The media last week heralded the opening of the first shopping mall in Gaza and immediately the blogosphere was atwitter. Some saw it as proof of the easing of the closure, which Israel had promised, and others saw it as a sign that there is no crisis in Gaza. Indeed, a two-story building converted into an air-conditioned shopping mall (restrictions on the transfer of construction materials into Gaza for the private sector are still in effect and would preclude the building of such a structure) does not correspond with the usual images of the Strip, nor with concerned reports about hunger arising from the closure, still in effect despite the easing of some restrictions. But Gaza is not and was never a place with a quantitative food shortage; rather it is a place where many people lack the means to buy food and other goods because of a closure policy whose tenets are “no development, no prosperity, and no humanitarian crisis”.

Prices at the new shopping mall are particularly low, clients say, and considering the limited buying power of Gaza residents, there seems to be no other choice. Sixty-one percent of households in the Gaza Strip suffer from food insecurity, where the UN defines food security as “a situation in which all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. Unemployment is at 34%, a figure that should come as no surprise due to the sweeping ban on exports from Gaza enforced since the beginning of the closure of Gaza in June 2007. Israel has emphasized that the recent cabinet decision announcing an easing of the closure does not apply to export (nor to the movement of people). Even the recent lifting of the ban on the transfer of raw materials and the slow trickle of spare parts into Gaza have not yet made their mark on economic activity, especially considering the crossings’ capacity limitations.

According to the mall’s directors, the vast majority of brands sold at the mall – 90% – are Israeli-made, in addition to a small percentage of items originating in the West Bank. This is another indication of the dearth of goods manufactured in Gaza itself. Indeed, how can you manufacture clothing, shoes, carpets and food products (items that have been manufactured in Gaza in the past), when, even after the cabinet decision to “lift the closure”, the amount of goods transferred into Gaza last week (979 trucks compared to 2,350 trucks a week in 2005) meets only 40% of needs?

The price is of the products at the mall may be low, but apparently not low enough for most of the residents of Gaza.

The firing of rockets and mortar shells on towns in southern Israel from the Gaza Strip last week should be categorically condemned, since it targeted Israeli civilians or failed to distinguish between military and civilian targets. The perpetrators and the Hamas government which allows militant groups to fire from the territory under its control must be held accountable.

The Israeli Defense Ministry’s hasty response, however, declaring that Kerem Shalom would be closed until further notice, raised concern among those trying to transfer humanitarian supplies to Gaza. It was not clear whether the closure of the crossing was a legitimate measure in response to a real and concrete security risk to the crossing and those who work there, or if the Defense Ministry decided to react as it had in the second half of 2008: In the months leading up to the Gaza war, Israel closed the civilian crossings as punitive retribution for rocket fire, not as a response to a concrete security threat.

Residents of Gaza breathed a sigh of relief on Sunday, when Israel permitted the reopening of the Kerem Shalom Crossing and the resumption of a minimum level of supply to the Strip. The dependence on Kerem Shalom is so great because it is virtually the only goods’ crossing that remains open; every closure thus blocks the transfer of goods that are in short supply in Gaza because of the Israeli-imposed “minimum humanitarian standard”.

Since the closure of Gaza began in June 2007, Israel has systematically worked to restrict the operation of the Gaza Strip’s crossings – policies that reached a peak with the closure of the Nahal Oz crossing at the start of 2010. And so, at this time, with the exception of the grain conveyor at the Karni Crossing, the Gaza Strip is dependent on one crossing – Kerem Shalom – which was originally designed for the occasional transfer of humanitarian aid and which has limited capacity. Israel has even insisted that Egypt transfer all aid to the Gaza Strip coming from its territory via the Kerem Shalom crossing and not via its own crossing at Rafah. Last week, Egypt announced that it would permit supply from its territory only via Kerem Shalom. This dependence on Kerem Shalom is well-known to those who shoot at it and to those who allow the shooting to take place.

Israeli policies to restrict the operation of the Kerem Shalom crossing stand in violation of international agreements it has signed, which take into account situations where a security risk may occur at a particular crossing. In these agreements Israel committed to three basic principles that were intended to ensure that the Gaza Strip crossings would function on a continuous basis, even in the presence of real security threats: the operation of alternative lanes (lane redundancy) and alternative crossings (passage redundancy), as well as a commitment to the primary aim: the principle of continuous operation. Yet as of 2010, virtually all alternative crossings have been closed.

