1. Passage through the crossing remains limited: Egypt has indicated that it will operate the crossing six days per week during regular working hours, but it seems this won’t be enough: between 400 – 450 individuals have been able to travel through the crossing per day from Gaza to Egypt. From November 2005 to June 2006, approximately 660 passengers per day exited the Gaza Strip through Rafah and according to the Palestinian Crossings Authority, 10,000 people are currently waiting to travel.
2. The situation is unstable: As last week’s closure of the crossing indicates, the situation on both sides of Rafah remains unstable, such that it’s not clear whether the crossing will remain open, nor exactly to what degree.
3. Rafah doesn’t lead to the West Bank: Travel and movement of goods between Gaza and the West Bank remains severely limited, a problem which Rafah cannot address, as goods and Gaza ID holders are not allowed into the West Bank even via the Egypt-Jordan route. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip are part of the same customs envelope, and are recognized, including by Israel, as a single territorial unit, which, despite four years of tight closure, still shares one economy, one education system, one healthcare system and countless familial and social ties.
   

   Rafah Crossing, June 2011. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

4. Export is not moving and not through Rafah either: Export remains severely limited (about 2 truckloads per day, the last of which left Gaza on May 12, 2011, compared with a target of 400 per day in the Agreement on Movement and Access) and is currently not taking place through Rafah at all. This is impacting industries across Gaza which used to sell or export their wares in Israel, the West Bank and abroad. Before the closure, the vast majority of Gaza’s “exports” were sold in Israel and the West Bank.
5. Construction materials do not enter through Rafah: Construction materials are being let into Gaza via Kerem Shalom only (between Israel and Gaza) for approved projects undertaken by international organizations and following exceedingly lengthy bureaucratic procedures. Each month since January 2011, about 10% of what entered monthly in the years prior to June 2007 has entered for these specific projects. At present, Egyptian authorities have not indicated if or when they will allow construction materials to pass at Rafah.
6. Import of goods does not take place at Rafah: Imports to the Strip purchased by the private sector enter Gaza from Israel via Kerem Shalom Crossing. Even if Egypt were to allow goods to enter at Rafah (and there is no indication that they intend to do so nor when) the crossing and surrounding roadways are not currently equipped to handle the transfer of large quantities of goods, on the scale of the access needs of the Strip.
   

   Rafah Crossing, June 2011. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

7. Humanitarian aid does not regularly enter through Rafah: Aid enters Gaza via Kerem Shalom Crossing, between Gaza and Israel. At present, Egyptian authorities have not indicated if or when they will allow convoys of humanitarian aid to pass at Rafah.
8. Medical patients in need of treatment not available in Gaza cannot always make the long journey to Egyptian hospitals. In any case, Palestinian hospitals in east Jerusalem and the West Bank, part of a common Palestinian health care system, are there to serve all residents of the Palestinian territory, including Gaza residents.
9. Reports prove it: Restrictions on access at the crossings between Israel and Gaza (at Kerem Shalom for goods and Erez for people) continue to impact the well-being of residents of the Strip. Yesterday UNRWA published a study showing high rates of unemployment and the Association for International Development Agencies also reportedrecently on how limits on the entrance of construction materials primarily impacts the work of aid agencies and residents of Gaza.
   

   Rafah Crossing, June 2011. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

10. Rafah doesn’t lead to the West Bank: Oh wait, did we say that already? Well, we’re saying it again, because it’s very, very important.

Some might think that what happens at Rafah Crossing is irrelevant to Israel; as if, since the disengagement, Israel no longer owes obligations to the people of Gaza. If that’s what you think, we made this video for you:

Wheat is delivered to Gaza through the conveyer belt at the Karni crossing (currently the only operational part of the crossing, which was closed to trucks in June 2007). So far, the conveyer belt has been operational on only two days per week for the transfer of wheat and animal feed into Gaza.  However, since mid-October, Israel has reduced the transfer of wheat and animal feed to just one day per week. On the other day, Israel allows gravel to be transferred to the Strip, pursuant to its June announcement regarding changes to the policy for the entry of goods into Gaza, including a promise to allow the entry of construction materials for projects run by international organizations. Incidentally, Israel also promised to open other land crossings “if the need arises to further increase the capacity of the crossings”.

