Their only crime is being ugly. Carnations from Gaza. Photo: Tania Hary

By: Tania Hary

If I had a carnation for every time someone told me that “now that food gets in, things are ok in Gaza” and that the restrictions still in place post June 2010 “aren’t as ridiculous as those that were put on chocolate and children’s toys before then”, I could get out of the human rights business and go make a nice living selling carnations.

Recently, I heard the same things from a colleague at a café in Tel Aviv…but this time, instead of just countering with my rhetorical skills alone, I had props – carnations. Two Valentine’s red carnations fresh from the Gaza Strip (I won’t reveal here where I got them, but suffice to say they had permits to be in Israel, but not to be sold here!). I pushed them in the direction of my interlocutor’s face: what isn’t ridiculous about these carnations not being allowed out of Gaza for sale in the West Bank or Israel?! Their only crime is being ugly and last I checked, looks still can’t kill!

I will gladly concede that having food to eat seems more important than selling carnations. But if Netanyahu himself has said that economic warfare is out and economic development is in (Hebrew) when it comes to Israel’s Gaza policy, then having a job to be able to feed your family is in and food handouts are….well, out. Questions about whether people in Gaza have enough to eat are out and asking if people have access to dignified, productive work is in.

It’s complicated, people will say. Yes, it’s complicated, but it’s also not so complicated. If carnations, peppers, strawberries, tomatoes and furniture can make their way via Israeli territory to be sold abroad, the only restrictions left on sale of those same goods in Ramallah, Jenin, Hebron and even Tel Aviv are political hurdles it doesn’t make sense not to jump. With Gaza’s tunnel economy still churning revenues for the local government and nurturing a class of spoilers supporting the status quo, restoring and even expanding the activity of Gaza’s private sector through the provision of access to West Bank and Israeli markets isn’t just good for human rights, it’s also good for business. No one can guarantee there will be a market for these ugly carnations, but that’s already beside the point.

Tomatoes from Gaza in Kerem Shalom crossing. Reuters

Over the past few days, the question of whether sale of goods from Gaza will be allowed has seemed more relevant than ever following the reported rise in tomato prices (Hebrew); the response of the Israeli Vegetable Growers Association that it does not oppose the marketing of tomatoes from the Gaza Strip in Israel, and; the end of the season for agricultural export from the Gaza Strip to Europe. We decided to try and provide some answer to the main questions on the topic.

Is there sale of goods out of Gaza today?

Yes, but not enough. Ever since the closure on the Gaza Strip was tightened in June of 2007, Israel has banned the marketing of goods to the West Bank and Israel. Seasonal agricultural export to Europe does exist, but it is negligible in quantity and depends on subsidies provided by the Dutch government in a special export project. The export project accounted for only about 100 truckloads per month at the height of the season, compared to an average of 2,000 trucks that left Gaza each month before the closure was imposed.

Officially, Israel permits export of non-agricultural products from Gaza abroad, such as furniture and textiles, but export abroad is simply not profitable under the current circumstances (see more below) and manufacturers have yet to develop significant commercial ties for marketing their products outside Israel or the West Bank.

On a few occasion in early 2012, Israel granted permission to market goods to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and in one special case also to the West Bank. All these goods were shipped through Israeli territory.

Isn’t it enough that Israel allows export to almost all destinations worldwide except Israel and the Gaza Strip?

No, because Gaza’s industry is suited for sale to nearby markets. The demand for products, packing methods and potential consumers are located in Israel and the West Bank. In fact, there is little demand for Gaza-made products outside these areas. In addition, even if trade ties were established, packing and shipping requirements and the distance of outside markets make exporting to other locations a non-viable and not profitable option for merchants. Prior to 2007, some 85% of the goods that left Gaza were marketed in Israel and the West Bank.

It is important to note that even if Rafah Crossing in Egypt is converted to allow commercial transport, which it currently is not, it would still fail to provide a solution for shipping goods from Gaza to Israel and the West Bank.

Why is export so important?

Gisha’s position is that Israel has an obligation to allow normal civilian life in the Gaza Strip, including allowing the economy to function, with requisite import and export. Israel may condition access of goods on security inspections. Moreover, the current government has decided to allow economic development in the Gaza Strip as part of its policy to distinguish between residents of Gaza and the current government, based on the understanding that a thriving Palestinian economy is also an Israeli interest.

