Wadah Bassiso, a prominent businessman in the furniture industry who lives in Gaza, was granted a rare opportunity. He was to be the first person to export furniture from Gaza since the year 2007. But the opportunity came and went. Shortly before he was to begin exporting his furniture to the Czech Republic, Bassiso’s factory burned to the ground. The cause of the fire is still being investigated.

Bassiso’s tragedy is Gaza’s tragedy, as he was the only merchant who was able to secure a work order for furniture from abroad. Export of furniture from Gaza, touted as an expansion of export generally, was actually reliant on the export of a single merchant. One factory burns down and with it furniture export from Gaza.

It is no coincidence that there’s just one merchant wishing to export furniture. Furniture export to the Czech Republic, an operation in which the army already took great pride, is not a viable solution for Gaza furniture makers who have traditionally sold their wares to the West Bank and Israel. Gaza manufacturers do not make furniture for assembly which can be transported over long distances, but rather pre-assembled furniture which has to be loaded onto trucks. Shipping furniture to Europe would require major changes to the manufacturing process, which cost money, entail the development of new skills and take time, and all for export which is barely profitable considering shipping costs and international competition. Under these conditions, it is difficult to see how export to the Czech Republic – if another merchant rises in the place of Bassiso – would bring real improvement to Gaza’s economy.

Sealing up the fate of the dangerous potato

As always, shipping is key. Photo: stock.xchg

How do you allow export without actually allowing it? By imposing restrictions that make it impossible. Case in point: potato export to Jordan, the export that could not be. In principle, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories allows export of potatoes to Jordan and other places, provided those places are not Israel or the West Bank. Allows, that is, as long as a number of minor demands are met. In the case of the potatoes, they were to be transported in closed containers and inside specially-sealed trucks which have the capacity to transport 8 tons of produce (as opposed to the 20 ton-capacity of a standard truck).

As always, shipping is key. Israel’s demands increased the shipping costs to Jordan so much so that the entire project was cancelled. Yes, Palestinians are officially allowed to export potatoes to Jordan, just like they are allowed to export furniture to Europe. Officially. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said in the past: “Now the Gazans must develop their export markets abroad”. Unfortunately, Israel isn’t making their job easy.

The run-away cherry tomatoes

So what’s left? Exporting agricultural products to Europe. There’s not much to write home about. First of all, export is limited to the winter season only. It does not include summer fruits and vegetables and of course, it does not include any non-agricultural products. The quantities in question are also negligible, relatively speaking. In 2005, before the closure, the Gaza Strip exported 904 tons of cherry tomatoes – more than five times the quantity designated for export this season. Past experience shows that it is doubtful that this year’s export plans will actually materialize in full.

Why do Europeans suddenly have such a great interest in Gaza’s cherry tomatoes? The real story is in the fine print. Agricultural export from Gaza is funded by the Dutch government. How can export be funded? The answer is simple – when it’s not profitable. All agricultural export from Gaza currently forms part of a joint Dutch-Palestinian project which is meant to help rehabilitate Gaza’s economy. In other words, even shipments of vegetables and flowers to Europe – small as they may be – resemble a humanitarian project more than actual economic activity.

In summary, we had furniture export that hinged on the luck of a single merchant, export to Jordan which became unfeasible because of a few impractical restrictions and agricultural export to Europe, which is so tenuous that it requires external funding. This is the story of Gaza’s export – export that is meant to support the economy of a population of over 1.6 million people.

Israel controls the supply of infrastructure upon which the Gaza Strip is reliant. Gaza’s electricity system, as developed since 1967, is largely based on power supplied from Israel through 11 high voltage transmission lines¹.  A power station was built in Gaza in 1998, but its capacity has been limited since it was bombed by Israel in 2006. The station has never been fully repaired. Restrictions on the transfer of equipment and the entrance of trained professionals, as well as on the shipping of equipment for repairs outside Gaza, have also impaired the ability to upgrade the electricity system. Another factor that interfered with the operation of the power station was the restrictions Israel imposed on the transfer of industrial diesel into Gaza beginning in October 2007 as part of its policy of “economic warfare”, designed to undermine Gaza’s economy. A dispute over finances between the Palestinian Authority and the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip further decreased industrial diesel supply to Gaza in 2010. In early 2011, the shortage was partially resolved by the purchase and transport of diesel for the power station through the tunnels. As a result, the power station’s dependence on Israel has decreased, though it still relies on Israel, to a degree, for shipping equipment for repairs, importing parts, bringing in expert engineers and sending engineers from Gaza for professional training and business meetings. Additionally, Israeli-supplied electricity still makes up the lion’s share of Gaza’s electricity, and there is no plan for an alternative in sight.