In practice, approvals for construction projects are extremely limited – since the change in policy, an average of 107 trucks carrying construction materials were allowed into Gaza per month compared to an average of about 5,000 trucks which entered Gaza every month prior to the closure. In addition, instead of opening additional crossing points, Israel has announced its intention to close the Karni conveyor belt and transfer all operations to Kerem Shalom.

Thus Israel’s promise to allow the entry of construction materials, which was supposed to be good news for the residents of Gaza, has created additional difficulties in transferring basic and essential nutritional ingredients. Israel refuses to increase the number of days the conveyor belt operates and with regard to opening additional crossing points – there is no room for discussion.

Moreover, the gravel which Israel allows into the Gaza Strip is not sufficient for the construction planned by international organizations. According to UNRWA, at this rate, it will take 75 years to implement the organization’s plan to rehabilitate Gaza. UNRWA, incidentally, is also facing a shortage in its flour reserves, because it buys flour from the local market in Gaza after the wheat is transferred to the Strip through the Karni crossing.

Employees in a furniture factory in Gaza.

As opposed to the textile factory we wrote about last week, al-Isi’s factory did not export to the West Bank before 2007, instead focusing on the local market. But since the sweeping ban on export was imposed in June 2007, al-Isi has found himself competing for the small local market in Gaza with all of the vendors who cannot export to the West Bank. The market is flooded with local merchandise, in addition to Israeli merchandise that is allowed in, and as a result, prices have dropped to the point where merchants hardly make any profit.

But that’s not the only problem. Al-Isi explains that when Israel banned the import of wooden boards, he bought expensive boards smuggled through the tunnels. When the ban was lifted, al-Isi discovered that the price of the boards he was buying was three times higher than the price of those recently brought into the Gaza Strip through the crossings from Israel. And so al-Isi found himself having to compete with other furniture-makers who had paid less for their materials, which in turn forced him to reduce production by 50%. If he had continued producing at the normal volume, says al-Isi, his losses would have reached $50,000.

Furniture factory in Gaza

The ban on export not only floods the market with cheap products but also causes a steep rise in unemployment. Whereas in the past al-Isi had 18 carpenters working in the factory’s workshops, today he has only five workers. Al-Isi says that the workers suffer from the situation the most. So much so that most of them now rely on the aid of local and international organizations: “Most are frustrated and desperate about the economic situation”, al-Isi says sadly, “and we merchants do not have a magic wand to change the situation in Gaza”.

Therefore, the ban on export, which is one of the most important aspects of the closure on Gaza, affects directly the citizens’ right to live with dignity.

“Even though there was not a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, I decided to gradually ease the limitations and the movement of goods through the land crossings. I did so because gradually these limitations turned into a diplomatic and public relations burden”.

If the limitations really were, as Netanyahu claimed, necessary “to prevent the entry of weapons and war materiel into Gaza”, easing them just in order to improve Israel’s public relations would seem grossly irresponsible. If they weren’t necessary for security – why were they imposed in the first place?

We also found puzzling Netanyahu’s claim that “Israel increased the number of trucks entering Gaza by approximately 30% over the five months preceding the flotilla incident”.  According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the first five months of 2010, Israel actually decreased the volume of trucks permitted into Gaza by 9%, relative to 2009 (see the first and last pages of the MFA report, which show that the monthly average of trucks allowed into Gaza in 2009 was 2,576, compared with just 2,329 in the first five months of 2010).

The real change in the volume of trucks permitted into Gaza came only after the flotilla incident, when Israel was pressed to justify its policy blocking the movement of people and goods into and out of Gaza: Last week, Israel allowed Gaza residents to receive 1,126 truckloads of goods, approximately 45% of need, as compared to about 25% of need prior to the flotilla incident.