Five years without revenue generated from sale of goods outside the territory have led to an absurd economic model in the Gaza Strip, one in which as the manufacturing sector crashes, government revenue increases. Hamas’ budget in Gaza has grown with revenue coming mostly from funding by foreign entities and taxation on goods coming through the tunnels from Egypt. A new class of millionaires who benefit from import of goods, real estate and retail has emerged, while the unemployment rate among the general population rose to 30.3% at the end of 2011.

In short, a significant increase in sale out goods from Gaza isn’t to be expected in the coming years without reopening Israeli and West Bank markets to Gaza-made goods. And without an increase in sale of goods from Gaza, the industrial and agricultural sectors in the Strip will not be able to recover, unemployment rates will not go down and long-term, sustainable economic development will not be possible.

Are there security reasons for prohibiting the marketing of goods from Gaza in Israel and the West Bank?

All goods shipped out of the Gaza Strip, whether destined to the Ashdod seaport, Ben Gurion International Airport or the Allenby Bridge border crossing, transit through Israel after undergoing security checks. No security official has claimed that goods that transit through Israel require different standards of security screening than they would if they were marketed in Israel or the West Bank.

Considering the permission that was granted for emergency transport of palm fronds or “lulavs” from Gaza to Israel on the Jewish holiday of Sukkot last year, along with the agreement given a few weeks ago to allow, for the first time in five years, to the sale of date bars from Gaza to the West Bank, it is difficult not to get the impression that where there is a will to transport goods, there is also a way – without sacrificing security.

When security officials are asked about the sweeping prohibition on marketing goods in Israel and the West Bank, they do not say it is a security necessity, but rather that it is part of the “separation policy”. Only this week, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, Major General Dangot, said that this policy had a clear political purpose – “to put pressure on the Hamas regime”.

As a human rights organization, we do not consider it our role to comment on the content of the government’s political goals, but rather to insist that they are pursued in a manner consistent with international law. Any policy seeking to “put pressure on the Hamas regime” by indiscriminately harming Palestinian residents of Gaza is an unlawful policy. To this, one might add the fact that there is broad consensus in Israel that this tactic has failed. Those who still speak in these terms are living in 2007.

We will soon publish a document in which we detail what we know about the “separation policy” for the purpose of providing a comprehensive factual basis for a public debate on the policy and its various implications.

We chose to look only at the first paragraph of the piece, since it is quite representative of the rest:

Have you heard much lately about the 1.5 million Palestinians illegally imprisoned by the Israeli government in the world’s largest open-air Gulag? Their dire living conditions, worsened by a selective Israeli siege limiting the importation of necessities of life – medical items, food, water, building materials, and fuel to list a few – has resulted in an 80 percent unemployment rate and widespread suffering from unlawful punishment, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment in Israeli jails.

Does the situation in Gaza fit what most of us think of as a “humanitarian crisis”? Probably not. Nader (Reuters)

There are 1.6 to 1.7 million Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip today, not 1.5 million, as Nader writes, but this is a minor error compared to others in that same paragraph. In the past month alone, 3,659 entries to Israel were recorded at Erez Crossing and 29,925 people travelled through the Rafah Crossing in both directions. Travel via Israel is still far from what it was prior to the second Intifada – some half a million entries per month – but the Gulag comparison certainly does nothing to further our understanding of reality. Additionally, Israel does not restrict the import of food, water or fuel, and while Nader’s article implies that Israel is responsible for the medication crisis in the Strip, the truth is that ongoing disputes regarding payment for medication between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority are largely the cause of this. As we have demonstrated previously, the fuel shortage is also not a direct result of Israel’s closure policy. In addition, while there are a number of methods for measuring unemployment, even under the most liberal of these, Gaza’s unemployment rate is not 80%. Nader may have confused the unemployment rate with the percentage of Gaza residents who receive humanitarian aid.

We wouldn’t be discussing this article here were it not for the fact that it’s a good example of some of the current discourse about the Gaza Strip in international spheres. Whether for fear that Gaza will not get enough attention if not described in hyperbolic terms, or as a result of biased sources of information, it is not hard to find similar errors made in articles in some of the most well-respected newspapers, websites and blogs.

