Gaza is not as isolated from the rest of the world as it was a few years ago, but it is still cut off from the West Bank and it’s hard to find convincing security reasons why. For example, Israel prohibits students from traveling from Gaza to the West Bank – individual security checks are not even an option because the ban is sweeping. Israel does not allow goods from Gaza to be sold in the West Bank or Israel, while at the same time allowing exports from Gaza to Europe to be transferred through its own airports and seaports. It also imposes restrictions on the import of building materials into the Gaza Strip. The impact is felt mainly by international organizations rather than the local government, which gets all the cement, gravel, and steel it needs from the tunnels. Ongoing restrictions make it difficult for Gaza’s economy to recover, but they also split families apart and impede Gaza residents’ access to higher education and the opportunity to acquire training in a number of highly needed fields.

In fifth place: “Israel gives Gaza money, electricity and water”.

True, Israel does give Gaza residents electricity and water. That is, if by “give” you mean “sells”. Israel also does not “give” money to Gaza’s residents – it does transfer tax monies it collects on their behalf, although sometimes with great delay.

In fourth place: “The Palmer Report concluded that the closure was legal”.

The Palmer Commission decided not to examine the legality of the overall closure of the Gaza Strip and determined only that the naval blockade imposed on Gaza was legal. In its report, the commission included a recommendation for Israel to continue easing restrictions on movement “with a view to lifting its closure and to alleviate the unsustainable humanitarian and economic situation of the civilian population”.

And one wishes to move to the West Bank? Rafah crossing, 3.30.2005. Photo: PHR

In third place: “Gaza has a border with Egypt, so Egypt should take care of the Strip”.

Six months ago, we posted the top ten reasons why the opening of Rafah Crossing just doesn’t cut it. The list is still valid, but here’s the gist of it: Even if Egypt fully opens Rafah to movement of people and goods, this would still not provide a solution for the problem of movement restrictions between Gaza and the West Bank. The desire to push Gaza onto Egypt and therefore make it possible to cut the Strip off from the West Bank is a common one, but its implementation would entangle Israel legally and politically.

In second place: “Israel disengaged from Gaza and all it got was Qassam rockets”.

Firing Qassam rockets on civilians is an unjustifiable war crime. This much is clear. We should keep in mind that the rockets didn’t start after the disengagement from Gaza and that four and a half years of closure have done nothing to reduce the threat of rockets being fired from Gaza into Israel – but don’t take our word for it.

As for disengagement, Israel did remove its permanent military installations and civilian settlements from the Gaza Strip, but did this really end Israeli control over Gaza? Try asking a Palestinian from Gaza if she feels that Israel has really “disengaged” from her life. She wouldn’t think twice before responding in the negative. Israel controls her ability to study in the West Bank, export goods, fish, farm her lands and visit relatives. True, it’s hard to imagine control of a territory without permanent military presence on the ground, but this is exactly Gaza’s unique situation today.

And in first place: “Gaza’s residents voted for Hamas so they had it coming to them”.

Hamas’ victory in parliamentary elections in 2006, shortly after the “disengagement” was met with surprise. Withdrawal from Gaza didn’t bolster those in support of the peace process as many in Israel had expected. Today, more than five years after the elections were held, they are still used as an excuse for the closure.

First of all, it is important to stress that international law prohibits collective punishment of a civilian population and for good reason. Past experience has taught that civilians, irrespective of their political convictions, must remain “off limits”. This principle must be upheld in Gaza, in Israel and in all other places in the world facing conflict.

While we’re on the topic of the elections, and to be accurate, the elections Hamas won were not held just in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank and east Jerusalem. It was more than a year after the elections, in June 2007, that Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip.

No elections have been held in Gaza since 2006 and the debate between the various political movements in the Strip has been ongoing. One way of following this debate is through polls, such as those published by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. For example, a poll from December 2011 shows that if elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council were to be held now, Hamas would get 35% of the vote and Fatah 43%. It’s worth recalling also that over half of Gaza’s population is below voting age. How can children be blamed for the outcome of elections in which they didn’t take part?

Can you think of more misconceptions? Comment below.

