In sixth place: There is a siege/blockade on the Strip

all it takes is a few photos of a bustling market to refute a very simplistic understanding of the closure. Feras Market in Gaza City

Though the words “siege” and “blockade” are frequently used, we believe those terms actually misrepresent the situation in important ways. “Closure” has been our term of choice, and in our 2008 paper Gaza Closure Defined we explained why in detail. Leaving aside the legal terms and definitions, it’s clear that siege and blockade are used to describe the difficult situation faced by residents of Gaza, mainly by well-intentioned individuals who want to help. The problem is that these terms tend to evoke a situation where nothing and no one comes in or out (again, this despite the fact that their legal meanings are quite specific). It’s certainly not the case that nothing or no one is moving and because of this, it’s quite easy to refute the terms, thus dismissing the very real and difficult closure that is in place. In other words, all it takes is a few photos of a bustling market or statistics on truckloads to refute a very simplistic understanding of the closure. The point is not that movement isn’t occurring at all, the point is that it’s not in the right quantities or kinds.

In fifth place: People in Gaza can’t go anywhere

This was not far from the truth until June 2010, when Egypt began to allow for greater movement of people via Rafah Crossing. Today around 28,000 people pass through the crossing in both directions each month, and there are no longer waiting lists for exit from Gaza into Egypt. So access to the outside world from Gaza is easier today, and less controlled by Israel.

What hasn’t really changed are the restrictions on travel from Gaza to Israel and the West Bank, which is by far the most important. Considering that Gaza and the West Bank share one education and one health system, are bound by countless familial and social ties, and that Gaza’s primary markets are in Israel and the West Bank, this is where the crux of the problem lies. Exit from Gaza via Israel, for those needing to travel into Israel or to the West Bank, officially remains limited to “exceptional humanitarian circumstances”. In practice, Israel allows approximately 3000 exits of Palestinians from Gaza every month: nearly half are businessmen, and the rest are mainly medical patients and their companions. Compared with more than half a million exits before the start of the second Intifada in September 2000, this is hardly sufficient.

There are several thousand statusless persons in Gaza and it is unclear how many of these have no other form of valid travel document. For these individuals travel really is impossible because they are not recognized by Israel, Egypt, or any other place for that matter. Israel, via its control of the Palestinian population registry, continues to determine who is counted as a resident of the occupied territory and can therefore receive an ID and passport.

In fourth place: It’s illegal for Israel to stop ships on their way to Gaza

Gisha’s position is that Israel has the right under the law of occupation to determine by which routes goods and people enter and leave the Gaza Strip, and condition their passage on security checks. However, at the same time it bears an obligation to allow movement and access in such a way that facilitates normal life. In other words, the same authority that allows them to stop ships translates into a responsibility to allow freedom of movement, subject only to specific and necessary security screening procedures.

In third place: Israel bears full responsibility for what happens in Gaza because of the occupation

In our opinion, the formula that makes the most sense is that control equals responsibility – where you exercise it, you are also responsible for it. That means that Israel bears primary responsibility in the spheres where it maintains control of Gaza – such as on the ability to export and on movement between Gaza and the West Bank. This does not mean, however, that other actors exercising control, namely Hamas and the PA, don’t also bear a responsibility for what happens in those domains where they are the primary actor – for example, in the creation of school textbooks or the running of prisons.

In second place: What Gaza needs is more aid

A common refrain we hear is that people want to work, not receive charity. Abu Shawareb family

While it’s true that at least 70% of the population receives humanitarian aid, the key problem isn’t that there is a lack of aid but rather a lack of economic activity to pull people up and away from dependence on aid. A common refrain we hear is that people want to work, not receive charity. Restrictions on movement, of both goods and people, have prevented residents of Gaza from engaging in the productive, dignified work that could be available to them otherwise. Take the case of Naima Abu Shawareb and her family as an example.

The good news is that Gaza has the potential to form a productive and prosperous part of the Palestinian territory: it has infrastructure, universities, a robust civil society, industries and a highly educated population. This should give reason not to be satisfied that things are “good enough” but rather to demand that access be permitted to allow that potential to be reached.

In first place: There’s a humanitarian crisis in Gaza

Like we note above, when one paints the Strip with wide swaths of murky terminology, the task of refuting and obscuring the real picture becomes much easier. Is the entirety of Gaza’s population facing a humanitarian crisis, in the terms that one might imagine places ravaged by famine or destitution? The answer is no. It’s hard to argue though that without the efforts and resources of international organizations, including the United Nations, the situation wouldn’t be much worse. It’s also hard to argue that restrictions on movement which have resulted in a stifled economy and high dependence on charity are in any way acceptable, especially given that the official policy of the Israeli government is to enable economic development in Gaza. We think that the question of whether or not there is a humanitarian crisis is the wrong one to ask. We’re often under the impression that for some, the ambiguous red line that defines a humanitarian crisis also demarcates the extent of their concern. We believe that it’s Israel’s and the international community’s duty and in their interest to strive higher than that.

