Naturally, Israel exercises complete control over the crossings between it and the Gaza Strip. Since June 2007, it has closed three of the four commercial crossings: Karni, which was Gaza’s commercial life line, through which all trucks exited and most trucks entered; Sufa, through which construction materials were brought into the Gaza Strip; and Nahal Oz, through which fuel and cooking gas were transported. The crossings that remain open are Kerem Shalom, which is designated for the passage of goods and located inside Israel (near the three-way meeting point of Israel, Gaza and Egypt); and Erez, which is designated for passage by people and may be used by Palestinian residents only in “humanitarian cases, with an emphasis on urgent medical cases”¹.  In practice, as of July 2010, Israel permits approximately 3,000 exits by Palestinians through Erez each month, mostly by patients and accompanying family members, and, since 2011, merchants as well.

Through its control over the passage of commercial goods, Israel has a tremendous impact on life in the Gaza Strip, a small and densely populated area which relies on trade with the outside world for obtaining basic products and maintaining a productive economy. When Israel decides to allow the export of flowers, strawberries and peppers but not ice cream, cookies or soft drinks²,  it essentially determines which of Gaza’s industries will function. When Israel requires an international organization to change the location of a new school as a condition for allowing into Gaza the materials required for building it³,  it influences planning and zoning policy inside the Gaza Strip.

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1. Section 15 of the State’s response in H.C. 4906/10 Sharif v. Defense Ministry (hereinafter: State’s response in Sharif).
2. Security Cabinet Resolution, 32nd Government, Dec. 8, 2010; see also IDF Spokesperson, Pepper Export from Gaza Strip Begins [in Hebrew] (Jan. 23, 2011).
3. Thus, for example, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories required UNRWA to shift the location of a school it was planning to build by a few hundred meters, as the original location was allegedly near a building used by Hamas (Yaakov Katz, Israel Reviewing UNRWA List of Sites for Gaza Schools, The Jerusalem Post [Dec. 15, 2010]).

The 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access marked the end of Israel’s military presence at the Rafah Crossing on the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, yet allowed Israel to maintain substantial control over the terminal. This control was exercised via Israel’s continued control of the Palestinian population registry, which determines who may travel through Rafah, the ability to monitor individuals traveling through the crossing, and the power to decide when and if to close Rafah. The crossing operated routinely as per the Agreement on Movement and Access until June 2006. The circumstances that led to the end of this arrangement are detailed in a report published by Gisha and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel in 2009, entitled “Rafah Crossing: Who Holds the Keys?” The report also presents our position on the responsibility of each of the parties – Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Hamas and external players – as a result of their influence on the ability to open the crossing.

In June 2010, Israel intercepted the Mavi Marmara, a ship headed for Gaza, resulting in the deaths of nine passengers and international condemnation. In the wake of that incident, Egypt opened Rafah Crossing for regular travel. The crossing was opened outside the context of the Agreement on Movement and Access and for limited categories of travelers including foreign nationals; Palestinians seeking medical treatment in Egypt; Palestinians with foreign citizenship, residency status, or a visa to a third country; students wishing to study abroad and individuals receiving special travel coordination from the Egyptian authorities. Between June 2010 and the end of May 2011, a monthly average of 15,700 passengers traveled through Rafah in both directions, representing some 40% of the monthly average in the beginning of 2006, before implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access was halted¹.  In late May 2011, Egypt announced that Rafah Crossing would be opened for travel to all Gaza residents who hold a Palestinian ID card and passport, with the exception of males aged 18 to 40, whose travel would be subject to certain conditions. Between June and August 2011, the monthly average of travelers through Rafah increased to some 27,700. However, the Egyptian-imposed cap on the number of individuals who can exit Gaza per day has resulted in waiting periods of weeks.

The Agreement on Movement and Access prohibited the import of goods from Egypt to the Gaza Strip through Rafah, and although it permitted export of goods through the crossing, arrangements allowing for export were never made. Egypt still does not allow the transport of goods through Rafah, with the exception of humanitarian aid, subject to its discretion.

As has been the case since Rafah Crossing first opened, travel through it is subject to registration in the Israeli-approved Palestinian population registry. As such, Israel continues to have some, if significantly reduced, control over Rafah Crossing. Its continued influence over the crossing is also a result of cooperation with Egypt on security matters. Egypt continues to consider Israel as holding governmental powers in the Palestinian territory, in part due to the peace treaty between the two countries which stipulates that the international border between Israel and Egypt in the northern part of the Sinai desert is the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip².