Following Hamas’ takeover of internal control in Gaza in June 2007, the Palestinian Authority’s influence over Gaza has significantly diminished, and most of the routine administration of the government and public services, such as the education system, policing, sanitation and hospitals, is carried out by the Hamas regime. However, the Palestinian Authority still maintains significant responsibilities, particularly the financing of major public services such as the healthcare system and the supply of electricity. The Palestinian Authority continues to coordinate the passage of people and goods with Israel, and taxes levied on goods transported from Israel through the crossings are collected by Israel on behalf of the PA. Additionally, Palestinian Authority officials remain responsible for transferring applications for changes in the population registry to Israeli authorities, including for the purpose of issuing passports.
For this reason, Israel’s control over the Palestinian Authority, which operates both in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, influences the latter’s ability to make independent decisions related to Palestinian residents, govern them and fund public services¹.

In addition, Israel’s control over travel between the West Bank and Gaza Strip affects the operation of civil institutions and systems throughout the Palestinian territory. These systems and institutions have developed as part of a single apparatus serving residents in both parts of the Palestinian territory².  For example, a Palestinian democracy and human rights academic program is offered by Birzeit University in the West Bank. Israeli control over movement between Gaza and the West Bank and its prohibition on travel from Gaza to the West Bank for the purpose of studying impact Gaza residents’ access to this program and to higher education in general³.  In addition, control over the ability of Palestinian professionals from the West Bank to work in Gaza impacts the quality of services available in Gaza⁴.  It should be noted that control over movement between Gaza and the West Bank is not merely a result of the fact that Israel is situated between the two parts of the Palestinian territory, but also of its exclusive control over all crossings to and from the West Bank, including the Allenby Bridge, on the West Bank’s Jordanian border. Israel prohibits residents of Gaza from entering the West Bank irrespective of passage through Israel: a Gaza resident who exits to Egypt and seeks to enter the West Bank from Jordan will be thwarted by Israel’s policy of disallowing use of the Allenby Bridge by Palestinian residents whose registered address is in the Gaza Strip⁵.  Though a distinction should be made between Israel’s control over one part of the Palestinian territory and the other (and the legal ramifications of this distinction should be taken into account), Israel’s control over travel between the two areas impacts civilian institutions and the lives of residents throughout the Palestinian territory.

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1. For details see, GISHA, DISENGAGED OCCUPIERS, supra note 1, pp. 56-58.
2. See, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Washington DC, September 28, 1995, Article XI (hereinafter: Oslo B), and GISHA, DISENGAGED OCCUPIERS, supra note 1, p. 58.
3. See, Press Release, Gisha, Israel Announces: No Easing for Travel of People Into and Out of Gaza (July 8, 2010).
4. For example, the refusal to allow an educator from the West Bank to provide professional training for teachers designed to encourage parents to read to their children affects the quality of educational services in the Gaza Strip. See Press Release, Gisha, Following Gisha’s petition to the High Court: Parents in Gaza to benefit from workshop encouraging reading to children (Nov. 28, 2010).
5. Gisha, Legal Framework: Merchants and the Economy – Rights and Obligations under International and Israeli Law (May 2010) (hereinafter: Gisha, Merchants and the Economy).

The transfer of diesel through the tunnels reduces the electricity shortage in Gaza but does not resolve the problem. The power plant still needs industrial diesel, which is mixed with regular diesel coming from Egypt in order to reduce the amount of sulfur emitted from the production process. In these new circumstances, power outages have shortened but still occur for an average of six hours a day, posing hardship for Gaza residents. True to today, the plant is producing about 60 MW of energy, while the total electricity deficit in the Strip stands at 80 MW.

As far as underground economies go, the Egyptian channel is not reliable. Last week there was a drop in transfer of goods from Egypt due to recent events there, casting doubt on the stability of the diesel supply to the Gaza power plant. When the tunnels are operating, the government in Gaza coordinates the transfer of fuel and collects taxes on it (NIS 0.60 per liter of diesel that costs the merchants bringing it in less than one shekel). Based on these figures one can only wonder about the conclusion of the Turkel Commission, which legitimized Israel’s restriction on diesel transferred to the power plant, stating that these restrictions were an instrument to promote Israel’s military objective of harming “Hamas’s capacity, including its military capacity, to continue attacking Israel”.