The dependence on Israel for electricity translates into dependence on Israel for water supply and sewage treatment, as electricity is needed for pumping water from wells and delivering it to homes, pumping sewage from homes and transporting it to sewage treatment facilities and for operating the treatment facilities. Additionally, some 5% of the water in Gaza is delivered in pipes by the Israeli water company.

Israel also controls wired, wireless and Internet communications in the Palestinian territory: international calls from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are made on the Israeli network via an underwater communications cable located in the Mediterranean; the Internet connection runs through the Israeli network, and Israel determines what frequencies are designated to Palestinian cellular phone companies. The Palestinian Authority’s dependence on the Israeli network is a result of Israel’s control over the periphery of the Gaza Strip and passage between it and the West Bank, which includes control over the ability to bring in equipment, lay cables and build infrastructure. For instance, Israel prohibits transporting into the Palestinian territory certain types of equipment needed for improving communications and building independent infrastructure. In addition, repairing telephone network optical fibers that run between Palestinian cities in the West Bank or between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip requires Israeli approval, as these fibers run through Israeli territory or areas controlled by Israel.

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1. See, GISHA, RED LINES CROSSED: DESTRUCTION OF GAZA’S INFRASTRUCTURE (Aug. 2009).

As usual, we hardly have any reservations about the numbers published by COGAT. However, we continue to recommend that the data be examined in a wider context. In a broader context, the report’s self-congratulatory nature is a little less persuasive. The security context provided by the report – it opens with statistics on rocket fire on Israel during the past year – is important, but needs to be examined alongside Israel’s obligations under international law, the government’s promises and the real needs of the residents of Gaza. What would the numbers look like then?

For instance, the report states: “Israel is working with the international community and the Palestinian Authority to advance and streamline procedures for the approval of internationally-funded projects. To this end a coordination and monitoring mechanism has been set up for the implementation of internationally funded projects in accordance with security considerations. So far 163 internationally funded projects were approved for implementation”.

And in the broader context? The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), whose projects account for half of those approved by Israel last year, reports that this still only represents 27% of the projects they wish to implement in their recovery and reconstruction plan. For example, of 100 schools the agency seeks to build, only 42 were approved, and as getting clearance for materials still involves cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, actual construction has begun on only half of the schools.  ”Advancing and streamlining”, indeed.

The report continues: “In the past year, 29,715 Palestinians entered Israel from the Gaza Strip. Additionally, Israel decided to increase the quota of traders entering Israel to 70 per day. In the past year 7,282 traders entered from the Gaza Strip for business reasons in Israel, Judea and Samaria [the West Bank], and abroad as part of the ongoing economic activities in the Gaza Strip”.

And back to the broader context. It is interesting to compare those numbers to the average of half a million workers who left Gaza every month on the eve of the Second Intifada. Furthermore, permits issued today are only for “senior businesspeople”, defined as those whose exit would contribute to improving the Gaza economy. The few women traders in Gaza, as well as young merchants, who want to build commercial ties with Israel and the West Bank, generally do not receive permits. Israel is thereby ignoring the common wisdom that small businesses are a driver of economic development.

From the report: “In the framework of the Cabinet’s decision on agricultural exports, the export project, in cooperation with the Netherlands to export strawberries and carnations continued. In addition it had been decided to export bell-peppers, but the exports stopped due to low quality of the produce that did not meet European standards. As an alternative the export of cherry tomatoes to European markets was approved”.

Here too, the context puts a damper on the good news. In the first five months of 2011, Israel may have allowed export of agricultural produce to Europe at the economically negligible volume of around two truckloads per day, but it has now been more than two months since a single truckload of goods left Gaza. Besides, as opposed to the government’s December decision and repeated promises made to international actors, the export of textile and furniture from the Gaza Strip has still not been approved.

Certain measures have indeed been taken over the past year to “ease” the closure, and we welcome those. But when seen in the broader context of the needs of Gaza residents and promises made to them, it’s clear that overall, progress has come too little and too late.