Export and the movement of people, critical for economic recovery and normal life in Gaza, are still blocked. Perhaps these restrictions do not constitute a sufficiently heavy “diplomatic and public relations burden”?

Prices at the new shopping mall are particularly low, clients say, and considering the limited buying power of Gaza residents, there seems to be no other choice. Sixty-one percent of households in the Gaza Strip suffer from food insecurity, where the UN defines food security as “a situation in which all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. Unemployment is at 34%, a figure that should come as no surprise due to the sweeping ban on exports from Gaza enforced since the beginning of the closure of Gaza in June 2007. Israel has emphasized that the recent cabinet decision announcing an easing of the closure does not apply to export (nor to the movement of people). Even the recent lifting of the ban on the transfer of raw materials and the slow trickle of spare parts into Gaza have not yet made their mark on economic activity, especially considering the crossings’ capacity limitations.

According to the mall’s directors, the vast majority of brands sold at the mall – 90% – are Israeli-made, in addition to a small percentage of items originating in the West Bank. This is another indication of the dearth of goods manufactured in Gaza itself. Indeed, how can you manufacture clothing, shoes, carpets and food products (items that have been manufactured in Gaza in the past), when, even after the cabinet decision to “lift the closure”, the amount of goods transferred into Gaza last week (979 trucks compared to 2,350 trucks a week in 2005) meets only 40% of needs?

The price is of the products at the mall may be low, but apparently not low enough for most of the residents of Gaza.

What has changed on the ground since the announcement and more generally, since international pressure mounted on Israel in the wake of the May 31 flotilla incident? The list of consumer goods permitted into Gaza has been expanded to include previously banned items such as ketchup, mayonnaise, and children’s toys. Ah, yes, and chips (french fries) as well, for dipping into the ketchup. But that’s about it.

We are therefore puzzled by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statement that “we are already seeing a significant growth in the scope of the civilian goods entering Gaza.” There has been no significant change in the volume of trucks entering Gaza, as is evident from Gaza Gateway’s graphs. Last week, for example, 654 trucks entered Gaza, including via the grain elevator, similar to the number that entered in the week before the flotilla incident (662). This week, as of yesterday, the fourth of five working days for the crossings, approximately 567 trucks had entered Gaza, which is consistent with the policy, since June 2007, to allow entry of approximately 25% of what Gaza residents need.

Indeed, it is hard to see how more goods could enter Gaza, given that the one crossing still operating – Kerem Shalom (Kerem Abu Salam) – is working at near capacity with an average of 110 trucks per day of goods, five days per week. The “significant growth” mentioned by Mr. Netanyahu would be difficult unless Israel opens some of the crossings it has sealed over the last three years, including Karni Crossing, Gaza’s commercial lifeline, with a capacity of 1,000 trucks per day.

In any event, as Dan Ephron notes in Newsweek today, without the ability to export finished products and receive raw materials (they are still not being allowed in), economic recovery in Gaza will remain elusive.

We wrote last week about the seeming paradox between a policy whose stated goals are to reduce civilians to the minimum “essential for survival” (but not to fall below it) in order to achieve political gains, while at the same time boasting of one’s humanitarianism.

This week, together with Physicians for Human Rights-Israel (PHR-Israel), an Israeli human rights group that protects the right to health, we provide further details.

Humanitarian aid only, and even that just barely trickles through

• Food and hygiene products continue to account for 76% of the goods allowed in to Gaza, although entrance is routinely denied for many food items including chocolate and vinegar. Food items that could be used as inputs for local food production – such as margarine in large buckets or glucose – are banned. Civil society institutions, critical infrastructure, factories, schools, and even homes can’t function on flour, sugar, and sponges alone.

• Numbers show that indeed many tons of aid is going into the Strip, destined especially for the 80% of Gaza residents now completely dependent on charity because of the collapse of the economy. Export for commercial purposes, which was allowed on exceptional basis for the strawberry and flower markets, was minimal: 259 trucks in three years were allowed to leave Gaza, which is less than what Gaza residents were exporting in four days prior to June 2001.

