In sixth place: There is a siege/blockade on the Strip

all it takes is a few photos of a bustling market to refute a very simplistic understanding of the closure. Feras Market in Gaza City

Though the words “siege” and “blockade” are frequently used, we believe those terms actually misrepresent the situation in important ways. “Closure” has been our term of choice, and in our 2008 paper Gaza Closure Defined we explained why in detail. Leaving aside the legal terms and definitions, it’s clear that siege and blockade are used to describe the difficult situation faced by residents of Gaza, mainly by well-intentioned individuals who want to help. The problem is that these terms tend to evoke a situation where nothing and no one comes in or out (again, this despite the fact that their legal meanings are quite specific). It’s certainly not the case that nothing or no one is moving and because of this, it’s quite easy to refute the terms, thus dismissing the very real and difficult closure that is in place. In other words, all it takes is a few photos of a bustling market or statistics on truckloads to refute a very simplistic understanding of the closure. The point is not that movement isn’t occurring at all, the point is that it’s not in the right quantities or kinds.

In fifth place: People in Gaza can’t go anywhere

This was not far from the truth until June 2010, when Egypt began to allow for greater movement of people via Rafah Crossing. Today around 28,000 people pass through the crossing in both directions each month, and there are no longer waiting lists for exit from Gaza into Egypt. So access to the outside world from Gaza is easier today, and less controlled by Israel.

What hasn’t really changed are the restrictions on travel from Gaza to Israel and the West Bank, which is by far the most important. Considering that Gaza and the West Bank share one education and one health system, are bound by countless familial and social ties, and that Gaza’s primary markets are in Israel and the West Bank, this is where the crux of the problem lies. Exit from Gaza via Israel, for those needing to travel into Israel or to the West Bank, officially remains limited to “exceptional humanitarian circumstances”. In practice, Israel allows approximately 3000 exits of Palestinians from Gaza every month: nearly half are businessmen, and the rest are mainly medical patients and their companions. Compared with more than half a million exits before the start of the second Intifada in September 2000, this is hardly sufficient.

There are several thousand statusless persons in Gaza and it is unclear how many of these have no other form of valid travel document. For these individuals travel really is impossible because they are not recognized by Israel, Egypt, or any other place for that matter. Israel, via its control of the Palestinian population registry, continues to determine who is counted as a resident of the occupied territory and can therefore receive an ID and passport.

In fourth place: It’s illegal for Israel to stop ships on their way to Gaza

Gisha’s position is that Israel has the right under the law of occupation to determine by which routes goods and people enter and leave the Gaza Strip, and condition their passage on security checks. However, at the same time it bears an obligation to allow movement and access in such a way that facilitates normal life. In other words, the same authority that allows them to stop ships translates into a responsibility to allow freedom of movement, subject only to specific and necessary security screening procedures.

In third place: Israel bears full responsibility for what happens in Gaza because of the occupation

In our opinion, the formula that makes the most sense is that control equals responsibility – where you exercise it, you are also responsible for it. That means that Israel bears primary responsibility in the spheres where it maintains control of Gaza – such as on the ability to export and on movement between Gaza and the West Bank. This does not mean, however, that other actors exercising control, namely Hamas and the PA, don’t also bear a responsibility for what happens in those domains where they are the primary actor – for example, in the creation of school textbooks or the running of prisons.

In second place: What Gaza needs is more aid

A common refrain we hear is that people want to work, not receive charity. Abu Shawareb family

While it’s true that at least 70% of the population receives humanitarian aid, the key problem isn’t that there is a lack of aid but rather a lack of economic activity to pull people up and away from dependence on aid. A common refrain we hear is that people want to work, not receive charity. Restrictions on movement, of both goods and people, have prevented residents of Gaza from engaging in the productive, dignified work that could be available to them otherwise. Take the case of Naima Abu Shawareb and her family as an example.

The good news is that Gaza has the potential to form a productive and prosperous part of the Palestinian territory: it has infrastructure, universities, a robust civil society, industries and a highly educated population. This should give reason not to be satisfied that things are “good enough” but rather to demand that access be permitted to allow that potential to be reached.

In first place: There’s a humanitarian crisis in Gaza

Like we note above, when one paints the Strip with wide swaths of murky terminology, the task of refuting and obscuring the real picture becomes much easier. Is the entirety of Gaza’s population facing a humanitarian crisis, in the terms that one might imagine places ravaged by famine or destitution? The answer is no. It’s hard to argue though that without the efforts and resources of international organizations, including the United Nations, the situation wouldn’t be much worse. It’s also hard to argue that restrictions on movement which have resulted in a stifled economy and high dependence on charity are in any way acceptable, especially given that the official policy of the Israeli government is to enable economic development in Gaza. We think that the question of whether or not there is a humanitarian crisis is the wrong one to ask. We’re often under the impression that for some, the ambiguous red line that defines a humanitarian crisis also demarcates the extent of their concern. We believe that it’s Israel’s and the international community’s duty and in their interest to strive higher than that.