Gaza is not as isolated from the rest of the world as it was a few years ago, but it is still cut off from the West Bank and it’s hard to find convincing security reasons why. For example, Israel prohibits students from traveling from Gaza to the West Bank – individual security checks are not even an option because the ban is sweeping. Israel does not allow goods from Gaza to be sold in the West Bank or Israel, while at the same time allowing exports from Gaza to Europe to be transferred through its own airports and seaports. It also imposes restrictions on the import of building materials into the Gaza Strip. The impact is felt mainly by international organizations rather than the local government, which gets all the cement, gravel, and steel it needs from the tunnels. Ongoing restrictions make it difficult for Gaza’s economy to recover, but they also split families apart and impede Gaza residents’ access to higher education and the opportunity to acquire training in a number of highly needed fields.

In fifth place: “Israel gives Gaza money, electricity and water”.

True, Israel does give Gaza residents electricity and water. That is, if by “give” you mean “sells”. Israel also does not “give” money to Gaza’s residents – it does transfer tax monies it collects on their behalf, although sometimes with great delay.

In fourth place: “The Palmer Report concluded that the closure was legal”.

The Palmer Commission decided not to examine the legality of the overall closure of the Gaza Strip and determined only that the naval blockade imposed on Gaza was legal. In its report, the commission included a recommendation for Israel to continue easing restrictions on movement “with a view to lifting its closure and to alleviate the unsustainable humanitarian and economic situation of the civilian population”.

And one wishes to move to the West Bank? Rafah crossing, 3.30.2005. Photo: PHR

In third place: “Gaza has a border with Egypt, so Egypt should take care of the Strip”.

Six months ago, we posted the top ten reasons why the opening of Rafah Crossing just doesn’t cut it. The list is still valid, but here’s the gist of it: Even if Egypt fully opens Rafah to movement of people and goods, this would still not provide a solution for the problem of movement restrictions between Gaza and the West Bank. The desire to push Gaza onto Egypt and therefore make it possible to cut the Strip off from the West Bank is a common one, but its implementation would entangle Israel legally and politically.

In second place: “Israel disengaged from Gaza and all it got was Qassam rockets”.

Firing Qassam rockets on civilians is an unjustifiable war crime. This much is clear. We should keep in mind that the rockets didn’t start after the disengagement from Gaza and that four and a half years of closure have done nothing to reduce the threat of rockets being fired from Gaza into Israel – but don’t take our word for it.

As for disengagement, Israel did remove its permanent military installations and civilian settlements from the Gaza Strip, but did this really end Israeli control over Gaza? Try asking a Palestinian from Gaza if she feels that Israel has really “disengaged” from her life. She wouldn’t think twice before responding in the negative. Israel controls her ability to study in the West Bank, export goods, fish, farm her lands and visit relatives. True, it’s hard to imagine control of a territory without permanent military presence on the ground, but this is exactly Gaza’s unique situation today.

And in first place: “Gaza’s residents voted for Hamas so they had it coming to them”.

Hamas’ victory in parliamentary elections in 2006, shortly after the “disengagement” was met with surprise. Withdrawal from Gaza didn’t bolster those in support of the peace process as many in Israel had expected. Today, more than five years after the elections were held, they are still used as an excuse for the closure.

First of all, it is important to stress that international law prohibits collective punishment of a civilian population and for good reason. Past experience has taught that civilians, irrespective of their political convictions, must remain “off limits”. This principle must be upheld in Gaza, in Israel and in all other places in the world facing conflict.

While we’re on the topic of the elections, and to be accurate, the elections Hamas won were not held just in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank and east Jerusalem. It was more than a year after the elections, in June 2007, that Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip.

No elections have been held in Gaza since 2006 and the debate between the various political movements in the Strip has been ongoing. One way of following this debate is through polls, such as those published by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. For example, a poll from December 2011 shows that if elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council were to be held now, Hamas would get 35% of the vote and Fatah 43%. It’s worth recalling also that over half of Gaza’s population is below voting age. How can children be blamed for the outcome of elections in which they didn’t take part?

Can you think of more misconceptions? Comment below.

Santa is back. Photo: stock.xchg

Last Monday we put up a post about the narrowed criteria for allowing Christians to travel out of the Gaza Strip over Christmas this year, which the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) called “easings”.