The Israeli cabinet decision to ease the closure on the Gaza Strip did not change the sweeping ban on Gaza exports. While industrial raw materials were allowed into Gaza beginning in July, the limited capacity of the crossings meant only small quantities entered (raw materials were 4% of the total amount of goods that entered in July), while at the same time Israeli-made consumer products, no longer banned, flooded the market. The combination does not bode well for manufacturers in particular and the economy in general, as evidenced by the story of Jihad Abu Dan, aged 22, married and the father of two, whose family owns a textile factory in the northern Gaza Strip town of Beit Lahiya. His father was a textile worker who built a two-story factory that spans an area of 1,500 m², meant to support the extended family. Says Jihad:

“Not only did the ‘easements’ Israel declared not help us, they have even harmed us. Exports are still banned, and that is a problem because the Gaza market is very small, and a large amount of ready made clothes have been brought in from Israel and China. The Gaza market was flooded with products, there is a lot of supply and less demand, and because of the stiff competition, we are forced to lower prices. As long as there is no export, it is hard for workers in the clothing and textile sector to profit and produce. After three years of closure, we lost the contacts we had developed with clients from Israel, and they went elsewhere”.

“Before the closure, we worked at our full manufacturing capacity, producing 2000-3000 pieces a day. We did not manufacture for the local market; all of our products were for export to Israel and abroad. Back then, we imported between one and one and a half trucks of raw materials a day through the Karni Crossing, three days a week, and we exported between one and one and a half trucks of goods a day, two or three days a week”.

Mohammad Abu Dan and Co. Textile and Clothes Company. ‘These days the factory operates at only about 10% of its production capacity.’

“Right before the closure began, we received an order from an Israeli client, who asked for 100,000 items, which we had to make in three months. We managed to send him 30% of the order before Israel closed the crossings, and the rest of the goods remained in Gaza; he did not benefit from them, nor did we. Because clothing on the local market is sold more cheaply, we had to lower prices in order to sell the goods, and we lost money”.

“Today we employ 25 workers. There is not much work. The Gaza market is very small, and profits are minute. We mostly just cover manufacturing costs, but we continue to operate out of a desire to maintain the factory my father built. Out of 180 sewing machines, these days we are working with just 20. More than half of the machines broke down, partly due to remaining idle for a long period of time. These days we manufacture about 300 pieces a day, 10% of our capacity and our actual production before the closure. For many hours a day we have no electricity, and during that time we don’t work. We adjust our daily schedule to the power supply – Sometimes we work from 6 in the morning until 1 pm, we then stop working, because there is no electricity, and go back to work when the power returns, sometimes from 10 at night to 5 in the morning.”

Mohammad Abu Dan and Co. Textile and Clothes Company. ‘Out of 200 workers prior to the closure, only 25 are employed today, and 20 sewing machines out of 180 are operational.’

The sewing and textile industry in Gaza – general information

In 2005, prior to the closure, the production value of the sewing and textile industry in the Gaza Strip was estimated at $39 million, and approximately 70% of the manufactured goods were designed for sale to Israel and West Bank. In 2000, 37,000 people worked in this industry, whereas today the number of workers is estimated at 1,500. In the past there were 600 textile and sewing companies in the Gaza Strip, however it is estimated that only 10% are active today.