Movement of people and goods between Egypt and the Gaza Strip by land also takes place through underground tunnels on the Egypt – Gaza border. The tunnels are not new, but before June 2007, they were primarily used for smuggling contraband such as weapons and narcotics. When Israel began restricting the passage of civilian goods into the Gaza Strip in June 2007, commercial trade via the tunnels increased and began to include many consumer goods and industrial products whose transfer Israel bans through land crossings. The tunnels now serve as the primary route for transporting fuel and building materials, which are restricted for import into Gaza by Israel³.  The tunnels are also used for transporting cigarettes from Egypt, which are cheaper than the ones brought from Israel, as well as weapons, cash and narcotics. Israel occasionally bombs the tunnels from the air⁴.  The tunnels do not provide a dependable or satisfactory trade route, yet the transporting of civilian goods through them has allowed the government in Gaza to determine tax rates (which are different from the ones set by Israel) for goods such as fuel, cigarettes and building materials, as explained below.

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1. Press Release, Gisha, Gisha response to Egyptian announcement on the opening of Rafah Crossing: There is still a need to permit passage of people and goods between Gaza and the West Bank,( May 26, 2011).
2. Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt, March 26, 1979, 1138 U.N.T.S. 59, Article 2, according to which: “The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip.”
3. Based on visits to the area, telephone conversations and personal interviews with tunnel operators in the Gaza Strip (February 2011). See also, Gisha, Reconstructing the closure – Will recent changes to the closure policy be enough to build in Gaza? (Dec. 2010), (hereinafter: Gisha, Reconstructing the closure).
4. See for example, IDF Spokesperson press release, IAF Strikes Gaza Tunnel in Response to Rocket Fire (Feb. 2, 2011).

Following Hamas’ takeover of internal control in Gaza in June 2007, the Palestinian Authority’s influence over Gaza has significantly diminished, and most of the routine administration of the government and public services, such as the education system, policing, sanitation and hospitals, is carried out by the Hamas regime. However, the Palestinian Authority still maintains significant responsibilities, particularly the financing of major public services such as the healthcare system and the supply of electricity. The Palestinian Authority continues to coordinate the passage of people and goods with Israel, and taxes levied on goods transported from Israel through the crossings are collected by Israel on behalf of the PA. Additionally, Palestinian Authority officials remain responsible for transferring applications for changes in the population registry to Israeli authorities, including for the purpose of issuing passports.
For this reason, Israel’s control over the Palestinian Authority, which operates both in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, influences the latter’s ability to make independent decisions related to Palestinian residents, govern them and fund public services¹.

In addition, Israel’s control over travel between the West Bank and Gaza Strip affects the operation of civil institutions and systems throughout the Palestinian territory. These systems and institutions have developed as part of a single apparatus serving residents in both parts of the Palestinian territory².  For example, a Palestinian democracy and human rights academic program is offered by Birzeit University in the West Bank. Israeli control over movement between Gaza and the West Bank and its prohibition on travel from Gaza to the West Bank for the purpose of studying impact Gaza residents’ access to this program and to higher education in general³.  In addition, control over the ability of Palestinian professionals from the West Bank to work in Gaza impacts the quality of services available in Gaza⁴.  It should be noted that control over movement between Gaza and the West Bank is not merely a result of the fact that Israel is situated between the two parts of the Palestinian territory, but also of its exclusive control over all crossings to and from the West Bank, including the Allenby Bridge, on the West Bank’s Jordanian border. Israel prohibits residents of Gaza from entering the West Bank irrespective of passage through Israel: a Gaza resident who exits to Egypt and seeks to enter the West Bank from Jordan will be thwarted by Israel’s policy of disallowing use of the Allenby Bridge by Palestinian residents whose registered address is in the Gaza Strip⁵.  Though a distinction should be made between Israel’s control over one part of the Palestinian territory and the other (and the legal ramifications of this distinction should be taken into account), Israel’s control over travel between the two areas impacts civilian institutions and the lives of residents throughout the Palestinian territory.

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Scale of Control: The project »
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1. For details see, GISHA, DISENGAGED OCCUPIERS, supra note 1, pp. 56-58.
2. See, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Washington DC, September 28, 1995, Article XI (hereinafter: Oslo B), and GISHA, DISENGAGED OCCUPIERS, supra note 1, p. 58.
3. See, Press Release, Gisha, Israel Announces: No Easing for Travel of People Into and Out of Gaza (July 8, 2010).
4. For example, the refusal to allow an educator from the West Bank to provide professional training for teachers designed to encourage parents to read to their children affects the quality of educational services in the Gaza Strip. See Press Release, Gisha, Following Gisha’s petition to the High Court: Parents in Gaza to benefit from workshop encouraging reading to children (Nov. 28, 2010).
5. Gisha, Legal Framework: Merchants and the Economy – Rights and Obligations under International and Israeli Law (May 2010) (hereinafter: Gisha, Merchants and the Economy).