Adv. Nomi Heger, director of Gisha’s Legal Department, wrote a letter to the Ministry of Defense raising questions about the narrowing of criteria. We can’t tell whether the letter had its intended effect or whether it was our short post on the subject, or perhaps the security establishment’s goodwill, but it appears that COGAT has retreated. The age criterion, which was set this year at allowing travel for those over 46 and under 16, was restored to last year’s age range of over 35 and under 16.

COGAT didn’t bother to post a separate update notifying about its decision to change the criteria but instead chose to quietly alter the original notice posted on its website, the one that reported the “easings” in the first place. It’s unclear how the word “easings” can be used to describe the act of leaving the situation exactly as it was previously. But then again, COGAT is good at coming up with creative uses for this and other words .

Luckily, Google kept a cached version of the original notice, before COGAT decided to change it. Below are images of the screens side by side. Enjoy and happy holidays.

Before and after. Screenshot from COGAT site

A closer look at the goodwill gesture suggests that the Grinch – and not just Santa Claus – has been at work. Photo: stock.xchg

Christmas cheer came a bit early for Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza with the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories’ (COGAT) announcement of goodwill gestures for Christians during the holiday season. It would appear that Santa has decided that 500 Palestinian Christians from Gaza who are under the age of 16 and over the age of 46 have been nice this year and so deserve a chance to visit family in Israel and the West Bank and participate in religious festivities at holy sites outside the Strip.

It’s a welcome gesture and certainly important that the principles of freedom of movement and freedom of religious worship, as well as goodwill, find expression in COGAT’s actions.

But a closer look at the goodwill gesture suggests that the Grinch – and not just Santa Claus – has been at work. In this year’s stocking for Gaza’s Christians is a rollback of their ability to access holy sites on the holidays, relative to past years: Israel has raised the age of those banned from traveling to 46 years old, rather than 35 years old, and has set a quota of just 500 people being allowed to travel, even though about 600 Christians traveled last year.

Whether they have been naughty or nice, at least two-thirds of Gaza’s approximately 1,500 Christians, including all those between the ages of 16-46 who are excluded from the gesture, won’t be able to celebrate the holiday with their family members who meet the criteria and do squeeze into the quota. That means a family of six, with mom and dad over the ages of 46 but with children aged 20, 16, 14, and 7 will either have to forfeit the chance to travel or the option of spending Christmas together.

Last year at Christmas, and even this past Easter, the criteria stipulated that those over 35 years of age could receive permits. It’s not clear why this Christmas only those over 46 can travel. Israel’s policy is even more restrictive for Muslims in Gaza: Muslims of any age can’t travel to holy sites, a policy approved in the courts earlier this year, so I guess we have to be grateful for small miracles. In any case, Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year to all!

Update, 12.22.11: It appears the COGAT has decided to change the criteria again. If you wish to read about the change and the way it was done click here.

In order to reach its conclusions, which it claims to do by applying accepted international law doctrines³,  Gisha’s report challenges some of the most basic principles of the international law of belligerent occupation and international human rights law. The purpose of this rejoinder is, therefore, to reaffirm the relevance of these principles as part of the applicable legal framework setting out Israel’s responsibilities towards the population in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT).

1. International law of belligerent occupation fully applies to territory placed under the ‘effective control’ of a hostile power

In 2005 Israel withdrew most of its troops and evacuated the settlements from the Gaza Strip⁴. According to Israel’s “Disengagement Plan”, approved by the Israeli Parliament (Knesset), these measures were deemed sufficient to refute claims regarding Israel’s continued responsibility for the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip⁵.  However, as Gisha’s report points out, Israel persists in directly exercising some forms of governmental authority over the Gaza Strip. For instance, it retains control of the population registry, preventing the Palestinian authorities from issuing identity cards and changing addresses between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ; blocks the delivery of gas and electricity to the local population; and controls international traffic of people and goods from and to the Gaza Strip, collecting, and frequently retaining, custom duties on behalf of the Palestinians.  Israeli troops remain stationed along the borders between Israel and the Gaza Strip, enforcing the so-called “buffer zone” – an area extending over approximately 17 per cent of the territory of the Gaza Strip barred to Palestinian access⁶ – and conducting regular raids into cities and villages. Additionally, Israel retains exclusive jurisdiction over the territorial waters and airspace of the Gaza Strip and full control over its land borders, with the exception of the Rafah crossing⁷.  Israel intensified its comprehensive closure regime on the Gaza Strip in 2007, preventing the movement of goods and people to and from the Gaza Strip by land and sea. Resultantly, the ability of the Palestinian authorities to exercise governmental powers is thereby significantly limited, even in those domains where Israel has allegedly relinquished its authority.