The thing is that there are real problems in Gaza and they are bad enough as it is. Amplifications and exaggerations draw attention away from these issues and are easily refuted. Once those who say “everything is terrible” are exposed as not credible, trust easily shifts to the other side, to those who say “everything is fine”. Major General Eitan Dangot, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories recently gave a presentation entitled “Fighting the Assault on Israel’s Legitimacy” (Hebrew), where he gave two examples of major distortions about Israel’s policy: the medication crisis and the fuel crisis in the Gaza Strip. Israel did not cause either of these, Dangot correctly noted.

But Israel is responsible, for example, for severe restrictions on sale of goods from the Gaza Strip, which Dangot simply shrugged off. He stated that, “The fact that in less than three weeks [international representatives] stopped talking to us in terms of ‘hunger’ and started talking about economics and export from Gaza proves that they have become aware of what really goes on in Gaza and that the claims about a humanitarian crisis were unfounded”. Well, true, restrictions on export from Gaza do not sound as terrible as restrictions on bringing in food, medications and fuel, but they are still one of the major reasons for Gaza’s high unemployment rate and economic stagnation in the Strip, which thus leads to low purchasing power, including the inability to purchase food and other necessities.

Does the situation in Gaza fit what most of us think of as a “humanitarian crisis”? Probably not, but dire poverty and unemployment are exacerbated by Israeli imposed restrictions on movement – particularly on export. Gaza residents are able to travel to other parts of the world via Egypt with almost no Israeli intervention, but Israel still prevents them from engaging with the other part of the Palestinian territory, straining professional, academic, and familial ties under severely restrictive criteria for travel. Attempting to raise awareness by using exaggerations like “open-air Gulag” impedes efforts to provide relevant, fact-based criticism of the policy toward the Gaza Strip. It’s hard for us to understand who is served by this.

In June 2010, the AIX Group published a series of noteworthy position papers on the two-state solution. At a time when restrictions on access between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are becoming ever more entrenched, AIX researchers made an attempt to look into the future to see how access might be realized. The result: a long position paper (PDF) which details a number of possibilities for a safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank and thoroughly addresses security, environmental and statutory considerations.

Dr. Ron Pundak, one of the architects of the Oslo Accords and a member of the AIX Steering Committee, told Gisha: “In the Oslo Accords, Israel recognized that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are a single territorial unit, and therefore there must be a link between them.” Dr. Pundak said that “the minute Palestinians have to travel through Israel to get from Gaza to the West Bank, you have a system that makes things difficult for all parties. There are security problems, and trade becomes more restricted and less competitive. This is why we preferred to plan a closed route that would be designated exclusively for Palestinian use and would be under Palestinian responsibility.”

The absence of a “safe passage” is by no means the only reason for the restrictions on travel between Gaza and the West Bank – Israel forbids passage even when Palestinians seek to access the West Bank from Gaza via Jordan, without entering Israel at all. A “safe passage” could facilitate travel.

AIX brings together senior researchers, individuals who have participated in negotiations and people experienced in Israel’s and the Palestinian Authority’s economic institutions with the aim of analyzing the economic aspects of a permanent agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The cost of the territorial link between Gaza and the West Bank has also been considered. AIX estimates that the project would cost about 700 million dollars, in addition to 180 million dollars for security arrangements.

Of a number of alternatives examined, AIX recommended Route 33 – to create a new overland road and railway between the Karni crossing and the Al-Majid crossing: “The construction of a tunnel or a bridge is not feasible, and the use of a monorail or a train alone will not satisfy the core interests of the Palestinians,” the position paper states.

What happens when this route intersects with Israeli roads?

“There is an appropriate engineering solution for every location. We can build a bypass, tunnel or any other solution allowing for travel. We tried to find a route for the link that minimizes friction as much as possible.”

Restrictions on movement between Gaza and the West Bank, which have intensified over the past two decades, exact a heavy price: Palestinians living in Gaza are unable to see family members in the West Bank; commercial ties between Gaza and the West Bank have been severed, with especially detrimental consequences for those living in Gaza; and students from Gaza are prevented from accessing universities in the West Bank. However, even today, each month, there are 4,000 exits of Palestinians from Gaza via the Erez Crossing into Israel, meaning that even in the current security and political situation, travel between Gaza and the West Bank is possible, with or without a separate designated route.

A map of the routes that AIX considered. The route chosen was route number 3.