The Rafah border crossing opened last June, following the flotilla incident, after being closed for nearly four years. However, it was closed again in late January, until further notice, due to security concerns in the Sinai Peninsula. While Egypt and the Hamas government administer the border crossing by way of ad-hoc agreements, Israel also exerts partial control of the crossing through its control of the Palestinian population registry (in other words, Palestinians who wish to cross must be listed in the registry administered by Israel). Israel also exercises control through joint security arrangements with Egypt. According to reports in the Palestinian media, approximately 4,000 people are waiting in the Sinai Peninsula for the crossing to re-open so that they can return to Gaza. A number of Palestinian residents of Gaza were also being held at the airport in Cairo, since, according to Egyptian protocol, they can not leave the airport except to go directly to the Rafah border crossing, and this requires a police escort. Other residents of Gaza worldwide are also waiting to return home.

On the Gaza side of the crossing, 300-500 people in need of medical attention are waiting to exit the Strip in order to receive treatment.

Students who returned to Gaza for the vacation cannot return to their schools. Among them is Ahmad, a medical student studying in Egypt. He hesitantly agreed to return home after five years during which he had avoided making the trip, fearing that once in Gaza, he would not be permitted to return to his studies. His worst fears have now come true and he is missing out on his studies while waiting to leave: “We never could have imagined that the source of our problems in returning this time would be instability in Egypt”, he said. The exit of students through the Erez crossing, which is controlled by Israel, is limited to those with a scholarship for study in a “Western” country. So exit through Rafah is Ahmad’s and many other students’ only option. If the opening of Rafah last June indicated a partial solution to the movement restrictions faced by students seeking to study abroad, recent events show how easily this freedom can be undermined.

Petrol station in Gaza. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

Events in Egypt have also led to a rise in the cost of fuel and construction materials in the Strip as a result of a drop in activity in the tunnels and shortages in supply on the Egyptian side. Last week, the price of cement rose by more than 30%, while the price of gravel increased by about 20%. The rising fuel costs were checked following the government’s decision to set a fixed maximum rate, but shortages continue. Since Israel imposed restrictions on the transfer of these goods in 2007 (claiming that this would “weaken” the Hamas rule), the trade in fuel and construction materials has operated through the tunnels, where the Hamas government levies taxes on it. As events calm down in Egypt, tunnel activity is resuming.

Recent events in Egypt illustrate how the closure of Gaza and the dependence it creates on the border with Egypt make freedom of movement in Gaza as vulnerable as a leaf blowing in the wind.

]]> http://www.gazagateway.org/2011/02/meanwhile-in-gaza/feed/ 2 http://www.gazagateway.org/2010/07/not-your-average-trip-to-the-mall/ http://www.gazagateway.org/2010/07/not-your-average-trip-to-the-mall/#comments Thu, 29 Jul 2010 14:40:16 +0000 admin http://www.gazagateway.org/?p=1429 Continue reading →]]> The media last week heralded the opening of the first shopping mall in Gaza and immediately the blogosphere was atwitter. Some saw it as proof of the easing of the closure, which Israel had promised, and others saw it as a sign that there is no crisis in Gaza. Indeed, a two-story building converted into an air-conditioned shopping mall (restrictions on the transfer of construction materials into Gaza for the private sector are still in effect and would preclude the building of such a structure) does not correspond with the usual images of the Strip, nor with concerned reports about hunger arising from the closure, still in effect despite the easing of some restrictions. But Gaza is not and was never a place with a quantitative food shortage; rather it is a place where many people lack the means to buy food and other goods because of a closure policy whose tenets are “no development, no prosperity, and no humanitarian crisis”.

Prices at the new shopping mall are particularly low, clients say, and considering the limited buying power of Gaza residents, there seems to be no other choice. Sixty-one percent of households in the Gaza Strip suffer from food insecurity, where the UN defines food security as “a situation in which all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. Unemployment is at 34%, a figure that should come as no surprise due to the sweeping ban on exports from Gaza enforced since the beginning of the closure of Gaza in June 2007. Israel has emphasized that the recent cabinet decision announcing an easing of the closure does not apply to export (nor to the movement of people). Even the recent lifting of the ban on the transfer of raw materials and the slow trickle of spare parts into Gaza have not yet made their mark on economic activity, especially considering the crossings’ capacity limitations.

