Committee in Gaza subject to the authority of the PA in Ramallah, which then forwards the request to the Israeli Army at Erez Crossing. This process takes an average of 6 weeks and is extremely taxing on Gaza’s sick and injured as well as their families.

• While Israel has the right to conduct security checks, Israel often exploits a patient’s vulnerable state by preconditioning entry for medical treatment on participation in a Shin Bet interrogation – in violation of international law. In several cases, the Shin Bet has summoned patients to the Erez Crossing for security investigations, and then tried to coerce them into collaborating with the Shin Bet by conditioning an exit permit on their collection and provision of information to the Shin Bet. In a number of instances, the Shin Bet went as far as using the permit application process as a way to “lure” Palestinians to the Erez checkpoint in order to arrest them: upon arrival at the checkpoint, they have been immediately arrested and imprisoned in Israeli jails.

Illustration: Moran Barak, source: PHR-Israel

• The MFA reports that coordination with international parties on entrance for building supplies takes place regularly. OCHA, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that it took nine months of negotiations to get approval for entrance of items to finish construction on some 151 housing facilities that were already 85% complete on the eve of the closure in June 2007. This is a hard-fought-for drop in the bucket compared with the 86,000 housing units that are needed in Gaza.

• Likewise, UNRWA reports that donor funds to the tune of $109 million USD are frozen because restrictions on movement of building materials prevent breaking ground on 24 constructions and infrastructure projects. If it took nine months to negotiate the start of each of the 24 projects, we’d be looking at 18 years of negotiations.

• We’ve written before about Israel’s refusal to allow books, stationery, toys, and other educational materials for 248,000 students in Gaza, although it makes an exception for other students studying in UNRWA schools. But UNRWA alone, whose schools generally operate three shifts to deal with overcrowding, needs to build 100 schools to meet demand, and Israel refuses to allow the building materials to enter. Even if Israel were to agree to allow in the building materials and if it takes nine months to negotiate the construction of each school, UNRWA would have its schools after about 75 years, about the time that today’s children would be in their 80s.

We are encouraged that the MFA report seems to embrace the need to facilitate humanitarian aid, while encouraging the development of a healthy economy in Gaza. If Israel is truly interested in implementing such a policy, it would be advised to open Gaza’s crossings for movement of goods and people, subject only to concrete security considerations and not political maneuvering.

Israel’s declared objective: Political — to weaken (or overthrow?) the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip.

The means: Economic warfare: “The transfer of goods into the Gaza Strip will be restricted“. 

Implementation: Erasing the customs code ascribed to the Gaza Strip from the computer system of the Israeli Customs Administration and forbidding the import of any goods that are not defined as “humanitarian”.

The significance: Gaza is closed to the import of goods. Theoretically, goods exempt from customs (such as goods from the West Bank and Israel) could be imported, but in practice Israel does not allow the transfer of goods that are not humanitarian.

Consequences: The business sector that existed in Gaza on the eve of the closure in 2007 is precluded from importing raw materials and commercial goods, and the Palestinian Authority cannot collect on the taxes that would be imposed on these goods. Not to mention that 1.5 million people are suffering from a punishing closure, which severely limits their access to goods and to employment options.

And meanwhile in Gaza: The emergence of a “parallel market” in the form of approximately 1,200 tunnels, through which more than 4,300 kinds of items are imported (as opposed to the few dozen items which Israel allows in). Recently, the Hamas government took another step to institutionalize the tunnel economy when it decided to impose official taxes on some of the goods transferred through the tunnels, in addition to the taxes already imposed on those who apply for licenses to dig and operate tunnels.

Indeed, despite indications that the Hamas government is facing a cash flow problem and has even confiscated money, the public service sector in Gaza is now estimated to employ and provide a source of income for 30,000 workers and an estimated 180,000 family members who are sustained, among other things, by the taxes that the government collects in Gaza, including from the tunnel industry. And thus a new business class has emerged in Gaza, fast becoming wealthy from the tunnel economy.

So who, then, is Israel actually weakening?

The eleven-day protest of Ahmed Sabeh, released from an Israeli prison on Wednesday, April 21, 2010, and taken to the Gaza Strip – even though his home, wife and son are in Tulkarem – raises an interesting challenge to Israel’s control over the borders and population registry of the occupied Palestinian territory. Mr. Sabeh has camped out inside the Erez Crossing, refusing to enter Gaza, in protest of Israel’s refusal to allow him to return to his home in the West Bank. The Hamas government, in turn, has announced that it will not allow him back into Gaza, in order to avoid facilitating the Israeli policy of removing Palestinians from the West Bank.

Mr. Sabeh, represented by HaMoked – Center for the Defence of the Individual, was taken to Gaza as part of a policy to remove from the West Bank Palestinians whose addresses in the Israeli controlled population registry are listed in Gaza, a policy strengthened by a new military order that gives the military broad powers to deport and arrest.