On December 8th, the Israeli Security Cabinet decided to ease some of the restrictions on export of goods from Gaza. It announced that Israel would increasingly allow export of textile, furniture and agricultural produce from the Strip. These promises were reiterated as part of a package of gestures that the prime minister announced in February. The same promises reappeared in an April report to donor countries which also included the news that Israel was installing special inspection equipment at Kerem Shalom that would allow for increased exports. However, six months after the cabinet decision, the volume of exports from Gaza has only decreased.

From January to May 2011, Israel allowed only 187 truckloads of goods to leave Gaza – an average of two truckloads per day. Since May 12th, not a single truck has left Gaza. Since goods cannot be transported through the Rafah Crossing, there is presently no way to export goods from the Strip. More than one and a half million people – zero export.

A policy that categorically bans the export of civilian goods from the Gaza Strip is, at the very least, puzzling. Why, during the last harvest season, were Palestinians in Gaza allowed to export strawberries, peppers, cherry tomatoes and flowers via Israel to Europe but are now forbidden to export furniture, textiles and other food products in the same way? And why was the export Israel did allow to be transferred through its territory restricted to Europe and not allowed to be sold to closer markets in Israel, the West Bank or Jordan? Is that what the government meant when it claimed it was making efforts to “improve the economic situation of the population in the Gaza Strip”?

The damage caused by restrictions on export is significant. The restrictions are the main reason why 83% of Gaza’s factories are closed or are operating at less than half their capacity, according to the Palestinian Federation of Industries. The restrictions also result in high unemployment rates, which stand at some 30.8%.

The export ban has paralyzed whole sectors of the Gaza Strip. The fashion and textile industries in Gaza used to sell 70% of their products outside of the Strip. Today, due to the ban, the industry has suffered a near fatal blow. The same is true for other sectors, such as furniture and food, which depend on markets outside of the Gaza Strip for their survival.

What can explain the harm that’s been done to the ability of residents of Gaza to earn a dignified living? In an interview (Hebrew) a year ago, the prime minister said that the civilian closure must be lifted, leaving in place only a “security closure”, but it is hard to find a security argument that would justify a complete ban on export. Just like all goods entering Israel, goods transferred from the Strip undergo security inspections. The sale of Gaza-made armchairs in the West Bank will not supply weapons to Hamas and selling socks made in Khan Younis in Israel will not help build bunkers in the Gaza Strip. If there is a reason, security or otherwise, preventing the government from keeping its promises and from implementing a policy it defined as an Israeli interest, then it owes the public an explanation.

No economy can survive over time without trade and export, and the present condition of Gaza’s economy is a painful reminder of that fact. A stable economy is one of the conditions for a functioning society – a vital interest both for Palestinians and Israelis. Without export there can be no independent private sector and the only alternative that leaves is an economy in which money flows only from top to bottom – from the government and foreign donors to citizens. This is exactly what is happening today in Gaza where the public sector has become the biggest employer. Whereas in the past 60% of the workforce was employed in the private sector and 40% in the public sector, today the ratio has been reversed.

Israel began the closure of Gaza with the declared goal of ending Hamas rule. Four years later, it is clear that this policy has failed. Restrictions on export have brought increasing harm on residents of the Gaza Strip and made them more dependent on Hamas than ever.

Recently there has been an improvement in the situation in the Gaza Strip: while unemployment remains high, it dropped some in relation to 2010, and new building projects have begun. This is a welcome development, but there is nothing that will help more than allowing Gaza’s businesses to access markets beyond the Strip. Four years on, maybe it is time to finally consider a change in policy.

So what exactly are we asking for? That the welcome but unfortunately limited measures taken to ease the closure be expanded, so that civilians and civilian goods can enter and leave Gaza. This week, we present three easy steps for how Israel can lift the closure while protecting legitimate security interests:

Step #1: Lift restrictions on exports from Gaza:

Recently, Israel allowed the export of tomatoes for sale in Europe. This was in addition to the permission given in the last two months for the export of strawberries, flowers and peppers, to the tune of an average of four trucks per day of exports – as opposed to the 400 trucks per day promised by Israel in 2005. Israel should now lift restrictions on the export of all goods, subject only to appropriate security checks. Export should be allowed not only to Europe (a market with limited profitability), but also to markets in Israel and the West Bank. Export is vital in order to inject money into the private sector in Gaza and consequently to lower unemployment (currently at 37.4%) and raise consumption. Only then will the entire economy recover – industry, agriculture, trade and services.