“Not Immune to Risk”

Dr. Pundak admits that the route is not “immune to risk,” but adds, “We believe that in every solution Israel has created for itself over the years, it left a certain margin of security risk. The question is how to create appropriate monitoring in order to reduce the risks as much as possible. The route we are talking about was planned such that it would be far away from existing Israeli communities, and it would be built in a manner that does not allow traveling off the road and onto the Israeli road system. However, monitoring and safety controls are essential if this solution is to work.”

According to Dr. Pundak, “This project has three angles: the architectural-environmental angle, the angle related to planning the chosen route and the political-diplomatic angle. We preferred a route that takes account of the existing topography.” Route 33 does weigh factors such as the length of the route in the occupied Palestinian territory and in Israel, compatibility with engineering and planning criteria, security considerations, engineering feasibility, compatibility with existing building plans and environmental concerns. In fact, says Pundak, “construction on this route could start tomorrow, instead of waiting twenty years for an agreement.”

Have you suggested this route to the government?

“The previous government, the Olmert government, had begun considering these issues. I am not aware of the subject arising in the Netanyahu government. The reason we want to push this is that we believe that planning should be done today, yesterday, last week – before any other Israeli activity takes place in the area – like building additional communities and roads which would increase the cost of the project and make its implementation more difficult. On the other hand, as stated, this is one of the advantages of this solution – it can be implemented immediately.”

The issue is that other individuals, who hardly qualify as “exceptional humanitarian cases” do leave the Gaza Strip, but they are overwhelmingly men. Up to 100 senior merchants are allowed to leave the Gaza Strip every day. In February alone, merchants exited the Gaza Strip to Israel 2,146 times. The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) website boasts that 8,411 merchants left the Gaza Strip in 2011.

Permits to exit Gaza are granted only to individuals whom COGAT considers senior merchants, on the assumption that they are essential for economic development in the Gaza Strip. In Gaza, as in the rest of the world, men are more likely to own large businesses, so the result of COGAT’s decision is that women, who mostly own smaller businesses, do not meet the criteria for leaving Gaza for economic opportunities. Women deserve a chance at economic development too, not just for their own benefit, but also for the sake of strengthening the private sector in Gaza as well. Women’s empowerment is of crucial importance for economic development and for the development of a healthy civil society. Israel, as the military and government claim repeatedly, is interested in facilitating this process.

It is worth noting that the hairdressers were not the only ones denied exit from the Gaza Strip. Seven female students from Gaza were denied a permit to travel to Al-Quds University in Abu Dis to participate in an international technology competition organized by Microsoft. They too were told that their reason for travel was not an “exceptional humanitarian case” – another lost opportunity to facilitate economic and professional development for women in the Gaza Strip.

These are just ten women. Ten exit permits that might have improved their lives and the situation of Gaza’s civil society, even if just a tiny bit; but they were not senior enough and not lucky enough to be “exceptional humanitarian cases” – apparently, they are too healthy.

Students in Al Azhar University. Photo: Al Azhar

“Change is starting to unfold in the Gaza Strip”, says Suhair Sakka, 37. “We’ve managed to set up five cooperatives in the Strip over the past two years. Each cooperative is operated by five women”. Suhair is the women’s projects manager in the Palestinian Union of Agricultural Work Committees, a non-profit focusing on assisting farmers in the Strip. “The cooperatives we helped start work in carpet-weaving and embroidery, textile and catering services”, she says. “Some have succeeded enough to take part in international fairs in Morocco, Saudi Arabia and other countries”.

Suhair, who has been working for the UAWC for the past 12 years, works to help women enter the local job market. “Although my first degree is in biology and natural sciences, I always knew I wanted to effect change”, she says. “I saw the status of women here compared to their status in other countries and I realized something can be done about it”.

Suhair is charged with running training and empowerment workshops for women and providing support for the establishment of small businesses operated by women. The aim is to train women and then help them enter the job market. Instead of helping women enter positions that are typically reserved for women, for example in cleaning, secretarial work or caretaking, Suhair is trying to help women lead and manage their own independent businesses.

In addition to helping individual women and their families, integrating women into the workforce brings with it extensive economic advantages. Kevin Daly of Goldman Sachs, for instance, argues that closing the gap between male and female employment in the United States can increase the GDP there by 9 percent. Closing the gap in the Euro zone and in Japan could increase the GDP of those areas by 13%.