The 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access marked the end of Israel’s military presence at the Rafah Crossing on the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, yet allowed Israel to maintain substantial control over the terminal. This control was exercised via Israel’s continued control of the Palestinian population registry, which determines who may travel through Rafah, the ability to monitor individuals traveling through the crossing, and the power to decide when and if to close Rafah. The crossing operated routinely as per the Agreement on Movement and Access until June 2006. The circumstances that led to the end of this arrangement are detailed in a report published by Gisha and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel in 2009, entitled “Rafah Crossing: Who Holds the Keys?” The report also presents our position on the responsibility of each of the parties – Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Hamas and external players – as a result of their influence on the ability to open the crossing.

In June 2010, Israel intercepted the Mavi Marmara, a ship headed for Gaza, resulting in the deaths of nine passengers and international condemnation. In the wake of that incident, Egypt opened Rafah Crossing for regular travel. The crossing was opened outside the context of the Agreement on Movement and Access and for limited categories of travelers including foreign nationals; Palestinians seeking medical treatment in Egypt; Palestinians with foreign citizenship, residency status, or a visa to a third country; students wishing to study abroad and individuals receiving special travel coordination from the Egyptian authorities. Between June 2010 and the end of May 2011, a monthly average of 15,700 passengers traveled through Rafah in both directions, representing some 40% of the monthly average in the beginning of 2006, before implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access was halted¹.  In late May 2011, Egypt announced that Rafah Crossing would be opened for travel to all Gaza residents who hold a Palestinian ID card and passport, with the exception of males aged 18 to 40, whose travel would be subject to certain conditions. Between June and August 2011, the monthly average of travelers through Rafah increased to some 27,700. However, the Egyptian-imposed cap on the number of individuals who can exit Gaza per day has resulted in waiting periods of weeks.

The Agreement on Movement and Access prohibited the import of goods from Egypt to the Gaza Strip through Rafah, and although it permitted export of goods through the crossing, arrangements allowing for export were never made. Egypt still does not allow the transport of goods through Rafah, with the exception of humanitarian aid, subject to its discretion.

As has been the case since Rafah Crossing first opened, travel through it is subject to registration in the Israeli-approved Palestinian population registry. As such, Israel continues to have some, if significantly reduced, control over Rafah Crossing. Its continued influence over the crossing is also a result of cooperation with Egypt on security matters. Egypt continues to consider Israel as holding governmental powers in the Palestinian territory, in part due to the peace treaty between the two countries which stipulates that the international border between Israel and Egypt in the northern part of the Sinai desert is the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip².

Movement of people and goods between Egypt and the Gaza Strip by land also takes place through underground tunnels on the Egypt – Gaza border. The tunnels are not new, but before June 2007, they were primarily used for smuggling contraband such as weapons and narcotics. When Israel began restricting the passage of civilian goods into the Gaza Strip in June 2007, commercial trade via the tunnels increased and began to include many consumer goods and industrial products whose transfer Israel bans through land crossings. The tunnels now serve as the primary route for transporting fuel and building materials, which are restricted for import into Gaza by Israel³.  The tunnels are also used for transporting cigarettes from Egypt, which are cheaper than the ones brought from Israel, as well as weapons, cash and narcotics. Israel occasionally bombs the tunnels from the air⁴.  The tunnels do not provide a dependable or satisfactory trade route, yet the transporting of civilian goods through them has allowed the government in Gaza to determine tax rates (which are different from the ones set by Israel) for goods such as fuel, cigarettes and building materials, as explained below.

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1. Press Release, Gisha, Gisha response to Egyptian announcement on the opening of Rafah Crossing: There is still a need to permit passage of people and goods between Gaza and the West Bank,( May 26, 2011).
2. Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt, March 26, 1979, 1138 U.N.T.S. 59, Article 2, according to which: “The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip.”
3. Based on visits to the area, telephone conversations and personal interviews with tunnel operators in the Gaza Strip (February 2011). See also, Gisha, Reconstructing the closure – Will recent changes to the closure policy be enough to build in Gaza? (Dec. 2010), (hereinafter: Gisha, Reconstructing the closure).
4. See for example, IDF Spokesperson press release, IAF Strikes Gaza Tunnel in Response to Rocket Fire (Feb. 2, 2011).