• The Foreign Ministry claims that Israel facilitates “all cases of medical treatments from Gaza unless the patient is a known perpetrator of terror”. Last year, over 2,300 entry permits for medical treatment were either rejected or delayed by Israeli officials. These rejections included many individuals who, according to Israel, “only” wish to improve their “quality of life” – by trying to avoid loss of vision or limbs. In these cases, Israel says it need not allow entrance. It also includes patients denied entry where no security allegation was made, but rather the military claimed there was concern that they would remain in the West Bank after treatment, contrary to Israel’s political goal of separating Gaza from the West Bank.

• During the first two months of 2010, PHR-Israel re-submitted the requests of 23 individuals who were initially rejected for security reasons. Thanks to expert opinions from senior Israeli physicians attached to each request, 10 out of the 23 cases were overturned. This raises serious questions about the balancing act that Israel claims it performs between each patient’s medical needs and his or her perceived threat to State security. It also raises questions about the State’s definition of “security risk”.

• Israel claims that Hamas is often an obstacle to granting permits for medical care. However, Hamas has little to do with the permit process. The process was actually created during the Oslo Peace Process, and both the Palestinian Authority and Israel have a role to play. Patients are required to receive an authorized referral from practicing physicians in Gaza, apply for financial coverage from the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, submit papers to a Palestinian Civil Affairs Committee in Gaza subject to the authority of the PA in Ramallah, which then forwards the request to the Israeli Army at Erez Crossing. This process takes an average of 6 weeks and is extremely taxing on Gaza’s sick and injured as well as their families.

• While Israel has the right to conduct security checks, Israel often exploits a patient’s vulnerable state by preconditioning entry for medical treatment on participation in a Shin Bet interrogation – in violation of international law. In several cases, the Shin Bet has summoned patients to the Erez Crossing for security investigations, and then tried to coerce them into collaborating with the Shin Bet by conditioning an exit permit on their collection and provision of information to the Shin Bet. In a number of instances, the Shin Bet went as far as using the permit application process as a way to “lure” Palestinians to the Erez checkpoint in order to arrest them: upon arrival at the checkpoint, they have been immediately arrested and imprisoned in Israeli jails.

Illustration: Moran Barak, source: PHR-Israel

• The MFA reports that coordination with international parties on entrance for building supplies takes place regularly. OCHA, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that it took nine months of negotiations to get approval for entrance of items to finish construction on some 151 housing facilities that were already 85% complete on the eve of the closure in June 2007. This is a hard-fought-for drop in the bucket compared with the 86,000 housing units that are needed in Gaza.

• Likewise, UNRWA reports that donor funds to the tune of $109 million USD are frozen because restrictions on movement of building materials prevent breaking ground on 24 constructions and infrastructure projects. If it took nine months to negotiate the start of each of the 24 projects, we’d be looking at 18 years of negotiations.

• We’ve written before about Israel’s refusal to allow books, stationery, toys, and other educational materials for 248,000 students in Gaza, although it makes an exception for other students studying in UNRWA schools. But UNRWA alone, whose schools generally operate three shifts to deal with overcrowding, needs to build 100 schools to meet demand, and Israel refuses to allow the building materials to enter. Even if Israel were to agree to allow in the building materials and if it takes nine months to negotiate the construction of each school, UNRWA would have its schools after about 75 years, about the time that today’s children would be in their 80s.

We are encouraged that the MFA report seems to embrace the need to facilitate humanitarian aid, while encouraging the development of a healthy economy in Gaza. If Israel is truly interested in implementing such a policy, it would be advised to open Gaza’s crossings for movement of goods and people, subject only to concrete security considerations and not political maneuvering.