In Gaza, while unemployment in the last quarter of 2011 stood at 30.3 percent, unemployment among women was 46.4 percent, compared to 27 percent among men. Suhair says that the male job market in the Strip has been negatively impacted over the past decade as Gaza residents can no longer travel to work in Israel. In this situation, she argues, it is vital that women enter the job market, and for new business sectors to be created. Many women, she says, have already looked to agricultural unions in search of work.

The challenges she faces are anything but simple. “The job market is still completely male-dominated and the society in the Strip is a traditional one”, she says. “The closure of the Strip also prevents economic development and the economic advancement of women is given last priority. This is one of the reasons we are focusing on women who are trying to provide for their families. Providing for their family also makes them partners in decision-making”. In spite of all the difficulties, Suhair says that signs of change can already be seen.

criticism of the closure is consensus

“Okay, bye”. We didn’t really plan it, but an innocent question we asked transformed these two words into internet lore over the past week. A synopsis of the events: On Sunday, we posted a question (Hebrew) on Yair Lapid’s Facebook page. Lapid is a former television news anchor and a rising political star. We asked if he supported allowing four human rights and gender studies students to travel from Gaza to the West Bank, subject to individual security checks.

Lapid answered that he always supports the position of the security establishment. The comments that followed were full of fury. Lapid repeated his position and the debate continued until Lapid suddenly posted the words “Okay, bye”. The rest is internet history (Hebrew).

In Lapid’s defense, even if we do share the general feeling that his response to the question was bizarre, at least he took a position. Defense Minister Ehud Barak has yet to answer the question despite the fact that it was submitted as a parliamentary inquiry by Member of Knesset Doron Avital of Kadima on January 11, 2012. The deadline for his response expired three weeks ago.

In the meantime, four women from Gaza, all leading activists in civil society organizations in the Strip, are being denied a permit to travel to Birzeit to finish their studies in the gender, law and development program and the democracy and human rights program. These programs are not available in the Gaza Strip and the students’ applications for travel permits were not rejected for reasons of security, but simply because they are students and the security establishment has prohibited students from leaving Gaza to study in the West Bank since the year 2000. So, yes, we were surprised by Lapid’s position on this issue, but at least we know what it is. The defense minister remains silent on the issue.

Criticism of the closure policy is not a private obsession for the “leftist” organization, Gisha. As our new Facebook gallery of statements made by public figures shows, criticism of the closure is consensus. Over the next few weeks, we will post a new statement made by a security expert, senior pundit, politician and others. Heard together, their voices leave no room for doubt that the civilian closure of the Gaza Strip has caused Israel damage and that Gaza residents must be ensured the right to freedom of movement, including the right to engage in economic activity. Still sounds subversive? Listen to what the security establishment has been saying for the past year about its commitment to distinguish between Gaza’s civilian population and millitants in the Gaza Strip. Add to that the government’s announcement that the civilian closure has been lifted, and you’ll likely reach the conclusion that restrictions on movement, still imposed sweepingly on people and goods leaving Gaza, are worth reexamining at the very least. In our view, the four students are a good place to start.

Israel puts a lot of time and energy into showing how many goods enter Gaza each day. This post and the infographic which accompanies it follow an animated video clip and daily tweets by the IDF Spokesperson (example). But “normal civilian life” can’t be based only on goods coming into Gaza. A normal civilian economy also needs export. For some reason, on this issue, there are no impressive infographics. Maybe this is because last week, only seven truckloads of goods left the Gaza Strip and that’s not a very impressive number.

Without export, there can be no real economic development in Gaza. Without real economic development in Gaza, Israel will have to flaunt the 25% unemployment rate in the Strip as an achievement without revealing that this figure relates to the second fiscal quarter of 2011 and that in the following quarter, unemployment rose to 28%.

We took the liberty of using the army's infographic in order to compare the number of trucks leaving the Gaza Strip and the number of trucks entering.

The current capacity of Gaza's power station, together with electricity purchased from Israel and Egypt, can supply only 62% of Gaza's electricity needs

Even in coastal Gaza, it’s a cold, rainy February, and the power outages last an average of 12 hours each day, since Gaza’s power plant shut down Tuesday for lack of diesel. Fuel for generators, even for hospitals, is running low, and water and sewage pumping is disrupted.

The immediate reason for the crisis? Earlier this month, Egyptian security officials began intercepting fuel supplies en route to the tunnels between Gaza and Egypt, reducing supplies to one third of their previous levels.