According to Gisha’s report, the present situation calls for a ‘functional approach’ to the application of the international law of belligerent occupation, whereby the relevant provisions of the 1907 Hague Regulations and Fourth Geneva Convention would apply to the OPT only insofar as Israel persists in directly exercising governmental powers therein. Whereas in the fields in which it has diminished its authority, Israel’s responsibility as an Occupying Power should be considered extinguished⁸.  Claims for a ‘functional approach’ have been advanced in the past by scholars and international tribunals⁹ with the purpose of extending some of the guarantees provided by the international law of belligerent occupation to civilians who find themselves in the hands of an invading army that has yet to gain full control over the territory¹⁰.  It is however disingenuous and legally erroneous to invoke the ‘functional approach’ to challenge the widely accepted position of international law according to which a territory can either be occupied or not, with no intermediary status.

Notwithstanding Israel’s 2005 unilateral ‘disengagement’, the Gaza Strip remains under occupation, as affirmed by the ICRC¹¹ numerous States  and UN bodies.  Under Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, what triggers the application of the law of occupation is the establishment by a hostile power of its ‘effective control’ over a foreign territory and its population. In order to maintain such control, however, the Occupying Power is not required to keep its troops permanently stationed in the occupied territory¹²,  nor does it need to be the sole authority exercising governmental powers therein. As outlined by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Advisory Opinion on the Wall¹³,  the transfer of certain governmental powers to local authorities does not absolve the Occupying Power from its responsibility under the law of belligerent occupation¹⁴.  As long as the Occupant maintains paramount authority over the occupied territory, regardless of which governmental powers it has relinquished or diminished, it will still be called to fulfil all its obligations towards the local population, including ensuring that local authorities provide for the orderly administration of the occupied territory.

Ultimately, the binary test, upon which the application of the law of belligerent occupation is based, guarantees those living in territory controlled by a hostile army that the Occupying Power will assume full responsibility for life in the occupied territory until such time when it completely withdraws its authority, thus allowing the local population to freely and effectively administer their territory.

2. Under international law, there is no legal framework that provides for ‘post-occupation obligations’

Gisha’s report maintains that in the spheres in which it no longer directly exercises governmental powers, Israel owes obligations to Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip under ‘post-occupation law.’ To substantiate this position, Gisha mainly relies on the concept of residual responsibility – elaborated by Benvenisti¹⁵  and allegedly endorsed by the Israeli High Court of Justice in the al-Bassiouni case¹⁶ – whereby Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations is seen to impose forward-looking obligations on the Occupying Power to ensure that public order and civil life are maintained after the end of occupation, until the local population regains the ability to fully exercise its sovereign rights¹⁷.  This interpretation of Article 43, however, is inconsistent with the principle and right to self-determination of peoples, and further serves as an incentive for a hostile army to perpetuate its occupation of foreign territory.

By entrusting the Occupying Power with the preservation of public order and civil life in the occupied territory, international humanitarian law provides for an exception to the principle and right to self-determination, allowing the Occupying Power to substitute its own authority to that of the legitimate sovereign, in order to ensure its military and security needs whilst fulfilling its obligations towards the protected population. This substitution, importantly, should only be temporary: once the Occupying Power has withdrawn and completely relinquished its control, it cannot continue to interfere with the lives of the local population. The concept of residual responsibility, moreover, seems to be based on a misconception of the role of the Occupying Power. Under international law, it has no obligation to ensure that local authorities are ready to take up full responsibility for the administration of civil life before it fully withdraws its troops from foreign territory.

3. Any authority exercising governmental powers over a given territory must ensure respect for the human rights of the local population

According to Gisha’s analysis, irrespective of the question of control of the Gaza Strip, Israel owes obligations under international human rights law only to the extent that actions taken by Israel’s officials have a direct and substantial effect on the residents of the Gaza Strip¹⁸.  Yet, under international law, Israel – as the Occupying Power in the Gaza Strip – is not only required to respect the rights of the local population, but must also secure respect for these rights by protecting the population from violations perpetrated by governmental and non-governmental authorities. This positive obligation includes obligations to protect a range of international human rights, enshrined in treaties that Israel has ratified, which require it to prevent, investigate and repress violations of such rights in the Gaza Strip.

This conclusion does not detract from the responsibility of the Palestinian authorities since for the purpose of international human rights law jurisdiction over a given territory may simultaneously be exercised by two or more governmental authorities¹⁹,  each owing respective obligations towards the civilian population. To the extent that they actually exercise elements of governmental power in the Gaza Strip, therefore, the Palestinian authorities are also duty-bound to respect customary international human rights law and to do whatever is in their power to prevent other actors from violating these rules.