Source: Paltrade and the Textile Industry Association

1. Take things out of context. When you say that, “41 truckloads of equipment for the maintenance of the electricity networks were transferred”, you do not need to mention that those spare parts were waiting for many months for clearance, and that, at the end of 2009, the Gaza Electricity Distribution Company reported that 240 kinds of spare parts were completely out of stock or had dipped below the required minimum stock. Likewise, “There was a significant increase in the number of international organization staff entering the Gaza Strip” does not require explanation that, were the productive sector in Gaza not almost completely paralyzed, so many aid workers would not be needed and the number of aid recipients would not be so high. You also don’t need to explain that the high number of staff you quote might be misleading, since it’s likely you are counting individual entrances and not unique visitors (the same international aid workers enter and exit multiple times per month).
2. Demonstrate impartiality. Present the transfer of 44,500 doses of swine flu vaccine as having nothing to do with you. There is always a chance people will forget it is a border-transcending epidemic and that the head of the Gaza District Coordination Office himself said an outbreak in Gaza would endanger Israel.
3. Make it look like you are paying the bill. Use vague language such as “In 2009, Israel continued to supply electricity to the Gaza Strip”. Count on the fact that most people don’t know that Israel charges full payment for the electricity by deducting the amount from the VAT and taxes it collects for the Palestinian Authority via import into its territory.
4. Take credit for the work of others. Note that “Between April and October 2009, maintenance work was conducted on the power station by Siemens” and “In 2009, the international community transferred 141,390 tons of humanitarian aid” are your successes too. These actions were undertaken after you decided in a unique instance to lift the restrictions you imposed yourself. You deserve credit even for the summer camps UNRWA runs for children in Gaza: in an exceptional measure you did not prevent the transfer of musical instruments and other items you define as “non-humanitarian” (such as ice cream machines and swimming pools).
5. Make sure to even present your failures as successes. “As part of the preparations for winter” you approved the transfer of glass. Even if you did so only after external parties exerted heavy pressure on you, even if you had to make an exception to a prohibition you imposed for two winters, even if you started transferring the glass only on December 29 (long after winter weather had already begun battering destroyed homes in Gaza), and even if you continue preventing the transfer of heaters – present the transfer of glass as your success.
6. Make sure to use headlines that will stun your readers. “The activities of the private and banking sectors in the Gaza Strip are maintained”. With a headline like that, few are likely to realize you are talking about maintaining an economy that has been at an almost complete standstill for nearly three years, with more than 90% of the factories closed or working at minimal capacity, because Israel has been preventing the transfer of raw materials. The headline “Over the years, Israel has kept the issue of public humanitarian infrastructure out of the conflict” will also obscure the Cabinet Decision to restrict the transfer of industrial diesel fuel to the power plant, which is crucial to the functioning of the water and sewage systems and other vital infrastructure, in an attempt to pressure the Hamas government.
7. Use vague terminology. Choose words such as “transferred” and “were transferred”. This way, some people will understand that “Over 1.1 billion NIS were transferred to the Gaza Strip to cover the salaries and activities of international organizations” came out of Israel’s pocket and not, as actually happened, that Israel simply did not prevent the PA and international organizations from transferring the money through the border crossings under Israel’s control, in a rare exception to its restrictions on cash transfers and on the banking system in Gaza.
8. Use visual tricks. State the number of individual flowers you allowed to Gaza farmers to export (9,782,076). This method can become problematic only if you mention that the potential for export is 55 million individual flowers per year, or that in 2006, 2,089 tons of strawberries were exported (compared to only 54 tons in 2009). 105,701,740 liters of industrial diesel fuel (according to COGAT’s 2009 report) sounds like a respectable amount when you state it in individual liters, but is a little less respectable when you discover that it amounts to only 57% of the amount required for maximum electricity production at the Gaza power plant.
9. You do not have to reveal everything. Play down the extent and nature of your control of the Gaza Strip‘s border crossings, including indirect but substantial control of the Rafah Crossing.

 Don’t be so modest! You play a central role in the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

First of all, because of Israel’s prohibition on the entry of building materials to the Strip since the June 2007 start of the closure, we will need to use locally available materials. Mud will be used to build the foundation and the walls of the house, easily found during the wintertime in Gaza’s natural surroundings. Make sure to avoid collecting mud from areas where raw sewage flows. Have patience, once the ban on the entry of spare parts, equipment and fuel is lifted, the water and sewage systems will operate at better capacity.

We’ll need to mix the mud with gravel. Due to Israel’s ban on the entry of this material, we will use limestone instead. To the limestone-mud mixture, add rocks found scattered around the area and mix for a long time until a thick mass is formed. In order to hasten the hardening of the mud, approach the nearest wheat field, cut off some shafts of wheat, and add them to the mixture. Place the mud into a baking dish, wait until it dries and presto — you now have material to make bricks and begin construction!

One of the mud houses recently built in Gaza, which serves as an example of the way the Strip's residents are coping with the ban on the transfer of raw materials.

Now, to build the house. For the support structures we will need iron. However, as you can already guess, since June 2007, Israel has prevented the entry of iron to the Gaza Strip. If you can afford to pay for the iron available in Gaza coming in via the tunnels at 4000 shekels ($1,060) a ton compared to only 2600 ($690) before the closure, fantastic! If not, you will need to mix sand, straw and glue and then roll the mixture into long beams.

Next, we will use the most basic building material, which we have avoided using so far: cement. Cement, the entry of which is also banned by Israel, will be purchased from the tunnel operators. Due to the fact that cement is extremely expensive — 900 shekels ($238) a ton, compared with about 450 shekels ($119) before the closure — we will only use it to build the bathroom, though we’re itching to use it for the rest of the house! 

We’re almost finished. All that’s left to build is the roof and for this we will use plates of glass. Finally, something that is found in Gaza! Despite the prohibition on the transfer of glass to Gaza for two and a half years, since the end of December 2009, glass is no longer considered a security threat, and so far about 100 trucks of glass have entered the Strip.  

Now, after all your hard work, turn on the light switch that you’ve just installed and look around at the fruits of your labor. Oh, is there a blackout in the area again? At least you can enjoy the magnificent view of the sky and the light of the stars shining through the glass ceiling of your cozy, little house.  