Step #2: Cancel the ban on the transfer of construction materials:

As part of the package of measures to ease the closure, presented by Prime Minister Netanyahu a month ago, Israel promised to allow the entry of 40,000 tons of gravel into the Gaza Strip, about 1000 truckloads, as an exception to the ban on the transfer of building materials. Approximately 400 trucks have already entered through the Sufa crossing in the last week. This should only be the first step however: we note that since the “easing” of July 2010, Israel has allowed just 4.4% of the building materials (gravel, cement and steel) needed by Gaza residents – not nearly enough to rebuild.

There is an urgent need in the Gaza Strip to build schools, hospitals and homes, some of which have been in ruins for two years, following Operation Cast Lead. If we really want to rebuild Gaza, we need to end the ban on construction materials and re-open closed crossings to allow for their transfer. Israel argues that Hamas will use cement to build bunkers but meanwhile, the government in Gaza buys cement freely through the tunnels. Rather, it is international organizations and poor families who wish to rebuild their homes who are unable to purchase cement.

Step #3: Allow people to travel into and out of the Gaza Strip subject only to individual security checks:

In the last few months, Israel has indeed allowed more businessmen (but not women!) to leave the Gaza Strip for commercial purposes, which certainly aids the recovery of Gaza’s economy. However apart from businessmen, travel between Gaza and the West Bank remains limited to “exceptional humanitarian cases”. Israel must now increase the number of exit permits for all kinds of commercial purposes (men and women alike!), allow students to travel to study in the West Bank, let educators and academics travel for professional courses and training and, in fact, allow travel between Gaza and the West Bank subject only to individual security checks.

]]> http://www.gazagateway.org/2011/03/how-to-lift-the-closure-of-gaza-in-three-easy-steps/feed/ 3 http://www.gazagateway.org/2011/02/the-revolution-is-coming%e2%80%a6-one-truckload-at-a-time/ http://www.gazagateway.org/2011/02/the-revolution-is-coming%e2%80%a6-one-truckload-at-a-time/#comments Thu, 10 Feb 2011 14:07:49 +0000 admin http://www.gazagateway.org/?p=1889 Continue reading →]]> In a press conference this week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Quartet Representative Tony Blair announced a new package of measures aimed towards, in Blair’s words, improving “the conditions and living standards of the Palestinian people” and in Bibi’s, “enhancing stability”. This on the backdrop of instability in Egypt as well as the closing of Rafah and reduced activity in the tunnels. What do the measures Bibi and Blair announced mean in real terms for Palestinian residents of Gaza?

The new measures promised are welcome and important for Gaza’s struggling private sector and the population at large. The changes in access policies seen since the June 20^th Israeli Security Cabinet decision and the measures promised in this latest press conference are, however, minimal compared to need. Israel is currently allowing Gaza residents to receive 3% of the construction materials needed to re-build the Strip and to export 1% of the quantities promised in earlier agreements. A small fraction of projects led by the international community have received approval, let alone materials, to begin building.

With the proposed measures, we hope to see a rise in these figures. For example, the new package promises 40,000 tons of gravel – in February. The rest of the year is anyone’s guess, since hints in the press statement that Sufa crossing would be opened for transfer of construction materials appear to be just a one-time gesture intended to clear tens of thousands of tons of gravel which have been sitting there since Israel banned construction materials in 2007 and then closed Sufa in 2008.

Approval for twenty additional projects is also welcome, provided that it won’t take months to negotiate the entrance of each truckload of cement and steel, as has been the case until now. UNRWA alone reports that just 9% of its construction plan has been approved.

The measures also include reducing Gaza’s dependence on Israel for infrastructure – including by exploring new sources of energy and increasing capacity to treat sewage and de-salinate the water supply. Just for reference, currently the Palestinian Authority pays Israel for electricity to Gaza to the tune of some 40 million shekels per month (11 million dollars), and it is estimated that it would take several years to develop proper infrastructure to supply Gaza’s needs – assuming Israel refrains from measures taken in the past which have included blocking infrastructure inputs and bombing the power station.