The analysis presented in Gisha’s report demands that the following principles of international law be reiterated:

• The Gaza Strip remains under belligerent occupation. Although most of the permanent presence of Israeli troops has been withdrawn, Israel continues to retain effective control over all aspects of civil life in the Gaza Strip on a daily basis as well as to directly exercise certain elements of governmental control over the territory and the people of the Gaza Strip;

• For as long as Israel maintains its effective control over the Gaza Strip, it must fully comply with its obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law. Israel’s responsibility to ensure respect for Palestinian rights extends also to spheres in which governmental powers are exercised by Palestinian authorities. In order to comply with its obligations under international law, Israel must put an immediate end to its closure regime in the Gaza Strip and to all other practices and policies that hinder the Palestinian authorities’ abilities to administer the territory and provide for the basic needs of the civilian population;

• Israel’s policies in the OPT – including the closures imposed on the Gaza Strip and the restrictions on the freedom of movement between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, amongst others practices – are perpetuating the denial of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, in effect, creating a cultural, economical and social gap between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israel must therefore immediately relinquish its control of these territories, allowing the Palestinian people to freely decide for their own future;

• Under international law, the Occupying Power has no obligation to prepare the ground for its withdrawal, nor does it bear residual responsibility after the end of occupation, until the local sovereign is able to fulfill all the duties previously imposed on the occupant. As soon as Israel terminates its control, it will cease to be responsible for ensuring public order and civil life in the OPT. The primary obligation Israel will owe at that point will concern reparations for violations of international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law, perpetrated during the occupation.

Al-Haq is an independent Palestinian non-governmental human rights organisation based in Ramallah, West Bank.

1. Gisha, ‘Disengaged Occupiers: The Legal Status of Gaza’ (January 2007) accessed 5 December 2011
2. Gisha, ‘Scale of Control: Israel’s Continued Responsibility in the Gaza Strip’ (November 2011) accessed 5 December 2011, 10 (hereinafter: Gisha’s ‘Scale of Control’).
3. Ibid, 6
4. Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan of 6 June 2004, Addendum A – Revised Disengagement Plan – Main Principles’ (6 June 2004) accessed 5 December 2011, paragraph 1.
5. HaMoked, Btselem, ‘Separated Entities: Israel Divides Palestinian Population of West Bank and Gaza Strip’ (September 2009) accessed 10 December 2011
6. Al-Haq, ‘Shifting Paradigms: Israel’s Enforcement of the Buffer Zone in the Gaza Strip’ (23 June 2011) accessed 5 December 2011.
7. Israel shares responsibility for the administration of the Rafah crossing with Egypt. Gisha, ‘Rafah Crossing: Who holds the Keys?’ (March 2009) accessed 6 December 2011.
8. Gisha’s ‘Scale of control’, 26
9. See, amongst others, E Benvenisti, ‘The Law on the Unilateral Termination of Occupation’, in T Giegerich (ed.), A Wiser Century?: Judicial Dispute Settlement, Disarmament and the Laws of War 100 Years after the Second Hague Peace Conference (Berlin: Duncker & Humblet, 2009), 371, 374-5; and TD Gill, ‘The Law of Belligerent Occupation: The Distinction between Invasion and Occupation of Disputed Territory’, in A De Guttry, H Post, G Venturini (eds.), The 1998-2000 War between Eritrea and Ethiopia: An International Legal Perspective (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009), 365. See also, Prosecutor v Naletilić et al. (Judgment, Trial Chamber) ICTY-98-34-T (31 March 2003), para. 221.
10. See, JS Pictet, Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention (Geneva: ICRC, 1958), 60: ‘The relations between the civilian population of a territory and troops advancing into that territory, whether fighting or not, are governed by the present Convention. There is no intermediate period between what might be termed the invasion phase and the inauguration of a stable regime of occupation. Even a patrol which penetrates into enemy territory without any intention of staying there must respect the Conventions in its dealings with the civilians it meets.’
11. ICRC, ‘Gaza: no end in sight to hardship and despair’ (20 May 2011) accessed 5 December 2011.
12. See ‘US Field Manual’, para. 356 and ‘British Manual’, para. 11.3.2
13. See, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Rep 2004. The ICJ applied the international regime of belligerent occupation to the whole West Bank, notwithstanding the fact that certain governmental powers have been transferred to the Palestinian Authority.
14. See, in the same vein, ‘US Field Manual’, paragraph 367 (b): ‘The occupant may, while retaining its paramount authority, permit the government of the country to perform some or all of its normal functions. It may, for example, call upon the local authorities to administer designated rear areas, subject to the guidance and direction of the occupying power. Such action is consistent with the status of occupation, so long as there exists the firm possession and the purpose to maintain paramount authority.’
15. E Benvenisti (n 7) 9.
16. HCJ 9132/07, Jaber Al-Bassiouni v The Prime Minister of Israel (30 January 2008) accessed 5 December 2011, para. 12.
17. Gisha’s ‘Scale of Control’, 51-54.
18. Ibid, 61.
19. Ilaşcu and others v Moldova and Russian Federation (App no 48787/99), European Court of Human Rights, 8 July 2004. accessed 5 December 2011.