Kerem Shalom Crossing. At the crossing, less than half the quantity of goods entering Gaza in 2005 is currently transferred to the Strip, no goods are exported.

The deal to free Gilad Shalit in exchange for the release of Palestinian prisoners is a moment of liberation not only for them and their families but for all residents of Israel and the Gaza Strip. The deal also holds the possibility of release from the concept that has shaped Israeli policy toward the Gaza Strip ever since Gilad Shalit was captured five and a half years ago – the concept of closure.

In the time that has passed since Shalit’s capture, no one, not a single minister, security official, senior commentator or serious researcher, either on the left or the right, has argued that the closure helped Israel’s fight against Hamas and the efforts to free Shalit. In the past year, following the flotilla incident, consensus that this policy damages Israel both politically and in terms of security has only grown. The policy was meant to weaken Hamas, but instead it was strengthened. It was meant to isolate Gaza, but it was Israel that ended up isolated.

Last summer, the Israeli government decided (Hebrew) to remove what Prime Minister Netanyahu termed the “civilian closure” based on the understanding that it undermined the “security closure”. However, the “easing” of the closure has proceeded slowly – with words more than it has with deeds, with much hesitation and with many excuses – as if this wasn’t a goal the government itself had defined as an Israeli interest. A major part of the reason for this was Gilad Shalit’s continued captivity. Even Israeli policy makers who thought the closure should be lifted were held prisoner by the public’s anger and the security establishment’s frustrations. According to the formula that the public had come to accept, any policy or action that benefited Gaza’s residents (such as respecting their right to education – PDF) was a concession to Hamas, or worse still, it meant giving up on Shalit.

Throughout these years, Gisha has spoken to senior security, financial and political figures who agreed that the closure should be lifted but refused to say anything publicly “as long as Gilad is still in captivity”. And so, on top of the price Israeli society paid for one of its sons being held in captivity was the price paid for a damaging policy its leaders failed to overturn. The price paid by Gaza’s residents has of course been, and continues to be, very heavy and painful.

Now, with the imminent release of Gilad Shalit and Palestinian prisoners, we hope the moment of release from this policy has also come – a moment when official statements about the need to distinguish between Gaza’s civilian population and those who engage in violence against Israel are put into practice. From this moment on, the government would be able to say proudly and openly that it is finally breaking away from the concept it inherited from its predecessor and moving forward, without hesitation or excuses, to achieve its goal and remove the civilian closure. All that it needs to do is allow goods out of Gaza, allow people to travel between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and remove the restrictions on bringing building materials into the Strip – all while safeguarding legitimate security interests.

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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech last week at the United Nations highlighted once again the centrality of the Gaza Strip to any understanding of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. It is impossible to discuss the impasse currently facing the peace process without addressing the Gaza Strip and, in particular, Israel’s “disengagement” from the Strip. Netanyahu expressed a position shared by many Israelis, who see in the Gaza Strip a nightmare scenario of what is liable to happen if Israel leaves the West Bank, and particularly if it does so without an agreement. We left Gaza, Netanyahu declared, and the radicals gained strength.

However, developments in Gaza in recent years would seem to impart a different lesson – one that Netanyahu failed to mention in his speech. Netanyahu linked between Israel’s “disengagement” and the strengthening of Hamas, but that is not where Israel’s policy towards Gaza ended. The closure policy that soon followed, and which is still in effect, has been the subject of growing criticism by Israeli journalists, commentators and researchers who have argued that rather than fulfilling its explicit objective of weakening Hamas, the policy has actually achieved the opposite outcome.

In a previous post, we presented a collection of comments from the past year supporting this conclusion. Additional commentators and public figures have since added their voices to this growing chorus. In the past, Ofer Shelah (Hebrew), Amos Harel and Dan Margalit (Hebrew) have called for the removal of the closure. Dr. Zvi Bar’el, a senior commentator for Ha’aretz, has been arguing this position for several years. Barel urged an end to the closure, arguing that it is not only ineffective, but also damaging to Israel’s foreign relations. The Institute for National Security Studies also published a position paper suggesting that Israel should negotiate with Turkey to permit the entry of ships to the Gaza Strip after security inspection.

While the closure is ineffective, the easings announced by Israel in 2010 have proven beneficial. As Danny Rubinstein demonstrated in an article in Calcalist, the easings have had a significant impact on Hamas rule in the Strip. Rubinstein argues that the closure actually improves Hamas’ standing, since the organization relies heavily on taxes and levies raised on the smuggling of imports through the tunnels along the border at Rafah. Accordingly, the easing struck a blow at one of the organization’s main sources of income. Rubinstein bases his assessment, in part, on a report by the Peres Center for Peace. The report finds that Hamas has leveraged trade restrictions imposed by Israel in order to secure economic benefits. As a result, the movement’s annual budget rose from $40 million in 2006 to approximately $500 million in 2010. A report published by UNRWA on the same day shows that the closure has helped strengthen the public sector in the Gaza Strip, which is controlled by Hamas, while at the same time leading to the collapse of the private sector.