Since Israel insists on enforcing an almost total closure policy that leaves the Gaza Strip “on the edge” in every aspect of life (food, goods, electricity, cooking gas and more), every closure of the single crossing still permitted to operate, when already only minimum amounts are allowed through it, threatens to push Gaza over the edge.

As news organizations report each detail of a possible prisoner release deal between Israel and Hamas, a related subject is receiving less attention: whether the release of the captured Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, would lead to an opening of Gaza’s crossings, closed to all but the bare minimum passage of people and goods. Writing in Haaretz, Akiva Eldar has suggested that one would not necessarily follow the other:

“It has been decided that the Shalit deal will not bring about a change in Israel’s policy regarding the blockade of Gaza and preventing the passage of people and goods between Gaza and the West Bank, except for humanitarian cases and essential goods”.

Really? It won’t?

Israel has justified its 3.5 year closure of Rafah Crossing and 2.5 year closure of Gaza’s other crossings as “sanctions” designed to pressure the Hamas regime, especially to release Shalit. While Gisha and other human rights groups have criticized the closure as unlawful collective punishment – irrespective of its “goals” – Israeli officials  have insisted that closing Gaza’s crossings nearly hermetically is not only permissible but is also effective in achieving political objectives. The position that prevailed in an August 24, 2006 internal discussion among security officials regarding Rafah Crossing, reproduced in Gisha’s position paper, Disengaged Occupiers was to:

“Oppose opening the crossing even for a few hours, so long as the issue of the captured soldier remains unchanged”.

The “logic” of the policy was to make life so difficult in the Gaza Strip, that the 1.5 million civilians trapped in Gaza would somehow “overthrow” Hamas or at least – exert pressure for the Hamas regime to acquiesce to Israeli demands.

True, the Israeli public never quite believed the effectiveness of that goal: a 2008 survey commissioned by Gisha and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel found that 78% of Jewish Israelis believed it was unlikely that the closure would lead to regime change in Gaza, and 83% believed that Hamas had been strengthened since the closure was tightened in June 2007. A newly released film by the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem uses animation to show just how fanciful the idea that the suffering of 1.5 million people could somehow be “effective” in putting the squeeze on Hamas. But Israeli policy-makers insist that Gaza residents could be “taught a lesson” through the closure. Can they really?

The closure of the Gaza Strip is tight enough to make life difficult for residents, but fences and checkpoints don’t prevent viruses from passing through, as became apparent earlier this month. Despite predictions that the closure of Gaza might protect it from exposure to the Swine Flu, the virus was identified in the Gaza Strip two weeks ago, and already some 185 people have been diagnosed as infected, 13 of whom have died.

Not only has the closure of Gaza failed to protect it from the virus, but the restrictions on the passage of equipment and fuel are making it difficult to contain the virus’s spread.

During the military operation last winter, 15 hospitals and 34 medical institutions were damaged, and their repair has not been possible due to Israel’s refusal to allow building materials into the Gaza Strip. While Israel boasts of permitting increased quantities of humanitarian aid to Gaza, it continues to restrict the entrance of medical supplies, claiming security risks. Thus, Israel is making it difficult to send batteries needed for the UPS systems that protect sensitive hospital equipment during the frequent power outages and is limiting the supply of additional medical supplies, such as X-ray equipment.

The Swine Flu, however, known for its tendency to breach borders, is not treated like other illnesses, and Israel has allowed 6,000 vaccinations purchased by the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Ramallah into Gaza. The vaccinations are destined for Gaza residents who participated in the pilgrimage to Mecca (the Hajj) and for the medical professionals treating patients diagnosed with the virus. It is estimated that more than 400,000 vaccinations are needed for people in high risk groups.

Allowing vaccinations through to Gaza residents is surely a nice public relations photo opportunity, but preventing the outbreak of an epidemic requires appropriate sanitary conditions and infrastructure, too. Frequent and extended blackouts (8 hours a day, 4 days a week), due to Israel’s refusal to allow the transfer of the required amount of industrial diesel to the Gaza power station, interfere with the proper functioning of local hospitals. Hospitals rely on back-up generators during the power outages, but limitations on their power production interferes with the heating and ventilation systems that are vital for maintaining proper air-pressure.  Likewise, the ongoing shortage of gas limits the ability to run hospital washing machines needed for basic hygiene. This past week, only 34% of the gas needed by Gaza residents was supplied (518 tons out of the 1,500 tons needed per week).