Mohammad’s story isn’t necessarily heartbreaking. He is a 19-year old, outstanding student from Gaza who wants to study mechatronics (an emerging discipline that combines mechanical engineering with computer science and other fields) so he can join his father’s business. Until now there hasn’t been a mechatronics program in the Gaza Strip. Al Azhar University opened a pilot program this year, but Mohammad prefers to study at Birzeit University in the West Bank, in a program that already has an established reputation. The Israeli army’s district coordination office (DCO) for Gaza rejected Mohammed’s application to study in the West Bank. It has nothing to do with Mohammed himself. He is not accused or suspected of committing security offenses. It’s not personal, it’s just that no students from Gaza are allowed to travel to the West Bank to study.

Again, this is not a heartbreaking story, just another small dream crushed by movement restrictions. Israel’s security establishment has been preventing students from Gaza from studying in the West Bank since the year 2000, in a blanket ban. The students are not asked to undergo individual security checks; they are considered a security threat simply because they are students.

This isn’t an exaggeration. In 2005, Gisha petitioned the High Court of Justice (HCJ) on behalf of students from Gaza who wished to study occupational therapy in the West Bank. Gisha asked that the DCO run individual security checks on the students’ applications. The state opposed the request, claiming that students are collectively considered a risk group and that West Bank universities serve as “greenhouses for growing terrorists”. The HCJ rejected the petition in 2007, but it did recommend that a mechanism be established to individually examine such requests. Despite this recommendation, no student from the Gaza Strip has been allowed to study in the West Bank, apart from three who were allowed to exit in 2010 as an exception to the rule and at the request of the US. We repeat: so far – four years since the HCJ recommendation and 11 years since the ban on student travel was put in place – only three students have received permission to study in the West Bank.

The ban has a chilling effect. As time goes by, fewer and fewer students ask for a permit to study in the West Bank, simply because they know they won’t get it.

The sweeping ban on movement doesn’t just hurt individuals, it hurts Palestinian society as a whole. Picture: Al Azhar University

A blow to Palestinian society

The sweeping ban on movement doesn’t just hurt individuals, it hurts Palestinian society as a whole. Since the higher education system is more developed in the West Bank, cutting it off from the Gaza impairs the advancement of education and socioeconomic development in general in the Strip.

There are nine universities in the West Bank, as opposed to five in Gaza. The West Bank also has dozens of colleges. West Bank universities offer a much wider variety of programs including degrees in occupational therapy, medical engineering, veterinary medicine, and democracy and human rights, which are not available in the Strip. In fact, in 2010, the number of undergraduate programs and internships offered in the West Bank was 23% higher than the number offered in the Gaza Strip. It was 60% higher for graduate programs. At Gaza universities there is also a shortage of books, facilities and lab equipment and the student to teacher ratio in the Gaza Strip is twice that of the West Bank.

In addition to the lack of advanced studies, Gaza is short on skilled professionals: it has physicians who have not had sufficient training and a shortage of occupational therapists and dentists. For example, the Gaza Strip has no university-affiliated hospital and students are unable to complete their medical residency properly. Similarly, in the field of rehabilitation, while Gaza residents desperately need access to accredited therapists, Israel refuses to allow Gaza students to travel to the West Bank for training in occupational therapy.

And so, even as some Israeli politicians berate the Palestinian education system for teaching hatred, only a few have taken action against the ban on student travel to the West Bank to enroll in subjects like gender studies or human rights and democracy. After all, all Palestinian students are a “security threat”. And a shortage of physicians, human rights activists or engineers doesn’t threaten security at all.

To clarify, Israel has a right, even an obligation, to protect its citizens, but it is difficult to see how the current policy serves to ensure security. It is particularly puzzling considering the fact that Israel allows 70 to 100 merchants to enter its territory from Gaza every day. Though the scant number of permits given for the business sector do not meet its needs, it does prove that a similar mechanism for individual security checks could be put in place for students.

Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman recently stated in an interview that Palestinian economic development is vital for ending the conflict. Since the connection between quality higher education and economic development is self-evident, one might hope that the same logic would lead the foreign minister and the rest of the government to allow students from Gaza to study in the West Bank.

Wadah Bassiso, a prominent businessman in the furniture industry who lives in Gaza, was granted a rare opportunity. He was to be the first person to export furniture from Gaza since the year 2007. But the opportunity came and went. Shortly before he was to begin exporting his furniture to the Czech Republic, Bassiso’s factory burned to the ground. The cause of the fire is still being investigated.

Bassiso’s tragedy is Gaza’s tragedy, as he was the only merchant who was able to secure a work order for furniture from abroad. Export of furniture from Gaza, touted as an expansion of export generally, was actually reliant on the export of a single merchant. One factory burns down and with it furniture export from Gaza.

It is no coincidence that there’s just one merchant wishing to export furniture. Furniture export to the Czech Republic, an operation in which the army already took great pride, is not a viable solution for Gaza furniture makers who have traditionally sold their wares to the West Bank and Israel. Gaza manufacturers do not make furniture for assembly which can be transported over long distances, but rather pre-assembled furniture which has to be loaded onto trucks. Shipping furniture to Europe would require major changes to the manufacturing process, which cost money, entail the development of new skills and take time, and all for export which is barely profitable considering shipping costs and international competition. Under these conditions, it is difficult to see how export to the Czech Republic – if another merchant rises in the place of Bassiso – would bring real improvement to Gaza’s economy.

Sealing up the fate of the dangerous potato

As always, shipping is key. Photo: stock.xchg

How do you allow export without actually allowing it? By imposing restrictions that make it impossible. Case in point: potato export to Jordan, the export that could not be. In principle, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories allows export of potatoes to Jordan and other places, provided those places are not Israel or the West Bank. Allows, that is, as long as a number of minor demands are met. In the case of the potatoes, they were to be transported in closed containers and inside specially-sealed trucks which have the capacity to transport 8 tons of produce (as opposed to the 20 ton-capacity of a standard truck).

As always, shipping is key. Israel’s demands increased the shipping costs to Jordan so much so that the entire project was cancelled. Yes, Palestinians are officially allowed to export potatoes to Jordan, just like they are allowed to export furniture to Europe. Officially. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said in the past: “Now the Gazans must develop their export markets abroad”. Unfortunately, Israel isn’t making their job easy.

The run-away cherry tomatoes

So what’s left? Exporting agricultural products to Europe. There’s not much to write home about. First of all, export is limited to the winter season only. It does not include summer fruits and vegetables and of course, it does not include any non-agricultural products. The quantities in question are also negligible, relatively speaking. In 2005, before the closure, the Gaza Strip exported 904 tons of cherry tomatoes – more than five times the quantity designated for export this season. Past experience shows that it is doubtful that this year’s export plans will actually materialize in full.

Why do Europeans suddenly have such a great interest in Gaza’s cherry tomatoes? The real story is in the fine print. Agricultural export from Gaza is funded by the Dutch government. How can export be funded? The answer is simple – when it’s not profitable. All agricultural export from Gaza currently forms part of a joint Dutch-Palestinian project which is meant to help rehabilitate Gaza’s economy. In other words, even shipments of vegetables and flowers to Europe – small as they may be – resemble a humanitarian project more than actual economic activity.

In summary, we had furniture export that hinged on the luck of a single merchant, export to Jordan which became unfeasible because of a few impractical restrictions and agricultural export to Europe, which is so tenuous that it requires external funding. This is the story of Gaza’s export – export that is meant to support the economy of a population of over 1.6 million people.

Flowers and Vegetables. Munther Budi Farm , Gaza , Biet Lahia

Three days ago two truckloads of strawberries exited Gaza and passed through Israel on their way to Europe. They were the first truckloads of export allowed out of the Strip in over six months, part of a program funded by the Dutch government to bring Gaza produce to European markets.

To mark the occasion, we recall an animated clip about the volume of goods entering the Gaza Strip released by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) in June of this year.The numbers seem impressive – every day about 260 trucks enter Gaza from Israel, carrying about 6,000 tons of goods. According to the clip, Israel can transfer double that volume into the Gaza Strip, about 400 trucks per day, carrying 12,000 tons of goods, however “demand is ultimately determined by the Palestinians”.In other words, what closure?

As usual, our main dispute is not with the figures released by COGAT,we just wish to fill in the blanks and give a more complete picture of the situation. For example, alongside the relaxation in restrictions on entrance of goods to Gaza since mid-2010, the ban on sale of goods out of Gaza has remained in place. The two truckloads of strawberries that left in Sunday come on the heels of more than six months during which no product of any kind left the Strip. So can we call it an end to the restrictions on export? Doesn’t look like it. Are the restrictions for security reasons? You make the call.