Ironically, Prime Minister Netanyahu himself made this point cogently in an interview with Ayala Hasson on July 2, 2010 (Hebrew). “I think that the civilian closure will damage the security closure”, Netanyahu commented. “Instead of strengthening our position and our demands of Hamas, it has actually begun to erode our moral superiority”.

Netanyahu also claimed in the interview that Israel had removed the civilian closure imposed on the Gaza Strip. However, the easings do not entail the complete removal of the closure. Israel continues to prevent movement of people and goods from the Gaza Strip. This policy has exacteda heavy toll: over seventy percent of the residents of the Gaza Strip received humanitarian assistance and the unemployment rate is 25.6 percent.

Maybe the time has come to stop seeing the Gaza Strip as Israel’s doomsday scenario. The time has certainly come to stop regarding the situation in Gaza as an immutable fact. The closure imposed on the Gaza Strip has remained in place since 2007. During this period, the civilian economy in Gaza has collapsed, and Palestinians living in the Strip have been denied the right to visit their families, study or engage in commerce in the West Bank. To date, the closure has not helped stop the firing of rockets, bring back Gilad Shalit, or cause the downfall of the Hamas regime– objectives cited by the Israeli government to justify the closure. Instead, Israeli soldiers have found themselves discussing how many rolls of toilet paper should be allowed into the Gaza Strip, or confiscating smuggled tobacco. Clearly, Israel does not bear sole responsibility for the fate of the Gaza Strip, however, it can play its part by removing the civilian closure. It’s time to allow Gaza to be a different kind of example, for Israelis and Palestinians alike.

There is no deep sea port in Gaza

This week we address some common myths and misconceptions which have emerged over the past days following the release of the Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident (in other words, the Palmer Report). These are myths which we identified in the report itself, in the Israeli and Turkish positions as they are summarized in the report, as well as in public debate (mainly in the media) sparked by the report.

Myth: The commission determined that Israel’s closure of Gaza is legal.
Fact: The commission determined that Israel’s naval blockade is legal. The commission argued that an assessment of the legality of the naval blockade can be conducted independently of the question of the legality of the overall closure policy. We disagree with this assessment and believe that restrictions on movement, whether by land, sea or air, constitute a single policy, the components of which cannot be reviewed independently. The legality of the overall closure policy was left as an open question by the panel, however, a recommendation was made to Israel that it continue easing restrictions on movement “with a view to lifting its closure and to alleviate the unsustainable humanitarian and economic situation of the civilian population” in Gaza (par. 156).

Myth: The Palmer Commission was a formal panel of inquiry, charged with the authority to summon witnesses and whose findings can be considered thorough and binding by law.
Fact: The commission was established by the UN Secretary-General on August 2, 2010, to review the “circumstances and context” related to the May 2010 flotilla incident. The panel stressed in its report that it was not “acting as a Court and was not asked to adjudicate on legal liability” (Summary, par. 1). Moreover, it states that, “its findings and recommendations are therefore not intended to attribute any legal responsibilities” much in the same way as the recommendations of the Goldstone report were not legally binding. The panel did not have a mandate to summon witnesses, it was meant to work by consensus and no live testimony was heard. The panel formed its report drawing from the information supplied from Turkish and Israeli domestic inquiries and representatives chosen by each country.

Myth: The maritime closure began in January 2009.
Fact: Israel did indeed declare a naval blockade in 2009, but it has blocked sea access to Gaza since 1967 by virtue of its authority as an occupying power. Gisha’s position is that the laws of occupation continue to apply to the Gaza Strip following the implementation of Israel’s Disengagement Plan in 2005, since Israel still controls key aspects of life in the area. The laws of occupation permit Israel to decide through which channels goods and people will enter and leave the Gaza Strip, however they also impose upon Israel an obligation to allow movement, subject to specific security inspections, and to facilitate normal life in the occupied territory.

Myth: “Israel is the Occupying Power in Gaza, and cannot blockade the borders of the territory it occupies” (Summary of the Interim and Final Reports of Turkey’s National Investigation, par. 23e).
Fact: Gisha’s position is that Israel has the authority (under the law of occupation and not the law of naval blockade!) to determine by which routes goods and people enter and leave the occupied territory, while at the same time bearing an obligation to allow movement and access in such a way that facilitates normal life.