Other types of infrastructure systems which are needed to deal with infectious diseases are the sewerage and water purification systems, which also rely on fuel and supplies limited by Israel. A roof over the heads of the thousands of residents uprooted from their homes and the hundreds still living in tents since their homes were destroyed in the war is another basic requirement.

Some people resort to prayer to protect them from the Swine Flu. We would make do, for starters, with policies that allow the ongoing transfer of equipment required for sanitation and the proper functioning of the health system – out of respect for the rights of the 1.5 million people who live in the Gaza Strip.

A leading Israeli business newspaper this week provided a window into a different Palestinian economy – “a tunnel economy.” Meanwhile, in the Gaza Strip, the status quo continues this week – with Israel blowing up more tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt border in response to rocket fire on Israel.

Perhaps the Israeli business sector understands something that Israeli politicians simply don’t comprehend – that the Palestinian economy in Gaza, which has collapsed due the 27-month-long closure imposed by Israel, has changed beyond recognition: hundreds of tunnels are currently operational in the Strip (between 600 and 1,000) and thousands of people are risking their lives to work in them. These tunnels are supplying about two-thirds of the goods required by the residents of the Gaza Strip. Thousands of dollars in permit fees and millions of dollars in taxes are being collected by the Hamas government. 

While in Israel they are saying that the last Gaza war gave Israel an economic boost, in Gaza, besides the other kinds of damage sustained, thousands of people who chose to invest in operating the tunnels blown up by Israel have sustained a financial loss.

Israeli security officials view the tunnels as a security threat, due to the concern that arms will be smuggled through them, and this is the reason given for their destruction. Palestinian traders would also prefer to avoid the high costs of transporting goods via the tunnels and resume overland trade, via the border crossings that have remained closed now for over two years.

According to Palestinian officials, last week Israel mounted two attempts to transport industrial diesel into the Gaza Strip via the Kerem Shalom border crossing, and not via the Nahal Oz crossing, which has until now been the only crossing designed and equipped for the transfer of fuels and gas to Gaza. Attempts to transfer industrial diesel via Kerem Shalom were also made in the previous month. In the last week, Israel transferred not one drop of industrial diesel via Nahal Oz and in the previous two weeks transferred 3.68 million liters in total- 53% of the amount required. The reports that Israel intends to close down the Nahal Oz crossing completely follow a gradual slowdown of operations at the terminal, which now operates only three days a week.

The other crossings have also been closed: Karni Crossing, which was the main trade route, has been closed since June 2007, and only one conveyer belt, used to transport produce and animal feed, has continued to operate on a partial basis since then. The Sufa crossing has not operated since September 2008 and Israel announced its permanent closure in March 2009. The transfer of goods via the Rafah crossing is prohibited. And so all of Gaza is now almost totally dependent on the Kerem Shalom crossing, which has limited capacity and was originally designed for the occasional transfer of humanitarian aid only. Now Israel apparently plans to burden Kerem Shalom with fuel and gas transports as well.

Of course, in response to rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, Israel occasionally closes Kerem Shalom too, due to what it identifies as dangers to the crossing.

The possibility that security risks would threaten the opening of Gaza’s crossings was the subject of considerable forethought. As a result, three fundamental conditions designed to ensure that the Gaza Strip crossings would operate continuously were established and agreed to by Israel:  (1) Recognition of the need to operate alternative lanes (lane redundancy); (2) recognition of the need to operate alternative crossings (passage redundancy); and (3) the primary objective which Israel committed to in the Crossings Agreement: the principle of continuous operation.

It is hard to imagine how one crossing, consisting of only one primary lane, can fulfill these fundamental conditions.

Meanwhile, Israel continues to strike against the tunnels underneath the Egypt-Gaza border, via which the majority of goods required by Gaza residents are transported, including by blowing them up.

Under these circumstances, with the sea and air routes completely blocked, the tunnels rejected as a legitimate option, and the overland crossings increasingly shut down, how exactly are the residents of Gaza supposed to get the goods they need?