So is there export? Very little and with great difficulty

Produce from Gaza enters Israel, where it is transferred to the Ashdod seaport or Ben Gurion airport for travel on to Europe. Marketing Palestinian produce all the way in Europe is naturally more costly, so much so that it’s simply not profitable. In other words, the export isn’t a product of a functioning economy, more like the outcome of a humanitarian aid project.

Sale of goods to the West Bank or Israel from Gaza has been strictly prohibited since June of 2007, despite the fact that the produce that is exported to Europe enters Israel and undergoes full security screening en route to the port and airport. Before Israel tightened the closure in 2007, some 85% of the goods leaving Gaza were destined for Israel and the West Bank.

“Over the past year”, COGAT’s website states, “Palestinian exporters brought more than 399 tons of strawberries, 10 million carnations, 6.5 tons of cherry tomatoes, and 6 tons of yellow, red, and green bell pepper to European markets”. Sounds great, right? This is the entire quantity of export from Gaza for a whole year. Gaza’s strawberry export potential is some 2,300 tons per year. In 2005, 904 tons of cherry tomatoes were exported from Gaza, 140 times the amount planned for the upcoming season.

Let the goods go

Let’s get back to COGAT’s animated video clip. It says that Israel doesn’t transfer more goods into the Strip because Palestinians aren’t asking for more. This is partially true. Israel doesn’t “transfer” goods to Palestinians. It only allows goods to be bought by Palestinians. Palestinians are not demanding more goods in part because of continued restrictions on the entrance of some raw materials (including construction materials) and in part because purchasing power is weak in the Strip. And purchasing power will remain weak as long as Israel continues to severely restrict export.

In the second quarter of 2011, unemployment in the Gaza Strip stood at 28%. Unemployment is particularly high in the 20 – 24 age bracket, where it reached 42% in the first half of 2011. Without a vibrant and profitable manufacturing sector – industrial and agricultural – it is hard to see how the situation might improve.

What does Israel have to gain by continuing to paralyze the private sector in the Gaza Strip? According to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the answer is clear – nothing. This is what Netanyahu said in February:  “… [S]tability is important at all times, but it’s especially important now and the first set of steps that we’re taking are to continue the policy we’ve advanced to enable economic growth in the Palestinian areas…. it’s contributed to a better life for the Palestinians and I think it’s contributing to peace and security in the long term”.Well spoken indeed, but it is time to put words into action.

Stay tuned, in the next post we share three export stories: dangerous potatoes, burning furniture, and the runaway cherry tomatoes…

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Ever since disengagement in 2005, almost every discussion about Israel’s policy toward the Gaza Strip eventually raises the question: Does Israel still control Gaza? On one side of the argument, there are those who claim that Israel no longer controls Gaza and therefore no longer bears responsibility for what goes on in the Strip. On the other, there are those who believe Israel alone is responsible for the situation in Gaza because it continues to exercise full control over the Strip, even after the removal of its permanent military bases and settlements.

In our opinion, the truth is more complex and it lies somewhere in the middle. Israel continues to exercise control over significant aspects of life in the Gaza Strip, but it has relinquished control – and with it, responsibility – of other aspects. “Scale of Control” offers a legal framework for Israel’s responsibility in the Gaza Strip based on viewing the “end of occupation” as a process that takes place over time.

The first chapter of the position paper presents a brief review of the areas over which Israel continues to maintain control in Gaza. We have decided to publish the paper in a series of short posts on our blog with the hope that they will help facilitate an open and informed public discussion of Israel’s policy toward Gaza.

Areas of control:

Airspace »
Territorial waters »
Land crossings between the Gaza Strip and Israel »
The land crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt »
The population registry »
The tax system »
Physical control of the Gaza Strip »
Control of civilian infrastructure »
Control over the Palestinian Authority and movement between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank »

To read the position paper »
To read the executive summary »

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Israel maintains complete control over Gaza’s airspace and prevents movement of people and commercial goods by air. Gaza’s airport, built in 1998, was closed in October 2000, following the outbreak of the Second Intifada, and bombed by Israel in 2001. Since then, there has been no air traffic into and out of the Strip. The only exception is Israeli aircrafts, manned and unmanned, which fly over the Gaza Strip to carry out observations, collect information and bomb targets including in “targeted killings”, that is to say the assassination from the air of individuals defined by Israel as wanted.

Next Page »

Scale of Control: The project »
Scale of Control: The full position paper »
Scale of Control: The executive summary »
Gaza Reels: Watch the animation »