Myth: Bringing in goods via the sea isn’t possible anyway because there is no deep sea port in Gaza, and therefore the naval blockade is not related to the restrictions on movement of civilians and civilian goods (see par.78).
Fact: While it’s true that there is currently no deep sea port, the report fails to note that Israel bombed the site of a planned seaport in September 2001, where construction had already begun. Since that time, and despite a promise made in the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access, Israel has refused to provide guarantees to the international donors who wish to fund construction of a port that it will not bomb the site again, thus preventing it from being built. Blocking access via the sea is an inherent part of Israel’s overall closure policy.

Myth: “The blockade did not constitute collective punishment of the civilian population of the Gaza Strip: there is no evidence that Israel deliberately imposed restrictions on bringing goods into Gaza with the sole or main purpose of denying them to the civilian population” (from the Summary of the Report of Israel’s National Investigation, par. 47e).
Fact: Sweeping restrictions on movement of people and goods to and from Gaza were imposed in June 2007 and articulated in a September 2007 decision by the Israeli Security Cabinet. The cabinet decision refers to a need to restrict movement in order to respond to Hamas’ rise to power in Gaza and the firing of rockets from Gaza into Israel, however the restrictions are not imposed in order to confront a concrete security threat but rather as a means to exert pressure on the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip. The concept of using “economic warfare” as a means of pressure has been confirmed on numerous occasions in statements made by public officials, as well as by the Israeli Justice Ministry in a statement to the Israeli Supreme Court.

Israel’s closure of the Gaza Strip impacts each and every one of its residents, more than half of whom are children, regardless of whether they are personally involved in violent acts against Israel or not. For this reason, the closure constitutes collective punishment, in violation of international law.

Myth: Israel ended its closure of Gaza after the 2010 flotilla incident.
Fact: Some key aspects of Israel’s closure policy have been eased. In July 2010, Israel removed a ban on the entrance of consumer goods and raw materials, however, it continues to restrict export, entrance of construction materials and movement of people between Gaza and the West Bank. These restrictions continue to paralyze the economy of Gaza and cause substantial damage to key aspects of civilian life. In so doing, Israel continues to violate its obligations under international law, rendering its policy of closure – including the maritime closure – unlawful. In order to bring its policy into compliance with international law – meaning that security interests are protected while obligations to civilians in Gaza are maintained – Israel must allow export, entrance of construction materials, and travel between Gaza and the West Bank, subject only to individual security checks.

Ilustration: z_fishies, Flickr. CC BY-NC 2.0

The Palmer Commission, appointed by the UN secretary-general to investigate the events surrounding the Gaza flotilla in 2010, is supposed to publish its report tomorrow (we’re not holding our breath or putting much weight on it, since it’s been delayed several times already to give Israel and Turkey a chance to come to “an agreement on language”). According to media reports, the commission is likely to find that Israel was within its rights to stop the vessels on their approach to Gaza, but will criticize the excessive use of force during the operation. Below, Gisha offers responses to several questions regarding legal status of the flotilla, the closure, and the connection between the two.

 1. According to international law, is Israel permitted to block sea access and stop vessels heading for the Gaza Strip?

Yes, but at the same time it must allow the free passage of goods by alternative channels. Israel has prevented maritime access to the Gaza Strip since 1967 by virtue of its authority as an occupying power and in accordance with the laws of occupation as defined by international law. These laws continue to apply to the Gaza Strip following the implementation of Israel’s Disengagement Plan in 2005, since Israel still controls key aspects of life in the area. The laws of occupation permit Israel to decide through which channels goods and people will enter and leave the Gaza Strip. Although Israel has invited vessels to unload their cargo at Ashdod Port, it does not allow all the civilian goods on board to enter the Gaza Strip by land after security inspection.

 2. Does that imply that Israel’s maritime closure of the Gaza Strip is lawful?

No. In our opinion, the legality of the maritime closure must be considered in the context of the overall closure of the Gaza Strip, which is also enforced by air and land. In this context, Israel has failed to meet its legal obligations. It is a fundamental principle of international law that with control comes responsibility; this in order to avoid a situation where no side takes responsibility for the protection of civilians during wartime or in situations of occupation. Accordingly, the substantial control Israel exercises over the crossings into the Gaza Strip imposes an equally substantial responsibility to permit the movement of people and goods at the level required in order to maintain the proper functioning of the economy, the health and education systems, and other aspects of civilian life. Israel is permitted to prevent the passage of merchandise or people only if there is a concrete security reason for doing so, and even then it must strike a balance between its security needs and its obligation to maintain normal life in the occupied territory. By preventing the passage of civilians and goods of a civilian nature to and from the Gaza Strip, Israel has paralyzed the economy of the area and caused substantial damage to key aspects of civilian life. In so doing, it has violated its obligations under international law, rendering its policy of closure – including the maritime closure – unlawful.