His refusal to enter Gaza – and the Hamas government’s refusal to receive him – provide a window into Israel’s double-bind policy on control of Gaza. On the one hand, Israel claims that it has ended its occupation of Gaza and that Gaza is a “foreign” and even “hostile” entity for whose 1.5 million residents – Israel bears no responsibility. On the other hand, Israel has determined, that Mr. Sabeh is a “resident” of the supposedly “foreign” entity of Gaza (through Israel’s control of the Palestinian Population Registry) and that Israel may force him to live there (through Israel’s control of Gaza’s borders). 

Compare Mr. Sabeh’s plight with that of Palestinians who entered the West Bank from Jordan, but Israel refuses to “recognize” their residence and issue them Palestinian ID cards. Israel does not try to deport them to Jordan, because Israel cannot dictate who is a citizen of Jordan and cannot force Jordan, a sovereign state, to accept a deportee. Not so for Gaza, part of the occupied Palestinian territory, where Israel decides who is a Palestinian resident and uses its control to dictate where he or she may live (in the case of Mr. Sabeh – thus far with only limited success).

Gaza Gateway will soon be adding to its weekly updates statistics about the movement of persons through Gaza’s crossings – and we’ll be sure to include data about those stuck in the middle.

When the closure was imposed on the Gaza Strip in June 2007, clothes and footwear importers in Gaza found themselves unable to bring goods into the Strip that they had ordered from abroad. For almost three years now, these goods have been sitting in storage containers at Israel’s port in Ashdod or in the West Bank. Each month of storage costs an importer between $300-$500 per container.

Recently, however, it appears that Israeli policy-makers decided that fashion no longer constitutes a security threat to Israel (at least temporarily). In response to a petition to Israel’s High Court (see link to petition (in Hebrew)) by importers in Gaza, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories stated that it had decided “on a one-time basis, and as a goodwill humanitarian gesture, to grant permission to the petitioners to transfer their clothing and footwear products” to Gaza. This transfer was, however, subject to several conditions imposed by Israel, including: that the products were acquired prior to the Hamas takeover of the Strip; that the goods were originally purchased with the intention of being transferred to Gaza, and of course, upon provision of detailed information on the nature of the goods, such as the type of clothing (prompting us to ask whether there can be items of clothing more dangerous than others?).

Since April 4, 2010, Israel has permitted the transfer of clothing and footwear products to Gaza, and to date 110 trucks have entered the Strip, at a rate of 10 trucks per day. However, with each truck that enters, it becomes clear that the celebration over the transfer of new items may have been premature: the clothes and shoes have accumulated moisture in the many months of storage, and many of the products have either rotted completely or been partially damaged by mildew.  The losses to the merchants, in addition to the costs of storage, are estimated at 30% of the value of each truck.

Almost 750 more containers of clothes, shoes and other goods, including office equipment and children’s games, are still sitting in Israel or in the West Bank. Due to Israel’s vague and arbitrary policies regarding transfer of goods to Gaza, it’s not clear if and when it will decide to put a stop to this “one-time”, “humanitarian gesture” or when it will again permit the transfer of such items in the future. 

The pictures were taken by Khaled Abu Sahlul Company and Hamza Abu Hilal Company.

The firing of rockets and mortar shells on towns in southern Israel from the Gaza Strip last week should be categorically condemned, since it targeted Israeli civilians or failed to distinguish between military and civilian targets. The perpetrators and the Hamas government which allows militant groups to fire from the territory under its control must be held accountable.

The Israeli Defense Ministry’s hasty response, however, declaring that Kerem Shalom would be closed until further notice, raised concern among those trying to transfer humanitarian supplies to Gaza. It was not clear whether the closure of the crossing was a legitimate measure in response to a real and concrete security risk to the crossing and those who work there, or if the Defense Ministry decided to react as it had in the second half of 2008: In the months leading up to the Gaza war, Israel closed the civilian crossings as punitive retribution for rocket fire, not as a response to a concrete security threat.

Residents of Gaza breathed a sigh of relief on Sunday, when Israel permitted the reopening of the Kerem Shalom Crossing and the resumption of a minimum level of supply to the Strip. The dependence on Kerem Shalom is so great because it is virtually the only goods’ crossing that remains open; every closure thus blocks the transfer of goods that are in short supply in Gaza because of the Israeli-imposed “minimum humanitarian standard”.

Since the closure of Gaza began in June 2007, Israel has systematically worked to restrict the operation of the Gaza Strip’s crossings – policies that reached a peak with the closure of the Nahal Oz crossing at the start of 2010. And so, at this time, with the exception of the grain conveyor at the Karni Crossing, the Gaza Strip is dependent on one crossing – Kerem Shalom – which was originally designed for the occasional transfer of humanitarian aid and which has limited capacity. Israel has even insisted that Egypt transfer all aid to the Gaza Strip coming from its territory via the Kerem Shalom crossing and not via its own crossing at Rafah. Last week, Egypt announced that it would permit supply from its territory only via Kerem Shalom. This dependence on Kerem Shalom is well-known to those who shoot at it and to those who allow the shooting to take place.