The historic reason? Israeli restrictions on fuel supplies via the overland crossings, imposed in 2007, caused massive shortages and eventually diverted supply to the tunnels with Egypt, an informal arrangement that leaves Gaza residents vulnerable to supply disruptions.

In addition to this, a governance split between Fatah and Hamas has apparently dampened motivation to work together in order to resume ordering the significantly more expensive fuel from Israel.

A quick history of Gaza’s blackouts:

In June 2006, following the capture of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by militants in Gaza, Israel bombed Gaza’s power plant, destroying its transformers, and the damage has yet to be fully repaired. The current capacity of Gaza’s power station, together with electricity purchased from Israel and Egypt, can supply only 62% of Gaza’s electricity needs, which have never been fully met.

In October 2007, Israel imposed restrictions on the transfer of fuel to Gaza, including the industrial diesel needed to operate the power plant. After months of shortages and interruptions of electricity supply and transportation, the Hamas government began bringing fuel into Gaza via the tunnels with Egypt, at much lower prices. In 2010, after the EU stopped paying for diesel for the power station, Hamas began buying that, too, from Egypt. But officially, Egypt does not consider the tunnels to be a legitimate supply channel, and no formal agreement was reached between Egypt and Gaza on energy, which would include supply commitments.

So Egypt believes it can turn off the taps whenever it likes. As for resuming supply from Israel, there are three obstacles:

First, we are not aware of a request from the PA to purchase fuel from Israel for Gaza. Fatah and Hamas have long sparred over financial responsibility for Gaza’s energy supply, and the reconciliation agreement does not appear to have changed that. It is also not clear how quickly purchasers in Gaza would be able to re-adapt to the price differential – fuel from the tunnels is much, much cheaper than fuel purchased from Israeli companies. If Hamas and Egypt cannot agree to restore supplies, the Palestinian authorities will have to cooperate in order to purchase fuel from Israel.

Second, it is not clear whether Israel would still apply its restriction on fuel supplies, imposed in 2007 as a punitive measure against the Hamas regime. Those restrictions are the reason for the development of the tunnel fuel trade.

Third, since 2007, Israel has closed three of Gaza’s goods crossings, including the fuel depot that used to supply Gaza. The last remaining crossing, Kerem Shalom, is not designed for fuel transfer and has limited capacity.

Each of these obstacles can be overcome – Palestinian leaders can put aside their internal disputes and Israel can open crossings and cancel punitive policies. The question is whether all sides will choose to do so, in order to fulfill their responsibilities to the 1.6 million people in Gaza.

Abu Sal’s idea is inspired by Gaza’s many tunnels which, since the closure of the Strip, have become a critical part of Gaza’s economy. It’s difficult to estimate how many tunnels there are in Gaza today but they are used for smuggling weapons, people and goods. Abu Sal, however, imagines a different future for Gaza’s tunnels – he wants to transform them into a metro service and in doing so, help solve Gaza’s transportation problems.

In January, Abu Sal’s ‘A Metro in Gaza’ was displayed at the French Cultural Center. His planned metro includes seven lines and 200 stations in different neighborhoods throughout Gaza. One of the lines connects Gaza to the Sinai Desert; another, line no. 1, connects Erez Crossing in Gaza’s north to Rafah Crossing in the south.

Abu Sal is not an engineer and, as he puts it, he is only suggesting a “visual solution”.  Other than mapping the stations and drawing the route, Abu Sal also designed a large ‘M’ sign for the metro which he photographed in 50 different locations in the Strip. He says many people who were photographed next to the sign took the idea seriously. Some were cynical, some liked it, but either way, “people started talking about it seriously”. And according to Abu Sal, “there were a few who believed this project was actually going to happen”.

Abu Sal’s metro might never be built, and its large ‘M’ signs might not ever grace Gaza’s neighborhoods, but Abu Sal talks about Gaza in a way that very few others are prepared to do.  He dares to imagine a different reality and envision the future, despite the uncertainty of the day-to-day: “My dream is to see Gaza as a quiet, stable place, but I don’t want people here to just be able to eat, drink and sleep peacefully. I want Gaza to be a creative, thriving place, a place that makes a contribution to its environment”.  Even if it’s just a distant dream, at least Abu Sal dares to dream it.

The Metro map

The Metro sign, designed by Abu Sal