Gisha reiterates its call on Israel to lift the ban on the entry of building materials so that people in Gaza may rebuild their homes with dignity.

In November, the European Union, which funds the industrial diesel needed  to operate Gaza’s only  power station, announced that in a joint decision with the Palestinian Authority (PA), its funding worth 97 million Euros per year would end, due in part to the global economic crisis. Despite the fact that it warned of its intentions months in advance, no alternative arrangement was made, although some European states have expressed willingness to provide funding for the PA to cover the cost of the diesel. In the meantime, the Gaza power station was forced to limit itself to an output of just 30 megawatts, almost a third of its potential generation capacity (80 megawatts). According to media reports, another factor that is hampering resolution of the funding issue is the internal Palestinian conflict and the PA’s demand that Hamas contribute to the costs or collect money from consumers. The PA is effectively inviting Hamas, which has not previously been involved in electricity generation in Gaza, to play an active role in the procurement and funding of the industrial diesel supply for Gaza’s power plant. This week, the power plant increased production to 60 megawatt after receiving additional fuel deliveries, but it is not clear whether a solution has been found.

Gaza Power Plant

Indeed, it seems that all the players in this drama are exploiting a need as basic and obvious as electricity in order to promote their political objectives. Despite the fact that the power station is clearly a vital civilian infrastructure, despite the fact that it is largely privately owned, and despite the fact that the industrial diesel is used solely to operate the power station’s turbines, Israel decided to bomb the station in 2006, inflicting damage which has yet to be fully repaired. Moreover, since 2007, Israel has limited the transfer of industrial diesel to the Gaza Strip to a “minimum” that it set at 2.2 million liters per week, despite the fact that in reality 3.5 million liters are required for the present maximum output of the power station.

The Israeli policy of “reduction to the minimum” means that the power station has no ability to stockpile reserves of industrial diesel to prepare for interruption of supply. So when supply is interrupted, this time due to funding problems and the conflict within the Palestinian leadership, 1.5 million people need to learn to live with power outages for 8 hours or more per day.

Not only has the closure of Gaza failed to protect it from the virus, but the restrictions on the passage of equipment and fuel are making it difficult to contain the virus’s spread.

During the military operation last winter, 15 hospitals and 34 medical institutions were damaged, and their repair has not been possible due to Israel’s refusal to allow building materials into the Gaza Strip. While Israel boasts of permitting increased quantities of humanitarian aid to Gaza, it continues to restrict the entrance of medical supplies, claiming security risks. Thus, Israel is making it difficult to send batteries needed for the UPS systems that protect sensitive hospital equipment during the frequent power outages and is limiting the supply of additional medical supplies, such as X-ray equipment.

The Swine Flu, however, known for its tendency to breach borders, is not treated like other illnesses, and Israel has allowed 6,000 vaccinations purchased by the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Ramallah into Gaza. The vaccinations are destined for Gaza residents who participated in the pilgrimage to Mecca (the Hajj) and for the medical professionals treating patients diagnosed with the virus. It is estimated that more than 400,000 vaccinations are needed for people in high risk groups.

Allowing vaccinations through to Gaza residents is surely a nice public relations photo opportunity, but preventing the outbreak of an epidemic requires appropriate sanitary conditions and infrastructure, too. Frequent and extended blackouts (8 hours a day, 4 days a week), due to Israel’s refusal to allow the transfer of the required amount of industrial diesel to the Gaza power station, interfere with the proper functioning of local hospitals. Hospitals rely on back-up generators during the power outages, but limitations on their power production interferes with the heating and ventilation systems that are vital for maintaining proper air-pressure.  Likewise, the ongoing shortage of gas limits the ability to run hospital washing machines needed for basic hygiene. This past week, only 34% of the gas needed by Gaza residents was supplied (518 tons out of the 1,500 tons needed per week).

Other types of infrastructure systems which are needed to deal with infectious diseases are the sewerage and water purification systems, which also rely on fuel and supplies limited by Israel. A roof over the heads of the thousands of residents uprooted from their homes and the hundreds still living in tents since their homes were destroyed in the war is another basic requirement.

Some people resort to prayer to protect them from the Swine Flu. We would make do, for starters, with policies that allow the ongoing transfer of equipment required for sanitation and the proper functioning of the health system – out of respect for the rights of the 1.5 million people who live in the Gaza Strip.