According to the mall’s directors, the vast majority of brands sold at the mall – 90% – are Israeli-made, in addition to a small percentage of items originating in the West Bank. This is another indication of the dearth of goods manufactured in Gaza itself. Indeed, how can you manufacture clothing, shoes, carpets and food products (items that have been manufactured in Gaza in the past), when, even after the cabinet decision to “lift the closure”, the amount of goods transferred into Gaza last week (979 trucks compared to 2,350 trucks a week in 2005) meets only 40% of needs?

The price is of the products at the mall may be low, but apparently not low enough for most of the residents of Gaza.

The Israeli Defense Ministry’s hasty response, however, declaring that Kerem Shalom would be closed until further notice, raised concern among those trying to transfer humanitarian supplies to Gaza. It was not clear whether the closure of the crossing was a legitimate measure in response to a real and concrete security risk to the crossing and those who work there, or if the Defense Ministry decided to react as it had in the second half of 2008: In the months leading up to the Gaza war, Israel closed the civilian crossings as punitive retribution for rocket fire, not as a response to a concrete security threat.

Residents of Gaza breathed a sigh of relief on Sunday, when Israel permitted the reopening of the Kerem Shalom Crossing and the resumption of a minimum level of supply to the Strip. The dependence on Kerem Shalom is so great because it is virtually the only goods’ crossing that remains open; every closure thus blocks the transfer of goods that are in short supply in Gaza because of the Israeli-imposed “minimum humanitarian standard”.

Since the closure of Gaza began in June 2007, Israel has systematically worked to restrict the operation of the Gaza Strip’s crossings – policies that reached a peak with the closure of the Nahal Oz crossing at the start of 2010. And so, at this time, with the exception of the grain conveyor at the Karni Crossing, the Gaza Strip is dependent on one crossing – Kerem Shalom – which was originally designed for the occasional transfer of humanitarian aid and which has limited capacity. Israel has even insisted that Egypt transfer all aid to the Gaza Strip coming from its territory via the Kerem Shalom crossing and not via its own crossing at Rafah. Last week, Egypt announced that it would permit supply from its territory only via Kerem Shalom. This dependence on Kerem Shalom is well-known to those who shoot at it and to those who allow the shooting to take place.

Israeli policies to restrict the operation of the Kerem Shalom crossing stand in violation of international agreements it has signed, which take into account situations where a security risk may occur at a particular crossing. In these agreements Israel committed to three basic principles that were intended to ensure that the Gaza Strip crossings would function on a continuous basis, even in the presence of real security threats: the operation of alternative lanes (lane redundancy) and alternative crossings (passage redundancy), as well as a commitment to the primary aim: the principle of continuous operation. Yet as of 2010, virtually all alternative crossings have been closed.

Since Israel insists on enforcing an almost total closure policy that leaves the Gaza Strip “on the edge” in every aspect of life (food, goods, electricity, cooking gas and more), every closure of the single crossing still permitted to operate, when already only minimum amounts are allowed through it, threatens to push Gaza over the edge.

“It has been decided that the Shalit deal will not bring about a change in Israel’s policy regarding the blockade of Gaza and preventing the passage of people and goods between Gaza and the West Bank, except for humanitarian cases and essential goods”.

Really? It won’t?

Israel has justified its 3.5 year closure of Rafah Crossing and 2.5 year closure of Gaza’s other crossings as “sanctions” designed to pressure the Hamas regime, especially to release Shalit. While Gisha and other human rights groups have criticized the closure as unlawful collective punishment – irrespective of its “goals” – Israeli officials  have insisted that closing Gaza’s crossings nearly hermetically is not only permissible but is also effective in achieving political objectives. The position that prevailed in an August 24, 2006 internal discussion among security officials regarding Rafah Crossing, reproduced in Gisha’s position paper, Disengaged Occupiers was to:

“Oppose opening the crossing even for a few hours, so long as the issue of the captured soldier remains unchanged”.

The “logic” of the policy was to make life so difficult in the Gaza Strip, that the 1.5 million civilians trapped in Gaza would somehow “overthrow” Hamas or at least – exert pressure for the Hamas regime to acquiesce to Israeli demands.