On average, 2,500 trucks of goods enter the Gaza Strip each month. This is roughly 25% of the amount that entered prior to the June 2007 closure of the Strip (10,400/month). The items permitted entrance are limited to basic goods “necessary for the survival of the population” (to quote a recent letter Gisha received from the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)). Items like flour, grain, and sugar are allowed. Every month new items appear among those allowed in and others items are mysteriously rejected: coffee this month yes, but cardamom to flavor it, no. Anise yes, and black pepper too, but vinegar no. Significantly, there is a total ban on raw materials that would permit Gaza residents to engage in production and commerce, allowing for economic independence. Clarity regarding the policy requires no less than a court order.

Israel does not provide the aid transferred to Gaza. In fact it earns on each truck that passes and each ton of aid bought or shipped, stored, and transferred through its territory. After closing all of Gaza’s other crossings, including the airspace, territorial waters, and indirectly – Rafah Crossing – Israel partially opens its side of the gates to Gaza to allow others to bring in aid and other items. More often than not, Israel blocks the movement of goods in to and out of Gaza and of course the movement of people who in most parts of the world travel into and out of their countries for simple, every day things like work and school and weddings.

These restrictions – and the policy underlying them, limiting Gaza residents to a “minimal” existence – are what have helped make Gaza residents dependent on international aid, whose provision Israel burdens.

Prior to the June 2007 closure, 30-35 trucks of agricultural produce were exported every working day of the agricultural export season (November – March), carrying mainly cherry tomatoes, flowers and strawberries. This amount is from a total daily average of 70 trucks of exports, mostly furniture, garment, cash crops, vegetables, processed food, metal products, handicrafts, and other kinds of goods. Gaza export –halted except for the trickle of strawberries and flowers – used to account for 10.8% of the Palestinian gross domestic product (GDP), valued at $330 million. That is now lost. Estimated annual losses from the inability to export agricultural products alone stand at approximately $32 million, and tens of thousands of people in the agricultur! al sector have lost their livelihood.

The flower and strawberry export is part of a one million Euro program, sponsored by the Dutch government, to support Gaza’s farmers. The Dutch government insists that Israel permit the flowers and strawberries to reach European markets as an exception to the ban on all other kinds of export from Gaza, a ban which has forced other donors to convert development programs into humanitarian hand-outs. If Gaza’s crossings were fully open for export and Gaza residents were afforded the right to engage in a dignified living, European taxpayers could spend less money on aid and more money buying strawberries grown in Gaza, rumored to be among the sweetest and reddest in the world.

The other crossings have also been closed: Karni Crossing, which was the main trade route, has been closed since June 2007, and only one conveyer belt, used to transport produce and animal feed, has continued to operate on a partial basis since then. The Sufa crossing has not operated since September 2008 and Israel announced its permanent closure in March 2009. The transfer of goods via the Rafah crossing is prohibited. And so all of Gaza is now almost totally dependent on the Kerem Shalom crossing, which has limited capacity and was originally designed for the occasional transfer of humanitarian aid only. Now Israel apparently plans to burden Kerem Shalom with fuel and gas transports as well.

Of course, in response to rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, Israel occasionally closes Kerem Shalom too, due to what it identifies as dangers to the crossing.

The possibility that security risks would threaten the opening of Gaza’s crossings was the subject of considerable forethought. As a result, three fundamental conditions designed to ensure that the Gaza Strip crossings would operate continuously were established and agreed to by Israel:  (1) Recognition of the need to operate alternative lanes (lane redundancy); (2) recognition of the need to operate alternative crossings (passage redundancy); and (3) the primary objective which Israel committed to in the Crossings Agreement: the principle of continuous operation.

It is hard to imagine how one crossing, consisting of only one primary lane, can fulfill these fundamental conditions.

Meanwhile, Israel continues to strike against the tunnels underneath the Egypt-Gaza border, via which the majority of goods required by Gaza residents are transported, including by blowing them up.

Under these circumstances, with the sea and air routes completely blocked, the tunnels rejected as a legitimate option, and the overland crossings increasingly shut down, how exactly are the residents of Gaza supposed to get the goods they need?