Israeli policies to restrict the operation of the Kerem Shalom crossing stand in violation of international agreements it has signed, which take into account situations where a security risk may occur at a particular crossing. In these agreements Israel committed to three basic principles that were intended to ensure that the Gaza Strip crossings would function on a continuous basis, even in the presence of real security threats: the operation of alternative lanes (lane redundancy) and alternative crossings (passage redundancy), as well as a commitment to the primary aim: the principle of continuous operation. Yet as of 2010, virtually all alternative crossings have been closed.

Since Israel insists on enforcing an almost total closure policy that leaves the Gaza Strip “on the edge” in every aspect of life (food, goods, electricity, cooking gas and more), every closure of the single crossing still permitted to operate, when already only minimum amounts are allowed through it, threatens to push Gaza over the edge.

As news organizations report each detail of a possible prisoner release deal between Israel and Hamas, a related subject is receiving less attention: whether the release of the captured Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, would lead to an opening of Gaza’s crossings, closed to all but the bare minimum passage of people and goods. Writing in Haaretz, Akiva Eldar has suggested that one would not necessarily follow the other:

“It has been decided that the Shalit deal will not bring about a change in Israel’s policy regarding the blockade of Gaza and preventing the passage of people and goods between Gaza and the West Bank, except for humanitarian cases and essential goods”.

Really? It won’t?

Israel has justified its 3.5 year closure of Rafah Crossing and 2.5 year closure of Gaza’s other crossings as “sanctions” designed to pressure the Hamas regime, especially to release Shalit. While Gisha and other human rights groups have criticized the closure as unlawful collective punishment – irrespective of its “goals” – Israeli officials  have insisted that closing Gaza’s crossings nearly hermetically is not only permissible but is also effective in achieving political objectives. The position that prevailed in an August 24, 2006 internal discussion among security officials regarding Rafah Crossing, reproduced in Gisha’s position paper, Disengaged Occupiers was to:

“Oppose opening the crossing even for a few hours, so long as the issue of the captured soldier remains unchanged”.

The “logic” of the policy was to make life so difficult in the Gaza Strip, that the 1.5 million civilians trapped in Gaza would somehow “overthrow” Hamas or at least – exert pressure for the Hamas regime to acquiesce to Israeli demands.

True, the Israeli public never quite believed the effectiveness of that goal: a 2008 survey commissioned by Gisha and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel found that 78% of Jewish Israelis believed it was unlikely that the closure would lead to regime change in Gaza, and 83% believed that Hamas had been strengthened since the closure was tightened in June 2007. A newly released film by the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem uses animation to show just how fanciful the idea that the suffering of 1.5 million people could somehow be “effective” in putting the squeeze on Hamas. But Israeli policy-makers insist that Gaza residents could be “taught a lesson” through the closure. Can they really?

A leading Israeli business newspaper this week provided a window into a different Palestinian economy – “a tunnel economy.” Meanwhile, in the Gaza Strip, the status quo continues this week – with Israel blowing up more tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt border in response to rocket fire on Israel.

Perhaps the Israeli business sector understands something that Israeli politicians simply don’t comprehend – that the Palestinian economy in Gaza, which has collapsed due the 27-month-long closure imposed by Israel, has changed beyond recognition: hundreds of tunnels are currently operational in the Strip (between 600 and 1,000) and thousands of people are risking their lives to work in them. These tunnels are supplying about two-thirds of the goods required by the residents of the Gaza Strip. Thousands of dollars in permit fees and millions of dollars in taxes are being collected by the Hamas government. 

While in Israel they are saying that the last Gaza war gave Israel an economic boost, in Gaza, besides the other kinds of damage sustained, thousands of people who chose to invest in operating the tunnels blown up by Israel have sustained a financial loss.

Israeli security officials view the tunnels as a security threat, due to the concern that arms will be smuggled through them, and this is the reason given for their destruction. Palestinian traders would also prefer to avoid the high costs of transporting goods via the tunnels and resume overland trade, via the border crossings that have remained closed now for over two years.

In the JPost today Yagil Henkin – a military historian from the Shalem Center – argues that “it is very unlikely that sanctions will cause the Hamas government to fall,” as “comprehensive economic sanctions can backfire; they tend to consolidate regimes.” With a historical review of other experiences with sanctions in the last few decades, he explains that “sanctions give the regime total control over the distribution of goods, making the population more dependent on it and thus less likely to resist.”

He goes on to advise: “It is obvious that embargoes of food and basic goods are counter-productive. The people of Gaza may or may not view Hamas as the culprit, but in any case, it is unlikely that the lack of pasta or fresh meat will goad them to overthrow their government.”