 3. So according to this principle, during a violent conflict it is not permissible to use sanctions and other economic tools that hamper the enemy’s war effort but which also injure the population?

Not exactly. The case of the Gaza Strip differs substantially from sanctions imposed by one state on another. The closure of the Gaza Strip does not merely restrict the commercial relations of the area with Israel, but with the entire world. Accordingly, the closure cannot be considered to be the realization of Israel’s sovereign right not to maintain commercial relations with the area. The imposition of sanctions on commerce between the Gaza Strip and third countries is permissible only with the agreement of these countries, or in accordance with a binding resolution of the United Nations. Such action certainly deviates from Israel’s authority. Moreover, the closure does not meet the legal definition of a siege, which may be imposed in accordance with international law for a fixed period and in order to secure a defined military objective. To the best of our knowledge, the protracted closure has no defined military objective; additionally, it does not permit the free passage of civilians from the besieged area as required by law.

 4. But after the flotilla, the restrictions were relaxed. Doesn’t that mean that the closure is lawful now?

No. Following the 2010 flotilla, the State of Israel introduced certain relaxations in the closure policy. The prohibition against the transfer of consumer products and raw materials was abolished; Israel permitted approximately 1,000 exits per month by merchants from the Gaza Strip to Israel and the West Bank; and certain localized gestures were announced, including allowing entrance of building materials for international organizations and the export of negligible quantities of merchandise produced in the Gaza Strip. The sweeping prohibitions on the passage of people between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank apart from “humanitarian exceptions”, on the entrance of building materials for the private sector and export or sale of goods outside the Strip remained in force. The relaxations which were implemented are important, but fall far short of what is needed in order to permit economic and social recovery in the Gaza Strip, and fail to meet Israel’s legal obligations, as we have explained. In order to render its policy toward the Gaza Strip lawful, Israel must lift the sweeping restrictions that remain and allow transfer of construction materials, export of goods and travel of people between Gaza and the West Bank, subject to individual security inspections.

As usual, we hardly have any reservations about the numbers published by COGAT. However, we continue to recommend that the data be examined in a wider context. In a broader context, the report’s self-congratulatory nature is a little less persuasive. The security context provided by the report – it opens with statistics on rocket fire on Israel during the past year – is important, but needs to be examined alongside Israel’s obligations under international law, the government’s promises and the real needs of the residents of Gaza. What would the numbers look like then?

For instance, the report states: “Israel is working with the international community and the Palestinian Authority to advance and streamline procedures for the approval of internationally-funded projects. To this end a coordination and monitoring mechanism has been set up for the implementation of internationally funded projects in accordance with security considerations. So far 163 internationally funded projects were approved for implementation”.

And in the broader context? The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), whose projects account for half of those approved by Israel last year, reports that this still only represents 27% of the projects they wish to implement in their recovery and reconstruction plan. For example, of 100 schools the agency seeks to build, only 42 were approved, and as getting clearance for materials still involves cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, actual construction has begun on only half of the schools.  ”Advancing and streamlining”, indeed.

The report continues: “In the past year, 29,715 Palestinians entered Israel from the Gaza Strip. Additionally, Israel decided to increase the quota of traders entering Israel to 70 per day. In the past year 7,282 traders entered from the Gaza Strip for business reasons in Israel, Judea and Samaria [the West Bank], and abroad as part of the ongoing economic activities in the Gaza Strip”.

And back to the broader context. It is interesting to compare those numbers to the average of half a million workers who left Gaza every month on the eve of the Second Intifada. Furthermore, permits issued today are only for “senior businesspeople”, defined as those whose exit would contribute to improving the Gaza economy. The few women traders in Gaza, as well as young merchants, who want to build commercial ties with Israel and the West Bank, generally do not receive permits. Israel is thereby ignoring the common wisdom that small businesses are a driver of economic development.

From the report: “In the framework of the Cabinet’s decision on agricultural exports, the export project, in cooperation with the Netherlands to export strawberries and carnations continued. In addition it had been decided to export bell-peppers, but the exports stopped due to low quality of the produce that did not meet European standards. As an alternative the export of cherry tomatoes to European markets was approved”.

Here too, the context puts a damper on the good news. In the first five months of 2011, Israel may have allowed export of agricultural produce to Europe at the economically negligible volume of around two truckloads per day, but it has now been more than two months since a single truckload of goods left Gaza. Besides, as opposed to the government’s December decision and repeated promises made to international actors, the export of textile and furniture from the Gaza Strip has still not been approved.