But this isn’t just about “improving living standards” that have been dramatically and deliberately worsened over three and a half years of closure. While Israel negotiates numbers with the international community’s most high-ranking envoy, Gaza residents are being denied their right to build schools, hospitals, and homes and to travel, produce and sell the goods necessary in order to engage in their livelihoods. If there really has been a paradigm shift and security is the only criteria for what can enter or leave Gaza, then perhaps we can do better than this.

Since the closure was imposed, aid dependence in Gaza has increased from 63% to 80% because of the paralysis of the private sector, reports OCHA. The International Monetary Fund reported three months ago that the Gross National Product in Gaza is still 40% less than it was in 1994 and has yet to recover to 2007 levels.

Why is there so little economic activity and so much dependence on international aid? There is a very simple explanation: the closure of the Gaza Strip. The closure of Gaza is not just about shortages of products – coriander became the star-of-the-moment when it was discovered that its transfer into Gaza was banned by Israel – it is also about restrictions on selling of Gaza’s goods outside of the Strip, about bringing in construction materials, and about movement of people.

Before 2007, some 70 truckloads of consumer and agricultural products left Gaza for marketing outside Gaza each day. Since the Cabinet decision declaring an easing of the closure and until December 23rd, 70 trucks left the Gaza Strip, in other words, 2/3 of a truck per day.

A truck near Kerem Shalom. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

Another reason for the low economic activity is the ban on construction materials. Before the ban, residents of Gaza brought in 5,000 truckloads of gravel, cement and steel per month, compared to an average of 149 trucks per month since Israel declared the easing of the closure. As a result, there was a drastic decrease in the number of people employed in construction.

It is therefore no wonder that those who do have jobs in Gaza are more often than not working in the public sector. According to a recent report by the British think-tank The Portland Trust, jobs in the private sector shrunk from 100,000 to 30,000 over the years 2006-2010 – while in 2006 only 28% of those employed worked in the public sector, today 70% of those employed work in the public sector. Those who lost their jobs found work mainly in the public sector: in local government offices, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. Whereas the population of Gaza grew from 1.41 to 1.54 million between the end of 2007 and mid-2010, the number of jobs remained static. There has also been a shift from employment in factories, agriculture and construction towards employment in the Palestinian Authority, the Hamas government and international organizations. Work in the public sector is vital for sustaining a society – the public sector includes teachers, doctors, aid workers – but the private sector is the engine for development.

The question that should be asked, therefore, is not whether there is a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, but whether deliberate harm is being done to the economy and by extension to the well-being of residents of the Strip, and whom this serves. What is the likelihood that the percentage of residents living beneath the poverty line will decrease and that Gaza’s economy will enter a period of significant growth, without marketing Gaza’s goods outside of the Strip, without movement of people, and without construction?

True: “Traffic has increased significantly. The number of trucks coordinated with the PA normally reaches the current maximum capacity of 250 trucks a day”.

More True: While the volume of trucks has increased, it was still at just 38% of demand in the last month, due to Israel’s refusal to re-open crossings it has closed since 2007.

True: “Real GDP growth in the first half of 2010 (compared to the first half of 2009) is estimated by the IMF at 9 percent for the West Bank and 16 percent for Gaza”.

More true: The IMF report points out that growth is reflected in part because the first half of 2009, which included the military operation “Cast Lead” and its aftermath, represents a very low base or point of comparison. GDP per capita for Gaza is still 40% less than it was in 1994 and has yet to recover to 2007 levels, due to an apparently ongoing Israeli policy of “economic warfare”, including a ban on exports. The IMF has noted that true and sustainable economic recovery requires lifting the ban on exports and removing remaining restrictions on entrance of raw materials.

True: “Growth in the field of construction reached more than 20% in the first quarter of 2010 (in comparison to the parallel quarter in 2009)”.

More true: The parallel quarter in 2009 included the military operation “Cast Lead”, in which buildings were still being actively destroyed by the Israeli military. Due to onerous approval requirements and limited capacity of the crossings, just 132 truckloads of cement and gravel have entered Gaza since the “easing”, even though tens of thousands are needed. The UN notes, at this rate, it would take approximately 75 years to bring in the materials needed for UNRWA’s reconstruction plan.

True: “A number of projects have already been fully implemented or are currently underway. These projects include… Delivery of containers to serve as classrooms, a UN project”.

More True: Children in UNRWA schools attend classes in the aforementioned shipping containers, because despite the “easing”, Israel has yet to approve entry of a single truckload of construction materials for the 100 new schools UNRWA has requested to build.

