The firing of rockets and mortar shells on towns in southern Israel from the Gaza Strip last week should be categorically condemned, since it targeted Israeli civilians or failed to distinguish between military and civilian targets. The perpetrators and the Hamas government which allows militant groups to fire from the territory under its control must be held accountable.

The Israeli Defense Ministry’s hasty response, however, declaring that Kerem Shalom would be closed until further notice, raised concern among those trying to transfer humanitarian supplies to Gaza. It was not clear whether the closure of the crossing was a legitimate measure in response to a real and concrete security risk to the crossing and those who work there, or if the Defense Ministry decided to react as it had in the second half of 2008: In the months leading up to the Gaza war, Israel closed the civilian crossings as punitive retribution for rocket fire, not as a response to a concrete security threat.

Residents of Gaza breathed a sigh of relief on Sunday, when Israel permitted the reopening of the Kerem Shalom Crossing and the resumption of a minimum level of supply to the Strip. The dependence on Kerem Shalom is so great because it is virtually the only goods’ crossing that remains open; every closure thus blocks the transfer of goods that are in short supply in Gaza because of the Israeli-imposed “minimum humanitarian standard”.

Since the closure of Gaza began in June 2007, Israel has systematically worked to restrict the operation of the Gaza Strip’s crossings – policies that reached a peak with the closure of the Nahal Oz crossing at the start of 2010. And so, at this time, with the exception of the grain conveyor at the Karni Crossing, the Gaza Strip is dependent on one crossing – Kerem Shalom – which was originally designed for the occasional transfer of humanitarian aid and which has limited capacity. Israel has even insisted that Egypt transfer all aid to the Gaza Strip coming from its territory via the Kerem Shalom crossing and not via its own crossing at Rafah. Last week, Egypt announced that it would permit supply from its territory only via Kerem Shalom. This dependence on Kerem Shalom is well-known to those who shoot at it and to those who allow the shooting to take place.

Israeli policies to restrict the operation of the Kerem Shalom crossing stand in violation of international agreements it has signed, which take into account situations where a security risk may occur at a particular crossing. In these agreements Israel committed to three basic principles that were intended to ensure that the Gaza Strip crossings would function on a continuous basis, even in the presence of real security threats: the operation of alternative lanes (lane redundancy) and alternative crossings (passage redundancy), as well as a commitment to the primary aim: the principle of continuous operation. Yet as of 2010, virtually all alternative crossings have been closed.

Since Israel insists on enforcing an almost total closure policy that leaves the Gaza Strip “on the edge” in every aspect of life (food, goods, electricity, cooking gas and more), every closure of the single crossing still permitted to operate, when already only minimum amounts are allowed through it, threatens to push Gaza over the edge.

As news organizations report each detail of a possible prisoner release deal between Israel and Hamas, a related subject is receiving less attention: whether the release of the captured Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, would lead to an opening of Gaza’s crossings, closed to all but the bare minimum passage of people and goods. Writing in Haaretz, Akiva Eldar has suggested that one would not necessarily follow the other:

“It has been decided that the Shalit deal will not bring about a change in Israel’s policy regarding the blockade of Gaza and preventing the passage of people and goods between Gaza and the West Bank, except for humanitarian cases and essential goods”.

Really? It won’t?

Israel has justified its 3.5 year closure of Rafah Crossing and 2.5 year closure of Gaza’s other crossings as “sanctions” designed to pressure the Hamas regime, especially to release Shalit. While Gisha and other human rights groups have criticized the closure as unlawful collective punishment – irrespective of its “goals” – Israeli officials  have insisted that closing Gaza’s crossings nearly hermetically is not only permissible but is also effective in achieving political objectives. The position that prevailed in an August 24, 2006 internal discussion among security officials regarding Rafah Crossing, reproduced in Gisha’s position paper, Disengaged Occupiers was to:

“Oppose opening the crossing even for a few hours, so long as the issue of the captured soldier remains unchanged”.

The “logic” of the policy was to make life so difficult in the Gaza Strip, that the 1.5 million civilians trapped in Gaza would somehow “overthrow” Hamas or at least – exert pressure for the Hamas regime to acquiesce to Israeli demands.

True, the Israeli public never quite believed the effectiveness of that goal: a 2008 survey commissioned by Gisha and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel found that 78% of Jewish Israelis believed it was unlikely that the closure would lead to regime change in Gaza, and 83% believed that Hamas had been strengthened since the closure was tightened in June 2007. A newly released film by the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem uses animation to show just how fanciful the idea that the suffering of 1.5 million people could somehow be “effective” in putting the squeeze on Hamas. But Israeli policy-makers insist that Gaza residents could be “taught a lesson” through the closure. Can they really?

A leading Israeli business newspaper this week provided a window into a different Palestinian economy – “a tunnel economy.” Meanwhile, in the Gaza Strip, the status quo continues this week – with Israel blowing up more tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt border in response to rocket fire on Israel.

Perhaps the Israeli business sector understands something that Israeli politicians simply don’t comprehend – that the Palestinian economy in Gaza, which has collapsed due the 27-month-long closure imposed by Israel, has changed beyond recognition: hundreds of tunnels are currently operational in the Strip (between 600 and 1,000) and thousands of people are risking their lives to work in them. These tunnels are supplying about two-thirds of the goods required by the residents of the Gaza Strip. Thousands of dollars in permit fees and millions of dollars in taxes are being collected by the Hamas government. 

While in Israel they are saying that the last Gaza war gave Israel an economic boost, in Gaza, besides the other kinds of damage sustained, thousands of people who chose to invest in operating the tunnels blown up by Israel have sustained a financial loss.

Israeli security officials view the tunnels as a security threat, due to the concern that arms will be smuggled through them, and this is the reason given for their destruction. Palestinian traders would also prefer to avoid the high costs of transporting goods via the tunnels and resume overland trade, via the border crossings that have remained closed now for over two years.

In the JPost today Yagil Henkin – a military historian from the Shalem Center – argues that “it is very unlikely that sanctions will cause the Hamas government to fall,” as “comprehensive economic sanctions can backfire; they tend to consolidate regimes.” With a historical review of other experiences with sanctions in the last few decades, he explains that “sanctions give the regime total control over the distribution of goods, making the population more dependent on it and thus less likely to resist.”

He goes on to advise: “It is obvious that embargoes of food and basic goods are counter-productive. The people of Gaza may or may not view Hamas as the culprit, but in any case, it is unlikely that the lack of pasta or fresh meat will goad them to overthrow their government.”