Certain measures have indeed been taken over the past year to “ease” the closure, and we welcome those. But when seen in the broader context of the needs of Gaza residents and promises made to them, it’s clear that overall, progress has come too little and too late.

On December 8th, the Israeli Security Cabinet decided to ease some of the restrictions on export of goods from Gaza. It announced that Israel would increasingly allow export of textile, furniture and agricultural produce from the Strip. These promises were reiterated as part of a package of gestures that the prime minister announced in February. The same promises reappeared in an April report to donor countries which also included the news that Israel was installing special inspection equipment at Kerem Shalom that would allow for increased exports. However, six months after the cabinet decision, the volume of exports from Gaza has only decreased.

From January to May 2011, Israel allowed only 187 truckloads of goods to leave Gaza – an average of two truckloads per day. Since May 12th, not a single truck has left Gaza. Since goods cannot be transported through the Rafah Crossing, there is presently no way to export goods from the Strip. More than one and a half million people – zero export.

A policy that categorically bans the export of civilian goods from the Gaza Strip is, at the very least, puzzling. Why, during the last harvest season, were Palestinians in Gaza allowed to export strawberries, peppers, cherry tomatoes and flowers via Israel to Europe but are now forbidden to export furniture, textiles and other food products in the same way? And why was the export Israel did allow to be transferred through its territory restricted to Europe and not allowed to be sold to closer markets in Israel, the West Bank or Jordan? Is that what the government meant when it claimed it was making efforts to “improve the economic situation of the population in the Gaza Strip”?

The damage caused by restrictions on export is significant. The restrictions are the main reason why 83% of Gaza’s factories are closed or are operating at less than half their capacity, according to the Palestinian Federation of Industries. The restrictions also result in high unemployment rates, which stand at some 30.8%.

The export ban has paralyzed whole sectors of the Gaza Strip. The fashion and textile industries in Gaza used to sell 70% of their products outside of the Strip. Today, due to the ban, the industry has suffered a near fatal blow. The same is true for other sectors, such as furniture and food, which depend on markets outside of the Gaza Strip for their survival.

What can explain the harm that’s been done to the ability of residents of Gaza to earn a dignified living? In an interview (Hebrew) a year ago, the prime minister said that the civilian closure must be lifted, leaving in place only a “security closure”, but it is hard to find a security argument that would justify a complete ban on export. Just like all goods entering Israel, goods transferred from the Strip undergo security inspections. The sale of Gaza-made armchairs in the West Bank will not supply weapons to Hamas and selling socks made in Khan Younis in Israel will not help build bunkers in the Gaza Strip. If there is a reason, security or otherwise, preventing the government from keeping its promises and from implementing a policy it defined as an Israeli interest, then it owes the public an explanation.

No economy can survive over time without trade and export, and the present condition of Gaza’s economy is a painful reminder of that fact. A stable economy is one of the conditions for a functioning society – a vital interest both for Palestinians and Israelis. Without export there can be no independent private sector and the only alternative that leaves is an economy in which money flows only from top to bottom – from the government and foreign donors to citizens. This is exactly what is happening today in Gaza where the public sector has become the biggest employer. Whereas in the past 60% of the workforce was employed in the private sector and 40% in the public sector, today the ratio has been reversed.

Israel began the closure of Gaza with the declared goal of ending Hamas rule. Four years later, it is clear that this policy has failed. Restrictions on export have brought increasing harm on residents of the Gaza Strip and made them more dependent on Hamas than ever.

Recently there has been an improvement in the situation in the Gaza Strip: while unemployment remains high, it dropped some in relation to 2010, and new building projects have begun. This is a welcome development, but there is nothing that will help more than allowing Gaza’s businesses to access markets beyond the Strip. Four years on, maybe it is time to finally consider a change in policy.

1. Passage through the crossing remains limited: Egypt has indicated that it will operate the crossing six days per week during regular working hours, but it seems this won’t be enough: between 400 – 450 individuals have been able to travel through the crossing per day from Gaza to Egypt. From November 2005 to June 2006, approximately 660 passengers per day exited the Gaza Strip through Rafah and according to the Palestinian Crossings Authority, 10,000 people are currently waiting to travel.
2. The situation is unstable: As last week’s closure of the crossing indicates, the situation on both sides of Rafah remains unstable, such that it’s not clear whether the crossing will remain open, nor exactly to what degree.
3. Rafah doesn’t lead to the West Bank: Travel and movement of goods between Gaza and the West Bank remains severely limited, a problem which Rafah cannot address, as goods and Gaza ID holders are not allowed into the West Bank even via the Egypt-Jordan route. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip are part of the same customs envelope, and are recognized, including by Israel, as a single territorial unit, which, despite four years of tight closure, still shares one economy, one education system, one healthcare system and countless familial and social ties.
   