True: “In July … a total of 2,457 exit permits were granted [to leave the Gaza Strip]“.

More true: This is less than 1% of the number of exits in Sept. 2000, before Israel imposed tight restrictions. Israel has announced that “[the easing] does nothing to expand the criteria [for travel]“.

One month later, on June 7, 17-year-old Awad was shot in the same place: “At around 9:30 A.M., I bent over to pick up some gravel when I heard a shot being fired. The bullet hit me in the right knee and I fell over in great pain. Youngsters around me started running in all directions and I saw my brothers running towards me”. Awad fainted, waking up later in hospital. “Since that day, I’ve been feeling numbness in my right leg and I can’t walk on it like I used to”.

About two weeks later, on June 22, 16-year-old Abdullah was shot while working in the evacuated Israeli settlement of Elei Sinai: “It was around 6:00 A.M. I heard a shot being fired from the Israeli watchtower and I immediately fell to the ground in great pain. My brothers and cousins rushed towards me and put me on the cart and rushed me to the main road. My ankle was bleeding and I felt it going numb”. Abdullah was rushed to hospital, where he underwent an urgent operation. “I still feel pain in my right leg and I don’t know whether I will be able to walk normally again or not”.

 These disturbing testimonies were recently published on the website of the Palestinian branch of Defense for Children International (DCI), which defends children’s rights worldwide. The three boys’ stories point towards the difficult economic situation in the Gaza Strip, where young people put themselves at risk and work as gravel collectors along the border fence with Israel in order to support their families. Furthermore, the testimonies illustrate how despite the “disengagement”, Israel continues to restrict movement inside Gaza. According to international organizations the restrictions are enforced in 17% of the total area of the Strip, however, the boundaries of the restricted areas are not clearly marked for the population and the terms of access to them have not been explained. (A U.N. Report on the subject shows that in the first seven months of 2010, seven residents were killed and 94 were wounded in the buffer zones). Just this week it was reported that four people were killed and several more injured by military fire near the border fence.

The testimonies show that many young people work daily collecting gravel in the Erez industrial park and the evacuated Israeli settlements in the area. Furthermore, according to their testimonies, at the moment the boys were shot they were not doing anything that could have been perceived as dangerous. Why, then, did the soldiers shoot the boys? Was everyone who was shot really suspected of being a terrorist or trying to infiltrate Israel? What rules of engagement were the soldiers following? We requested a response to the testimonies from the IDF spokesperson, but by the time of publication it had not yet been received.

Since the declaration of the easing of the closure of Gaza in July 2010, Israel has allowed about 600 trucks of construction materials into the Gaza Strip, or in other words, about 4% of need. As long as Israel continues to forbid the entry of building materials into the Gaza Strip, the informal gravel industry will continue to flourish and young people will continue to risk this dangerous option to support their families.

Employees in a furniture factory in Gaza.

As opposed to the textile factory we wrote about last week, al-Isi’s factory did not export to the West Bank before 2007, instead focusing on the local market. But since the sweeping ban on export was imposed in June 2007, al-Isi has found himself competing for the small local market in Gaza with all of the vendors who cannot export to the West Bank. The market is flooded with local merchandise, in addition to Israeli merchandise that is allowed in, and as a result, prices have dropped to the point where merchants hardly make any profit.

But that’s not the only problem. Al-Isi explains that when Israel banned the import of wooden boards, he bought expensive boards smuggled through the tunnels. When the ban was lifted, al-Isi discovered that the price of the boards he was buying was three times higher than the price of those recently brought into the Gaza Strip through the crossings from Israel. And so al-Isi found himself having to compete with other furniture-makers who had paid less for their materials, which in turn forced him to reduce production by 50%. If he had continued producing at the normal volume, says al-Isi, his losses would have reached $50,000.

Furniture factory in Gaza

The ban on export not only floods the market with cheap products but also causes a steep rise in unemployment. Whereas in the past al-Isi had 18 carpenters working in the factory’s workshops, today he has only five workers. Al-Isi says that the workers suffer from the situation the most. So much so that most of them now rely on the aid of local and international organizations: “Most are frustrated and desperate about the economic situation”, al-Isi says sadly, “and we merchants do not have a magic wand to change the situation in Gaza”.

Therefore, the ban on export, which is one of the most important aspects of the closure on Gaza, affects directly the citizens’ right to live with dignity.