True, the Israeli public never quite believed the effectiveness of that goal: a 2008 survey commissioned by Gisha and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel found that 78% of Jewish Israelis believed it was unlikely that the closure would lead to regime change in Gaza, and 83% believed that Hamas had been strengthened since the closure was tightened in June 2007. A newly released film by the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem uses animation to show just how fanciful the idea that the suffering of 1.5 million people could somehow be “effective” in putting the squeeze on Hamas. But Israeli policy-makers insist that Gaza residents could be “taught a lesson” through the closure. Can they really?

]]> http://www.gazagateway.org/2009/12/has-israel-forgotten-the-reason-for-gazas-closure/feed/ 1 http://www.gazagateway.org/2009/12/vaccinating-gaza/ http://www.gazagateway.org/2009/12/vaccinating-gaza/#comments Wed, 23 Dec 2009 13:15:04 +0000 admin http://www.gazagateway.org/?p=657 Continue reading →]]> The closure of the Gaza Strip is tight enough to make life difficult for residents, but fences and checkpoints don’t prevent viruses from passing through, as became apparent earlier this month. Despite predictions that the closure of Gaza might protect it from exposure to the Swine Flu, the virus was identified in the Gaza Strip two weeks ago, and already some 185 people have been diagnosed as infected, 13 of whom have died.

Not only has the closure of Gaza failed to protect it from the virus, but the restrictions on the passage of equipment and fuel are making it difficult to contain the virus’s spread.

During the military operation last winter, 15 hospitals and 34 medical institutions were damaged, and their repair has not been possible due to Israel’s refusal to allow building materials into the Gaza Strip. While Israel boasts of permitting increased quantities of humanitarian aid to Gaza, it continues to restrict the entrance of medical supplies, claiming security risks. Thus, Israel is making it difficult to send batteries needed for the UPS systems that protect sensitive hospital equipment during the frequent power outages and is limiting the supply of additional medical supplies, such as X-ray equipment.

The Swine Flu, however, known for its tendency to breach borders, is not treated like other illnesses, and Israel has allowed 6,000 vaccinations purchased by the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Ramallah into Gaza. The vaccinations are destined for Gaza residents who participated in the pilgrimage to Mecca (the Hajj) and for the medical professionals treating patients diagnosed with the virus. It is estimated that more than 400,000 vaccinations are needed for people in high risk groups.

Allowing vaccinations through to Gaza residents is surely a nice public relations photo opportunity, but preventing the outbreak of an epidemic requires appropriate sanitary conditions and infrastructure, too. Frequent and extended blackouts (8 hours a day, 4 days a week), due to Israel’s refusal to allow the transfer of the required amount of industrial diesel to the Gaza power station, interfere with the proper functioning of local hospitals. Hospitals rely on back-up generators during the power outages, but limitations on their power production interferes with the heating and ventilation systems that are vital for maintaining proper air-pressure.  Likewise, the ongoing shortage of gas limits the ability to run hospital washing machines needed for basic hygiene. This past week, only 34% of the gas needed by Gaza residents was supplied (518 tons out of the 1,500 tons needed per week).

Other types of infrastructure systems which are needed to deal with infectious diseases are the sewerage and water purification systems, which also rely on fuel and supplies limited by Israel. A roof over the heads of the thousands of residents uprooted from their homes and the hundreds still living in tents since their homes were destroyed in the war is another basic requirement.

Some people resort to prayer to protect them from the Swine Flu. We would make do, for starters, with policies that allow the ongoing transfer of equipment required for sanitation and the proper functioning of the health system – out of respect for the rights of the 1.5 million people who live in the Gaza Strip.

Perhaps the Israeli business sector understands something that Israeli politicians simply don’t comprehend – that the Palestinian economy in Gaza, which has collapsed due the 27-month-long closure imposed by Israel, has changed beyond recognition: hundreds of tunnels are currently operational in the Strip (between 600 and 1,000) and thousands of people are risking their lives to work in them. These tunnels are supplying about two-thirds of the goods required by the residents of the Gaza Strip. Thousands of dollars in permit fees and millions of dollars in taxes are being collected by the Hamas government. 

While in Israel they are saying that the last Gaza war gave Israel an economic boost, in Gaza, besides the other kinds of damage sustained, thousands of people who chose to invest in operating the tunnels blown up by Israel have sustained a financial loss.

Israeli security officials view the tunnels as a security threat, due to the concern that arms will be smuggled through them, and this is the reason given for their destruction. Palestinian traders would also prefer to avoid the high costs of transporting goods via the tunnels and resume overland trade, via the border crossings that have remained closed now for over two years.