   Rafah Crossing, June 2011. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

4. Export is not moving and not through Rafah either: Export remains severely limited (about 2 truckloads per day, the last of which left Gaza on May 12, 2011, compared with a target of 400 per day in the Agreement on Movement and Access) and is currently not taking place through Rafah at all. This is impacting industries across Gaza which used to sell or export their wares in Israel, the West Bank and abroad. Before the closure, the vast majority of Gaza’s “exports” were sold in Israel and the West Bank.
5. Construction materials do not enter through Rafah: Construction materials are being let into Gaza via Kerem Shalom only (between Israel and Gaza) for approved projects undertaken by international organizations and following exceedingly lengthy bureaucratic procedures. Each month since January 2011, about 10% of what entered monthly in the years prior to June 2007 has entered for these specific projects. At present, Egyptian authorities have not indicated if or when they will allow construction materials to pass at Rafah.
6. Import of goods does not take place at Rafah: Imports to the Strip purchased by the private sector enter Gaza from Israel via Kerem Shalom Crossing. Even if Egypt were to allow goods to enter at Rafah (and there is no indication that they intend to do so nor when) the crossing and surrounding roadways are not currently equipped to handle the transfer of large quantities of goods, on the scale of the access needs of the Strip.
   

   Rafah Crossing, June 2011. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

7. Humanitarian aid does not regularly enter through Rafah: Aid enters Gaza via Kerem Shalom Crossing, between Gaza and Israel. At present, Egyptian authorities have not indicated if or when they will allow convoys of humanitarian aid to pass at Rafah.
8. Medical patients in need of treatment not available in Gaza cannot always make the long journey to Egyptian hospitals. In any case, Palestinian hospitals in east Jerusalem and the West Bank, part of a common Palestinian health care system, are there to serve all residents of the Palestinian territory, including Gaza residents.
9. Reports prove it: Restrictions on access at the crossings between Israel and Gaza (at Kerem Shalom for goods and Erez for people) continue to impact the well-being of residents of the Strip. Yesterday UNRWA published a study showing high rates of unemployment and the Association for International Development Agencies also reportedrecently on how limits on the entrance of construction materials primarily impacts the work of aid agencies and residents of Gaza.
   

   Rafah Crossing, June 2011. Photo: Mohammed Azaiza, Gisha

10. Rafah doesn’t lead to the West Bank: Oh wait, did we say that already? Well, we’re saying it again, because it’s very, very important.

Some might think that what happens at Rafah Crossing is irrelevant to Israel; as if, since the disengagement, Israel no longer owes obligations to the people of Gaza. If that’s what you think, we made this video for you:

Prominent Israeli opinion-makers Dan Margalit, Ofer Shelah and Amos Harel write that the closure harms Israel’s international standing (Hebrew), is “evil” (Hebrew), and even “foolish and ineffectual“. Prof. Shlomo Avineri believes broad agreement can be reached in Israel for a plan that includes lifting the closure. Minister Dan Meridor said (Hebrew) last weekend that the closure of Gaza won’t help weaken Hamas or return Gilad Shalit. Ami Ayalon, former head of the Shin Bet and 2007 member of the security cabinet, was also quoted in an article as saying that such pressure on the Gaza Strip was never thought to succeed and was implemented carelessly. The same article includes a call to lift the closure immediately by Prof. Avraham Sela, an expert on Hamas.

From another perspective, Ehud Yaari and Eyal Ofer do not call for an end to the closure policy but describe the dimensions of its failure. They show how throughout the years of closure, Hamas has cultivated an economic empire while the population has suffered increasing unemployment and poverty.

Uri Avnery calls for an opening of the border crossings and construction of sea and airports in Gaza, while Zvi Bar’el predicts that if Israel does not lift the restrictions itself, it will be forced to do so by international powers as part of their anticipated recognition of a Palestinian state. Who said there is no consensus about the need to lift the closure?

And what about the prime minister? According to Netanyahu, the closure had already been eased prior to June 2010, and he even boasted that this harmed Hamas propaganda. In an interview he gave at the time, Netanyahu said (Hebrew) that “ahead of the flotilla and even after the flotilla, [the closure] should have simply been lifted”. Ahead of the next expected flotilla, Netanyahu ought to simply lift the three sweeping restrictions that remain intact on the import of building materials, export and travel of people between Gaza and the West Bank.

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